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Palavras Chave privacidade, informação pessoal, informação de contexto, identidade, sis-
temas distribuídos, análise de dados, anonimidade, sensores, publicidade na
internet, redes sociais
Resumo Quem usa a Internet vê publicidade direccionada com base nos seus hábitos
de navegação, e provavelmente partilha voluntariamente informação pessoal
em redes sociais. A informação disponível nos novos telemóveis é ampla-
mente acedida e utilizada por aplicações móveis, por vezes sem razões claras
para isso. Tal como acontece hoje com os telemóveis, no futuro muitos tipos
de dispositivos elecónicos incluirão sensores que permitirão captar dados do
ambiente, possibilitando o surgimento de ambientes inteligentes. O valor dos
dados captados, se não for óbvio, pode ser derivado através de técnicas de
análise de dados e usado para fornecer serviços personalizados e definir es-
tratégias de negócio, fomentando a economia digital.
No entanto estas práticas de recolha de informação criam novas questões de
privacidade. As práticas naturais de relações inter-pessoais são dificultadas
por novos meios de comunicação que não as contemplam, os problemas de
segurança de informação sucedem-se, os estados vigiam os seus cidadãos,
a economia digital leva á monitorização dos consumidores, e as capacidades
de captação e gravação dos novos dispositivos eletrónicos podem ser usadas
abusivamente pelos próprios utilizadores contra outras pessoas.
Um grande número de áreas científicas focam problemas de privacidade re-
lacionados com tecnologia, no entanto fazem-no de maneiras diferentes e
assumindo pontos de partida distintos. A privacidade de novos cenários é
tipicamente tratada verticalmente, em vez de re-contextualizar trabalho exis-
tente, enquanto os problemas actuais são tratados de uma forma mais focada.
Devido a este fraccionamento no trabalho existente, um exercício muito rele-
vante foi a sua estruturação no âmbito desta tese. O trabalho identificado é
multi-disciplinar - da criptografia à economia, incluindo sistemas distribuídos
e teoria da informação - e trata de problemas de privacidade de naturezas
diferentes.
À medida que o trabalho existente é apresentado, as contribuições feitas por
esta tese são discutidas. Estas enquadram-se em cinco áreas distintas: 1)
identidade em sistemas distribuídos; 2) serviços contextualizados; 3) ges-
tão orientada a eventos de informação de contexto; 4) controlo de fluxo de
informação com latência baixa; 5) bases de dados de recomendação anóni-
mas. Tendo descrito o trabalho existente em privacidade, os desafios actuais
e futuros da privacidade são discutidos considerando também perspectivas
socio-económicas.

Keywords privacy, personal information, context information, identity, distributed sys-
tems, data mining, anonymity, sensors, online advertising, social networks
Abstract Internet users consume online targeted advertising based on information col-
lected about them and voluntarily share personal information in social net-
works. Sensor information and data from smart-phones is collected and used
by applications, sometimes in unclear ways. As it happens today with smart-
phones, in the near future sensors will be shipped in all types of connected
devices, enabling ubiquitous information gathering from the physical environ-
ment, enabling the vision of Ambient Intelligence. The value of gathered data,
if not obvious, can be harnessed through data mining techniques and put to
use by enabling personalized and tailored services as well as business intelli-
gence practices, fueling the digital economy.
However, the ever-expanding information gathering and use undermines the
privacy conceptions of the past. Natural social practices of managing privacy
in daily relations are overridden by socially-awkward communication tools, ser-
vice providers struggle with security issues resulting in harmful data leaks,
governments use mass surveillance techniques, the incentives of the digi-
tal economy threaten consumer privacy, and the advancement of consumer-
grade data-gathering technology enables new inter-personal abuses.
A wide range of fields attempts to address technology-related privacy prob-
lems, however they vary immensely in terms of assumptions, scope and ap-
proach. Privacy of future use cases is typically handled vertically, instead
of building upon previous work that can be re-contextualized, while current
privacy problems are typically addressed per type in a more focused way.
Because significant effort was required to make sense of the relations and
structure of privacy-related work, this thesis attempts to transmit a structured
view of it. It is multi-disciplinary - from cryptography to economics, including
distributed systems and information theory - and addresses privacy issues of
different natures.
As existing work is framed and discussed, the contributions to the state-of-the-
art done in the scope of this thesis are presented. The contributions add to
five distinct areas: 1) identity in distributed systems; 2) future context-aware
services; 3) event-based context management; 4) low-latency information flow
control; 5) high-dimensional dataset anonymity. Finally, having laid out such
landscape of the privacy-preserving work, the current and future privacy chal-
lenges are discussed, considering not only technical but also socio-economic
perspectives.
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Chapter One
Introduction
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1.1 Background
When the Internet started being accessible to the general public there were little in-
centives and tools to share information online. Chat-room users perceived the Internet
a world separated from the “real” one, where they went by awkward screen names and
managed their privacy towards other users by slowly disclosing facts but also through
feeding false information. Today’s real-name online social networks obsoleted the pri-
vacy tactics of the past. While some information and public image management is
possible, the norm has become that people subject themselves to high levels of expo-
sure in mainstream social networks. A comparatively small number of internet users,
that wish to communicate without exposure, seek refuge in anonymous bulletin boards
such as 4chan [Poole 2010]. Even simple web browsing is tracked and used to profile
user preferences for targeted advertising. If in the Internet of 20 years ago nobody
knew you were a dog (Figure 1.1), today your dog food is pictured on Instagram, liked
on Facebook and suggested in an Gmail ad.
The Internet is changing from a separated world to a digital representation of the
off-line world. Online social networks increasingly portray face-to-face social relations
[Madden et al. 2013], and the interface with traditional entities such as banks, gov-
ernments and retailers is increasingly done through the web. As connectivity reaches
everywhere and electronic devices become smaller, the Internet is bound to become part
of the physical world, integrated with it in every way possible [Punie 2003]. The change
in paradigm will lead to another change in the privacy norm, predictably in the same
direction: greater exposure for most people and a minority aggregating in a dark corner
of the Internet where creativity thrives together with illegality and unaccountability.
Figure 1.1: Popular Internet-culture cartoon by Peter Steiner, published in The New
Yorker in 1993
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The work presented in this thesis started out as a more technical-oriented but, as
it progressed, a multi-disciplinary approach became necessary to appropriately address
the problem of privacy in future context-awareness scenarios. The variety of technical
areas and perspectives on privacy harms depicts a fractured landscape that can only be
understood if the socio-economical context is taken into account. In scientific terms,
the contributions made in an area that so intricately influences users only has to gain
from such a multi-disciplinary approach, both in terms of quality and relevance.
1.2 Motivation
1.2.1 Why Privacy Matters
One of the most common arguments against privacy is the nothing to hide argument.
Famously, Google CEO Eric Schmidt stated in an interview to CNBC [Esguerra 2009]:
If you have something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you
shouldn’t be doing it in the first place.
The argument is commonly phrased as a question such as “If you’ve got nothing
to hide, then what do you have to fear?” and can be compelling when framed within
a legality context, suggesting that only people that desire to conceal unlawful activity
should be concerned [Solove 2007, p. 751]. The main fallacy of the argument is the
narrow conception of privacy it considers, equating it to simply “hiding a wrong”
[Schneier 2006], disregarding its other dimensions such as intimacy [Solove 2007, p. 764].
Furthermore, the argument ignores the cases in which privacy is threatened not by a
singular well-defined act, but by a slow series of relatively minor ones [Solove 2007,
p. 769].
In order to better illustrate the value of privacy, let us understand the implications
of its absence. The Panopticon is an architectural design for a prison, originally con-
ceived by Jeremy Bentham in the 18th century. A panopticon consists of an annular
building with a tower at the centre and cells at the periphery. Prisoners are allocated
individually to each cell and are perfectly observable from the tower due to the effect
of back-lighting. Due to its design, with a central observation tower from which all
prisoners can be observed while concealing if they are being watched at a given time,
the surveillance effect becomes extremely more effective. By living under a reality in
which one could be observed at any time, people assimilate the effects of surveillance
into themselves [Solove 2004, p. 30].
The kind of power that privacy deprivation brings is well illustrated by the Panop-
ticon. It forces individuals to live in constant fear of external scrutiny, behaving con-
servatively regarding their own perception of the judgement that observers will make
of their actions. Similarly to the telescreen from George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-
Four, the Panopticon enables social control and suppression of individuality [Solove
2004, p. 32]. Privacy is necessary for self-evaluation and self-definition. It enables
individuals to separate themselves from others and negotiate what to share and to
keep for themselves [Kerr, Steeves, and Lucock 2009, p. 205]. As illustrative examples
of the close relation between privacy and individuality, the jurisprudence developed
in Germany and Switzerland regarding privacy and data protection has at its centre
the concepts of Persönlichkeitsrecht and Persönlichkeitschutz, which translate to the
protection of personality [Bygrave 2010, p. 169].
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Figure 1.2: Postcard of an American panopticon, retrieved from [Wellerstein 2013]:
“Interior view of cell house, new Illinois State Penitentiary at Stateville, near Joliet,
Ill.”
Privacy is also a key requirement for democratic health. Again Germany, a coun-
try commonly cited has having the most privacy-friendly laws in the world, clarified
through its Constitutional Court the key value of data protection with respect to se-
curing the necessary conditions for active citizen participation in public life [Bygrave
2010, p. 172]. If privacy is not protected, political control could be exerted even be-
fore political movements become democratically relevant, by monitoring and disrupting
association and self-determination.
1.2.2 Zeitgeist
Historically, there are a few key definition moments for privacy. The most relevant
so far took place in the 1970s, when most of the privacy concepts currently in use
were developed. After some decades of low attention, privacy is now back in the
spotlight. There are three main motives that can explain why privacy re-emerged as a
popular topic for public discussion: government surveillance, the digital economy and
the current moment of technological development.
The publication of proof that the National Security Agency (NSA) conducts mass
surveillance programs [Greenwald 2013] in 2013 was a key trigger for public discussion
of privacy issues. On the table are a number of topics, such as whether mass surveillance
is necessary for preventing terrorist attacks, and whether safety from terrorism justifies
these practices. There are also fears of consumer backlash in the technological economy
for the role that Internet enterprises and telecommunication operators play in the
exposed intelligence gathering programs. However, the enterprises are not completely
innocent in this.
The digital economy, that enables innovative enterprises to flourish and make avail-
able free Internet services, feeds on personal data. Targeted advertising, which builds
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user profiles based on browsing habits and social network preferences, represents the
key source of revenue for web enterprises. The personal data aggregation performed is
profitable for them, but it may also be for hackers, identity thieves or intelligence agen-
cies. The privacy threats that tracking and profiling practices enable led the European
Union (EU) to start the Data Protection reform in 2012. This reform aims to set
fair game rules for personal data gathering and use practices by enterprises and gov-
ernments. However, the process has been lengthy and problematic and is not likely to
finish before 2016.
Technological development is a key motivator for privacy discussion. It was the
trigger in the 1970s, as well as in 1890, which led to the definition of privacy as the
right to be let alone. The popularization of social networking sites in recent years also
motivated some privacy discussion prompted by questionable information sharing op-
tions and long term privacy risks. The problems caused by excessive personal sharing
can go from mild embarrassment to serious professional and social problems. Cur-
rently, the latest technology products being questioned on the subject of privacy are
the ones related to wearable computing and augmented reality, namely Project Glass
from Google. As consumer-grade devices increasingly enable people to transparently
gather, record and access more information, artificially augmenting human perception,
the existing expectations of privacy will be challenged.
Given the current issues and ongoing public discussions, it’s justifiable to consider
that we currently are at another historic definition point for privacy.
1.3 Hypothesis and Objectives
When the goal is security, the problem is typically simplified through an attack model
where the objective is to simply thwart the attack under a given set of assumptions.
When privacy is addressed, it’s difficult to come up with such a simplification that
allows us to have only one objective without abstracting away essential parts of the
problem. Embedded in the very concept of privacy, there is a notion of trade-off
and choice. From an individual point of view, privacy involves choices between trans-
parency and reserve, publicity and discreteness, that are highly context dependent
and sometimes even apparently inconsistent [Acquisti 2009]. From a societal point
of view, privacy choices are equally complex. As technological development will lead
to increased communication and accessibility, more technology generally equates to
less privacy. It should be of concern to technologists that their work benefits society
while minimizing privacy threats, optimizing the overall social outcome of scientific
and technological development.
Surveillance techniques are argued to provide improved protection from terrorism
and crime, but they also raise democratic concerns of different natures. The most
common concerns involve Orwellian Big Brother scenarios, where governments exerts
totalitarian control over the population suppressing individualism and political dissi-
dence. Another recent concern, which also threatens essential freedoms and the rule of
law, is better illustrated by Franz Kafka [Solove 2004]. In Der Prozess Kafka describes
an excessively bureaucratic faceless organization that holds an unbounded amount of
data about individuals. This organization takes decisions about individuals without
adequate accountability or justification, disregarding individual’s right to a fair trial.
Such problems can easily arise from the adoption of automated investigation and pop-
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ulation profiling mechanisms [Solove 2004, p. 180]. While in an Orwellian scenario
there is an intention to control the population, in a Kafkian scenario the disrespect for
essential freedoms is a by-product of an over-powered bureaucratic poorly accountable
state.
Another privacy dilemma has to do with trade-offs between human comfort pro-
vided by services which live off the digital economy and the threats that arise from
excessive aggregation of information by enterprises that provide such services. Innova-
tive Internet services and mobile applications, usually available free of charge to users,
are very appealing from both individual and societal perspectives. However, the hid-
den cost is, in best case scenario, generalized consumer profiling. More obscure cases
involve detailed individual profiling for business intelligence and direct marketing and
questionable data transactions that can enable criminal activities such as identity theft
[Krebs 2013].
At the moment, science and technology are not well equipped to deal with these
dilemmas. Privacy has been addressed in a fragmented way, separately addressing
techniques and future use cases. The work developed from each viewpoint has seldomly
established links to work developed in other disciplines. A comprehensive structuring
review of the key efforts in each of the numerous privacy-relevant areas needs to be done
before privacy is tackled as a core objective, instead of being a supposed consequence
of security.
Aiming to address these topics, the hypothesis of this thesis states: unidentified
synergies between different privacy-related bodies of knowledge exist that are key for
improving privacy in face of near-future technologies. Given the multi-dimensional
nature of privacy, multi-disciplinary work is necessary in order to appropriately ad-
dress privacy trade-offs, and to maximize the social outcome of technological progress.
Consequently, the work presented in this thesis considers privacy from a variety of
perspectives, mostly technical but also social, economical and political. The concept
of privacy is explored drawing mostly from the legal field, and the diverse existing
technical privacy-related bodies of knowledge are analysed and inter-related. The ar-
eas that focus on communication - for control of data flows and identifiers - and data
analysis - enabling evaluation of the potential privacy harm - are given special atten-
tion. Considering the vision of Ambient Intelligence (AmI) for the near future, this
thesis also addresses the privacy challenges derived from the widespread implementa-
tion of context-awareness. The conclusion identifies and presents work in a number of
promising research tracks that effectively address privacy issues applicable to a variety
of future use cases, and formulates recommendations for resolving the current privacy
dilemmas.
1.4 Contributions
The contributions to the state-of-the-art done in the course of the work presented in
this thesis fit essentially in two fields: Context Management and Privacy-Preserving
Data Mining (PPDM) . However there has also been significant analysis and imple-
mentation effort towards building an identity layer for use in the European Project
Societies, described in Section 3.3.5, which resulted in a prototype [SOCIETIES
2011], a communication, derived research and a conferece publication [Gonçalves and
Gomes 2014].
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Contributions in Context Management were done in different steps. The earliest
contributions focus on two possible future applications, as well as the service-oriented
implementations of these applications. One of them performs content selection based on
context information instead of using traditional recommender techniques [Gonçalves,
Delahaye, and Lamorte 2010]. The other consists of a triggering system based on event
occurrence which can be used in different use cases with different business models
[Simões et al. 2009]. These contributions were done based on an early contribution
in area of context management [Zafar et al. 2009]. The next step was a contribution
towards event-based context management, enabling real-time adaptation of services
[Gomes et al. 2010] and a fine-grained access control mechanism that respects the
real-time constraints of such system [Gonçalves, Gomes, and Aguiar 2012].
In the field of PPDM, the contribution was a dataset sanitization technique, inspired
in communications-related privacy work such as pseudonyms and Identity Management
(IdM) . The technique works in high-dimensional datasets where most techniques fail,
while preserving dataset utility for recommendation, the most common data mining
objective for such datasets. This opens the possibility of further work combining the
IdM and PPDM fields, establishing the missing link between data management in the
IdM perspective and in the data analysis and aggregation perspective. The final goal
of this work track would be making IdM resistant to data-level re-identification while
maintaining partial identity profiling for recommendation and other benefits of data
mining.
The list of publications and communications relevant to the work presented in this
Thesis is presented in Table 1.1. Central to it, but only superficially communicated in
a national event, is the structured analysis of privacy problems and existing solutions
done in this thesis, and the multi-disciplinary approach that enables better understand-
ing and framing of privacy issues and technologies. Finally, the socio-economical and
technical review and discussion of the current privacy landscape is exclusively pub-
lished in this thesis, including an analysis of privacy topics addressed in mass media,
drawn from the tags of thousands of privacy-related news published over the last 30
years. The discussion addresses current social dilemmas and economic incentives, as
well as the technological and legal responses to privacy issues, synthesizing the moment
and giving a future outlook on how these issues can evolve.
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Table 1.1: List of Publications and Communications
Year Type Title Target
2009 Conference
Context Management Archi-
tecture for Future Internet
Services
ICT Mobile and Wireless
Communications Summit
2009
2009 Conference
CATS: Context-Aware Trig-
gering System for Next Gen-
eration Networks
IFIP Advances in Information
and Communication Technol-
ogy: Wireless and Mobile
Networking
2010 Conference
Professional and User-
Generated Content Rating
using Context Information
Networked & Electronic Me-
dia Summit 2010
2010 Conference XMPP based Context Man-agement Architecture
2010 IEEE Globecom
Workshops
2011 Communication Societies Positions on Fed-erated Social Networking
W3C Federated Social Web
Summit Europe 2011
2012 Conference
Low-latency privacy-enabled
Context Distribution Archi-
tecture
2012 IEEE International Con-
ference on Communications
(ICC)
2013 Communication Privacy Untangled
17o Seminário da Rede
Temática de Comunicações
Móveis (RTCM)
2014 Conference User-Hosted SOA Infrastruc-
ture over XMPP
2014 IEEE Symposium on
Computers and Communica-
tions
1.5 Structure
This thesis has at its core three technical chapters, separated according to the fields
they cover. These are surrounded by multi-disciplinary chapters: the ones preceding
define and frame the work, and the ones finalizing to analyse impact and outlook the
future.
Chapter 2 sets the ground for working on privacy: its definition, importance, history
and relation with ICT, as well as current foreseeable future threats. A survey of privacy
technologies is presented in Section 2.3, structuring them according to their academic
field or practical applications.
Each of the three technical chapters focuses a different set of fields, aggregated by
their general area. Chapter 3 addresses privacy from a communications and distributed
systems point of view, addressing network and transport, identity and access control
issues. Then, Chapter 4 focuses on future context-awareness scenarios which build upon
communication technologies to provide service and environment adaptation. Finally,
Chapter 5 addresses privacy from a data point of view, focusing on re-identification
and other privacy issues created by current data aggregation and mining practices.
In the two final chapters, having proposed a number of contributions to enhance
privacy, a multi-disciplinary analysis is presented where these contributions are framed
and identifying additional key research paths and public discussion topics. In Chapter
6 ICT-motivated privacy issues are revisited from four different perspectives: social,
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economic, technological and legal. Finally, in Chapter 7, the thesis is concluded by
synthesizing results, showing the way for future privacy research and laying out a set
of recommendations towards a socially-profitable technologic evolution, with regards
to privacy.
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Chapter Two
Privacy in ICT
The landscape of privacy issues related to technology is described, as well as areas of
scientific work aiming to address them. This exercise aims to structure privacy-related
work, which is often multi-disciplinary and developed under very different assumptions,
and also frame the work presented in this thesis.
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2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Chapter Outline
In technology, privacy is studied in distinct fields under different assumptions to tackle
different problems. A number of bodies of knowledge target overlapping parts of pri-
vacy, which are bound to be relevant for current and future technology-caused privacy
issues. However a holistic and consistent view of privacy-related knowledge requires a
well-defined overarching conceptual framework for privacy, which is possible to gather
mostly from non-technological disciplines. For that reason, this Chapter starts by con-
textualizing privacy, and moves on to provide an overview of existing privacy definitions
drawing from work in several fields in Section 2.2. Then, in Section 2.3 an overview
of the plentiful and disparate technology and privacy relevant bodies of knowledge is
given.
2.1.2 A Human Right
First and foremost, privacy is a human right according to two post World War II
international agreements, which are among the most relevant agreements ever signed:
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human
Rights.
Article 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.
European Convention on Human Rights
However these fundamental and consensual guarantees are formalized in different
ways by different countries. As referred in Section 1.2, German privacy protection
legislation emphasises its societal perspective, privacy as a requirement for active citi-
zenship and free democratic participation [Bygrave 2010, p. 172]. This contrasts with
the United States (US) privacy culture, in which privacy tends to be described as an
individual right that can be in tension or against the needs of society [Bygrave 2010,
p. 171]. The fact that the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, which protects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, is often considered a key piece of US pri-
vacy legislation, illustrates this cultural difference quite well. The Fourth also applies
to electronic eavesdropping since the US Supreme Court decision Katz vs United States
in 1967 [Solove 2004, p. 198], but it only safeguards against privacy abuses committed
by law enforcement and the government.
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Despite these differences, legislation and regulation work worldwide have made
most relevant contributions to the definition and safeguard of privacy. As introduced
in Section 1.2, this has frequently been motivated by technological advances and media
attention. In the past few years years there were plenty of news of surveillance programs
of intelligence and security agencies, hacked consumer information databases and social
networking sites privacy issues and mishaps. Looking beyond the current moment,
technology and privacy also have a significant common history. Email privacy has been
addressed since the 1980’s [Chaum 1981], legal academic work in technology-related
privacy issues has been around since mainframes began being used for storing personal
information in the 1970’s [Westin and Baker 1972], and privacy concerns stemming from
technological progress date back to the popularization of photographic snap cameras
more than 100 years ago [Warren and Brandeis 1890]. With technological development
aiming to realize ever more connected visions, such as AmI, Internet of Things (IoT)
and Machine-to-Machine Communications (M2M) , ICT-motivated privacy issues are
bound to become even more relevant in the near future.
2.1.3 Historical Perspective
At the end of the nineteenth century, Warren and Brandeis [1890] formulated the
right to privacy as the right to be let alone. What prompted them to do this was
the introduction of the snap camera by Kodak, a hand-held camera that could take
photographs at the click of a button, commercialized with the adequate advertising
slogan You Press the Button, We Do the Rest. In The Right to Privacy, Warren and
Brandeis noted that, with this new technology, pictures could be taken without the
photographed individual being required to stand still and pose, and argued for new
legislation to prevent pictures to be taken without permission:
Now that modern devices afford abundant opportunities for the perpetra-
tion of such wrongs without any participation by the injured party, the
protection granted by the law must be placed upon a broader foundation.
The 1970s were a very relevant decade for the protection of privacy, with respect
to the collection and use of personal data enabled by technological advancement. In
1972, Databanks in a Free Society [Westin and Baker 1972] highlighted how the use of
mainframe computers of the time for the purposes of record keeping enabled privacy
harms. Although the book is largely outdated, it argued that a citizen must have the
right to access data records that refer to them. The following year a US government
report [W. H. Ware 1973] argued for the creation of a set of Fair Information Practices
(FIPs) , required to “establish standards of record-keeping practice appropriate to
the computer age”. Subsequent work developed these FIPs which where applied to
federal agencies in the US with the Privacy Act of 1974. Around that time European
countries began to enact privacy laws applicable not only to the public but also to the
private sector, namely Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France [Gellman
2013]. At the end of the decade the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) presented the Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development 1980], which was the first international regulation effort on the matter.
Although the FIPs were drafted in the ’70s it was not until 2000 that the Federal Trade
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Commission (FTC) published them as a regulatory framework for private entities in
the US [Federal Trade Commission 2000; Gellman 2013].
On the technological perspective of privacy protection, the ’70s also were relevant,
especially regarding the development of encryption techniques. Public-key cryptogra-
phy was introduced in 1978 with the RSA paper [Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman 1978].
In 1981 Chaum proposed a mechanism to anonymously send messages over an unsecure
network without the need of a central trusted authority, using public-key cryptography
[1981]. The paper coined the use of the term mixes to designate email anonymizer
servers, or anonymous remailers. The posterior development and implementation of
these remailers occured related with the cypherpunk movement, a tech-savvy activist
group advocating for the widespread use of cryptography and other Privacy-Enhancing
Technologies (PETs) . A decade later, the Cypherpunk Manifesto [Hughes 1993] ar-
gued that privacy in an open society requires anonymous electronic transaction systems,
like physical money, and that such privacy requirements must be achieved by technical
means, such as cryptography. Like other forms of activism, cypherpunks opposed the
status quo, and consequently did not trust governments nor corporations with matters
of privacy protection. Despite these actions, decades later, only a few of the acclaimed
PETs are widely deployed. As an example, while the use of communication encryp-
tion became widespread with SSL and TLS, technologies that enable communication
anonymity, such as mixes, have met significant implementation resistance [Goldberg
2007].
Ironically, what became widespread instead was the use of the Internet in a cen-
tralized way, where web service providers hold large ammounts of users’ data in their
databases. The accumulation of personal data by online service provides provided fer-
tile ground for privacy issues to flourish. In 2006 AOL released search query data of
657 thousand anonymous users which was intended to be used for academic purposes.
However, as a result, many users were quickly re-identified due to the specificity of the
data, which included very sensitive queries such as “fear that spouse contemplating
cheating” and “how to kill oneself by natural gas” [Barbaro and Jr 2006]. Another
problematic data release was the Netflix Prize, a data mining competition that took
place from 2007 to 2009. Netflix provided an anonymized dataset which the public
would use to create better data mining algorithms for movie recommendations. The
initiative was well received by the data mining community, but as Netflix announced a
follow up competition in 2010, the FTC advised against it [Federal Trade Commission
2010], weary of potential privacy infringements after researchers managed do re-identify
users of the Netflix dataset [Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008].
Careless data releases aren’t only one type of issue raised by the accumulation of
personal data. As the user-bases of online and telecommunication services grow, the
value of their databases does as well, as do the security risks associated with main-
taining them. In 2011, as a result of an hacking attack, Sony announced that personal
information about Playstation online account holders, including names, addresses, e-
mail addresses and possibly credit card numbers, could have been compromised [Bilton
and Stelter 2011]. Furthermore, the value of personal data is not only appreciated by
outlaws but also by governmental agencies. In April 2013 the US Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court ordered Verizon, a major telecommunications company in
the country, to daily provide the NSA with information regarding all phone calls that
the operator serves, namely the numbers of both parties, location data, call duration,
14
unique identifiers, and the time and duration [Greenwald 2013]. Other major american
tech companies, namely Google, Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft and Apple, also have to
provide user data on request to the NSA [Miller 2013b]. These two reports are part of
the well-known “Snowden leaks”.
2.1.4 Privacy Legislation and the Digital Economy
The accumulation of personal data by companies did not occur accidentally: the value
of personal information for economy has been recognized in the US for decades. In
the 1970s the application of the FIPs was restricted to federal government agencies.
For the private sector the US enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act, a set of rules
coherent with the FIPs, to regulate the practices of consumer reporting agencies that
collect and compile consumer information into reports for use by credit grantors, insur-
ance companies, employers, landlords, and other entities in making eligibility decisions
affecting consumers [Federal Trade Commission 2011]. Nowadays the so-called dig-
ital economy orbits around personal information. Online targeted advertising is an
established billion dollar market which provides most of the revenue for online service
providers [Schonfeld 2009]. User’s browsing actions are tracked, typically by the use
of cookies, and aggregated to build a profile that can be used for targeting ads. The
microblogging giant Twitter had an advertising revenue of 269 million US dollars, but
also had a data licensing revenue in 2012 of 47 million [Twitter Inc. 2013, p. 71]). The
second item in their revenue sheet, data licensing, refers to another way of monetizing
personal data, in this case tweets: selling or licensing the data to third parties. Com-
panies that primarily focus the personal data selling business are usually denoted data
brokers. One such company, Acxiom, collects, analyses and sells consumer information
for use in business intelligence, having reported sales of 1130 million dollars in 2011
[Singer 2012]. Another such company, Experian, allegedly sold consumer data to a
rogue site, superget.info, known for supplying data to identity thieves [Krebs 2013].
The privacy-related regulation of this market in the US is currently done by the FTC,
which global mission is to act upon unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce. However, the FTC enforcement of the FIPs has been rather weak and reac-
tive [Solove 2004, p. 72], and even some of the FIP-coherent regulation is considered not
to adequately protect consumer interests, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act which
sets low hurdles for credit bureaus and insulates them from liability for defamation,
invasion of privacy, and negligence [Harper 2005].
In Europe the scenario is somewhat different as, historically, privacy laws make lit-
tle distinction whether personal information is being collected and used by a public or
private entity [Gellman 2013, p. 5]. At the supra-national level, privacy started being
addressed in 1995, by the EU, with Directive 95/46/EC, which attempts to enable the
flows of personal information between EU member states as long as some FIPs are
respected, namely legitimacy and transparency of data collection, confidentiality and
security of data processing and liability of stored data. Two years later, the telecommu-
nications sector privacy practices were targeted by EU Directive 97/66/EC, which de-
fines mandatory security principles and limits to data retention. Directive 2002/58/EC
generalizes the previous one from telecommunications to all electronic communications,
and specifies security and confidentiality requirements applicable to communications
and location data, as well as limits to spam. Subsequent directives 2006/24/EC and
2009/136/EC amend it with regards to data retention and web browser cookies consent
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requirements, respectively. Motivated by the the lack of European competition to the
American digital economy, by legal discrepancies between EU member country privacy
laws, and by citizen privacy concerns with privacy practices of Internet companies, the
European Commission initiated in 2013 the EU Data Protection reform. The initiative
included a EU Regulation for the general provisions applicable to public and private
sectors and a Directive targeting criminal investigation authorities.
2.2 Defining Privacy
2.2.1 Different Views of Privacy
The different understanding that American and European legislators have regarding
privacy has been introduced in Section 2.1.2. In the US privacy is primarily seen as
liberty and protection from an abusive state, in the spirit of the Fourth Amendment.
In turn, the private sector is subject to a set of regulatory practices and tort law. In
Europe privacy is seen as a right which needs protection against any entity, public
or private. However this is only one of the many different dimensions of possible
interpretations regarding the term privacy. Most of privacy issues described in the
historical outline of the previous section have strikingly different natures. The only
thing they have in common is the fact that there is ICT and personal information
involved, and that they are communicated using the same over-arching concept. As
Solove puts it it in his work A Taxonomy of Privacy [2006, p. 485]:
The term “privacy” is an umbrella term, referring to a wide and disparate
group of related things.
Different scholar communities see very different perspectives of privacy. In an exten-
sive interdisciplinary survey for use in Management Information Systems (MIS) Smith
et al. categorized four distinct approaches to the study of privacy [Smith, Dinev, and
H. Xu 2011]:
• Privacy as a Right, absolute, essential for a free and democratic society - an
approach taken mostly by law scholars;
• Privacy as a commodity, subject to cost-benefit analysis and personal choice -
mostly seen in economy and MIS;
• Privacy as a state, both physical and psychological, which enables reflexive pro-
cesses - related to sociology and philosophy;
• Privacy as control, of information and exposure - observed in several areas, espe-
cially MIS and US law.
In this Section the definition of privacy is explored, drawing mostly from the legal
field, where this matter was most addressed.
2.2.2 From Social Functions to Control of Information
Alan Westin passed away recently, at the age of 83, as one of the most cited authors for
framing privacy-related work. In his 1967 book, Privacy and Freedom [1968], Westin
characterizes privacy as a confusing and vague concept but puts forward a privacy
definition widely used in modern work on privacy issues, in various fields of study.
Westin formulates:
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Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others.
However, another law scholar with significant contributions related to privacy,
Daniel Solove, enumerates various authors focused on law and social sciences, many
of them posterior to Westin, which note the complexity of the subject [2002, p. 1088]
[2006, p. 479]. Furthermore he argues that proposed privacy definitions as a single
overarching concept have consistently fallen short. Westin’s definition is considered to
be an information control formulation of privacy, which is only a subset of the privacy
concept [Solove 2002, p. 1110] [Kerr, Steeves, and Lucock 2009, p. 192]. Despite this
narrower result, an analysis on the psychosocial functions of privacy was included in
Privacy and Freedom [Westin 1968]. Westin argues that privacy provides individuals
and groups in society with a preservation of autonomy, a release from role-playing,
a time for self-evaluation and for protected communication. He describes four basic
states of individual privacy:
• solitude: the individual is separated from the group and freed from the observa-
tion of other persons;
• intimacy: the individual is a member of a small unit that claims and is allowed
to exercise corporate seclusion so that it may achieve a close, relaxed, and frank
relationship;
• anonymity: the individual is in public places or performing public acts but still
seeks, and finds, freedom from identification and surveillance;
• reserve: the creation of a psychological barrier against unwanted intrusion.
Solitude is a state that represents isolation, allowing the individual release from social
pressure and norms. This isolation does not limit itself to physical isolation and even
includes psychological intrusion such as the strictness of one’s conscience and the belief
in an omniscient entity such as God. Solitude is a state for introspection, providing
conditions for one to form his own identity and individuality. Intimacy is a state that
responds to the need to be off stage. Still shielded from society’s direct influence, it
provides a trusted environment for interaction and sharing. The typical intimacy unit
example is the Family, but its relevance has diminished in modern ages, being increas-
ingly replaced with friendship relations. Other intimacy units are constructed and
regulated by society, such as Attorney-client privilege and Physician-patient privilege.
Anonymity and reserve, unlike solitude and intimacy, are privacy states observed in
public environments. Anonymity is a state characterized by public action with account-
ability limited to its specific context. The individual does not expect to be personally
identified and held to rules of behaviour other than those of the situational landscape
he has merged into. The state of Anonymity only became possible with urbanization:
while in small villages all individuals are known to each other, and if a stranger arrives
he is identified as such, in the streets of a big city we are allowed to act within society’s
boundaries as though we are invisible. Finally, reserve is the state that comes into play
in common interpersonal relations. It can be observed as the reciprocal reserve and
indifference in social interactions in order to protect the personality.
Westin acknowledges the social nature of privacy in his work, however critique
points out that this social dimension is undermined as the conceptualization work
progresses [Kerr, Steeves, and Lucock 2009, p. 199]. He subsequently frames privacy
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under the assumption the individual is in conflict with the collective (i.e. society)
regarding some disclosure issue. He formulates this conflict in terms of disclosure - the
individual’s choice of seeking out social interaction - and surveillance - social control
that can be resisted by the individual. The focus on protecting the flow of information
isolates the individual in the goal of privacy [Kerr, Steeves, and Lucock 2009, p. 200].
Under this formulation, absolute privacy comes from absolute seclusion.
2.2.3 A Practical Approach
In Conceptualizing Privacy, Solove [2002] questions the methodology to define privacy
itself. He begins by showing unsatisfaction towards existing privacy formulations, which
focus on finding a general and consistent formulation, and recognizes the multitude of
meanings the term privacy can transmit:
Currently, privacy is a sweeping concept, encompassing (among other
things) freedom of thought, control over one’s body, solitude in one’s home,
control over information about oneself, freedom from surveillance, protec-
tion of one’s reputation, and protection from searches and interrogation.
Subsequently he argues that one could take a bottom up, more pragmatic, approach
that would lead to fruitful understandings of privacy within specific contexts, rather
than further add to the academic discourse on the common denominator of privacy.
In his follow-up work, Solove [2006] proposes a taxonomy for use in privacy-related
legislation so that it moves away from the vague term “privacy”. As one would expect
from his previous work, the approach taken focuses on the activities that may invade
privacy and by how these are currently treated by the United States justice system.
The result is a conceptualization of potentially harmful activities, categorized in four
groups based on how they influence the data subject - the individual whose life is most
directly affected by these activities.
1. Information Collection - focuses on disruption caused by data gathering activities,
unrelated to the actual information collected:
a) Surveillance - data gathering by observation possibly leading to self-
censorship and inhibition, adversely impacting freedom, creativity, and self-
development;
b) Interrogation - data gathering by inquiry which typically involves coercive-
ness, frequently in disguise, creating discomfort even if information is barely
disclosed.
2. Information Processing - focuses on issues that arise when already-collected data
is handled:
a) Aggregation - gathering together information about a person such that it be-
comes possible to compose a comprehensive portrait of that individual, even
if he believes that in each information disclosure he is revealing relatively
little;
b) Identification - the association of data with a particular human being, which
can increase biases and prejudices in data interpretation, as well as fear of
reprisal in case the data is of political nature;
c) Insecurity - issues in the way that information is handled or protected, that
can lead to identity theft and subsequently to credibility and bureaucratic
problems;
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d) Secondary Use - use of data for purposes unrelated to the purposes for which
the data was initially collected, without the data subject’s consent;
e) Exclusion - failure to provide individuals with notice that a data record
exists about him and to allow him to ensure that the information in said
record is accurate.
3. Information Dissemination - focuses on harms caused by the revelation of personal
data or the threat of spreading information:
a) Breach of Confidentiality - release of privileged information by a trusted
party, betraying the confidence of the data subject;
b) Disclosure - release of true information that is potentially harmful to the
data subject, namely in terms of his reputation and security;
c) Exposure - exposing physical and emotional attributes about a person which
may cause embarrassment and humiliation and that the normal social prac-
tice involves concealing (e.g. nudity and bodily functions);
d) Increased Accessibility - make already publicly available information signif-
icantly more accessible such that it enhances its potential for harm;
e) Blackmail - coercive control exercised over an individual by threatening to
expose or disclose her personal secrets;
f) Appropriation - use of the data subject’s identity for the purposes and
goals of a third party, colliding with the way the data subject desires to
present herself to society, potentially interfering with her freedom and self-
development;
g) Distortion - inaccurate portrayal of a person to the public using false or
misleading information, with the intention of manipulating the way a person
is perceived and judged by others.
4. Invasion - focuses on privacy harms that don’t always involve information
a) Intrusion - Similar to Warren and Brandeis’ right to be let alone: invasions
or incursions into one’s life that disturbs her daily activities and routines,
destroys her solitude, and often makes her feel uncomfortable and uneasy;
b) Decisional Interference - governmental interference with people’s decisions
regarding certain, private, matters of their lives.
Solove’s taxonomy captures not only the information control perspective, but also
emotional and social harms that relate to privacy, establishing links and relations
between existing judicial elements such as laws, rulings and constitution articles, which
address privacy issues. Nature of the activity, namely the goal of the data holder while
performing it and its impact on the data subject, is the focus of the analysis. However,
in the context of ICT, some of these activities are not especially relevant, while others
are incredibly complex. As an example, while Appropriation and Distortion can be
applified by the use of ICT, both from the exposure of the data subject and reach of
data holder perspectives, they are essentially social activities. On the other hand, the
great majority of Surveillance activities depend on the existence of ICT infrastructure,
especially those which are more scalable and economically viable. In Section 6.5.2 the
correspondence between privacy harming activities and technological issues is explored.
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Figure 2.1: Privacy taxonomy figure from the original paper [Solove 2006]
2.2.4 Importance of Social Context
In the past, access to a personal or intimate information was mainly restricted by
physical barriers (e.g. walls and closed doors). Traditional privacy expectations include
temporal and spatial borders. These borders separate information from various periods
or aspects of one’s life. Also, a common assumption from oral communication practices
is that interaction and communication are ephemeral, not to be captured or preserved
through hidden video or audio [Marx 2001]. If such preservation is done, a conversation
had in a specific situation can easily be re-interpretable in originally unintended ways,
possibly decades after.
With the emergence of online commnication, information borders became signifi-
cantly permeable. Social contexts are no longer bound by space and time as before.
Behaviour cues given by online communication environments are often contradicting.
The users struggle to transfer their naturally acquired social privacy practices to the
online environments, often resulting in social awkwardness and embarrassment caused
by disclosing information in a wrong context or using an unappropriate medium [Boyd
2002]. Social networking sites, more than their bulletin board predecessors, enable
communication to a very wide audience. The bigger the audience and the types of
information that can be shared, the more complex it becomes to manage privacy. Con-
sider this well-known example: in 2010 Facebook had a privacy configuration of 50
settings and more than 170 options [Bilton 2010].
This complexity may be making the social networking giant a victim of it’s own
success. Three years after the grandmother effect on Facebook was announced [Wiggs
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2010], the Pew Research Center reports that increasing adult presence in the social
network has waned teenager enthusiasm for using it. Other social networking sites, such
as Twitter and Instagram, are used because there teenagers are free social expectations
and constraints of Facebook, and can better express themselves[Madden et al. 2013].
Instead of managing complex privacy settings, many teenagers simply choose another
(digital) space for their interactions.
Despite these concerns, most teenagers keep an active Facebook account in order
to not miss out, as it represents a key communication method. Also, they report high
levels of confidence in managing privacy settings, as well as positive experiences online
[Madden et al. 2013]. Managing privacy in new communication methods may be just
a matter of cultural adaptation for the users and of improving user experience and
managing the community for service providers.
Another key privacy issue with online sharing is its permanent nature. Even if
information is shared appropriately to the right audience, it can stay accessible for
many years and later be misused or have its meaning distorted. These long term risks
are especially hard to evaluate, as normal social practice does not offer such dilemmas
- oral conversation and even writings in paper are eventually lost in time. As digital
storage cost continuously declines, the risk for excessively long storage of information
increases. The changes one individual goes through a lifetime alone are enough for the
same information to be interpreted in different ways.
Social contexts online are liquid rather than solid, boundaries are inadvertently
crossed as wide audiences come together and the shared information remains indefi-
nitely available. Technological advances enabling more data to be collected and shared
only intensify this problem, making it more urgent and relevant. A social perspective
should be present in all new information sharing technological developments, otherwise
there is the risk of creating more problems than the ones solved.
2.2.5 Privacy in Future Scenarios
In the vision of AmI, connected devices are embedded in everyday objects, gathering
data from their surroundings and enabling interaction with the environment [Punie
2003]. These devices are spread out in numerous human environments and do not
require interaction to continuously provide gathered data to services. A related term
that gained significant attention more recently is M2M: the technologies and business
models associated with supporting communication between a plethora of connected
devices as the one AmI envisions. A third buzzword, IoT, is many times used to
describe a vision of connected objects very similar to AmI, but also used to describe
the vision of ubiquitous identification and electronic representation of objects, or things.
This second perspective is related to the use of Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID)
to identify objects [L. Atzori, Iera, and Morabito 2010].
Regardless of the specific vision that is considered, the quantity of collected data
by ICT systems is bound to increase dramatically in the near future, both in terms of
space-time coverage and variety of data types. One of the M2M flagship scenarios is
Smart Metering, which relies in collecting detailed electricity consumption data from
customers in order to improve energy efficiency. However, this new type of collected
information raises privacy concerns among expert groups. An European Commission
working party states [Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2013, p. 5]:
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From the detailed energy consumption data collected via the smart meters,
a lot of information can be inferred regarding the consumers’ use of specific
goods or devices, daily routines, living arrangements, activities, lifestyles
and behaviour.
These future systems have the potential for abuse by individuals, corporations and
nation states, enabling surveillance and monitoring in many ways. For this reason,
privacy is a key issue that has to be addressed if such systems are to produce a positive
social outcome. The difficulty of this issue lies in balancing inevitable trade-off between
privacy risks and service functionality [Punie 2003, p. 26].
Current privacy practices of companies in the online business only enhance privacy
concerns for future scenarios. Because of the value of personal information introduced
in Section 2.1.4, users’ web activity is often tracked using cookies and by monitoring
browser signatures [Eckersley 2010] and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Also, search
terms are usually passed from search engines to the sites the user browses to from
the search page. Finally, web activity in a site, dubbed clickstreams, as well as other
personal information, is commonly used a revenue source for these free services. To
top it off, users are usually unaware of these practices [McDonald and Cranor 2010]
[Madden et al. 2013, p. 10], leaving plenty of margin for abuse. Due to the current
economic incentives it is unlikely that companies will have the initiative to make their
practices more privacy friendly.
Individuals are also prone to commit privacy abuses with the advancement of tech-
nology. In fact, Warren and Brandeis’ privacy legal work from 120 years ago, as
introduced in Section 2.1.3, was prompted by new technology that would then enable
individuals to take pictures of others without needing their permission. The popular-
ization of smart-phone cameras over the last decade similarly prompted some shutter
sound law initiatives, mandating that smart-phones play the sound of a photographic
camera shutter whenever a picture is taken. Recently, similar problems were discussed,
prompted by the presentation of Google Glass [Miller 2013a; Streitfeld 2013].
The surveillance practices of US security and intelligence agencies exposed by in-
formation leaked by Edward Snowden [Greenwald 2013; Miller 2013b] also do not bode
well for privacy in future scenarios. George Orwell’s book Nineteen Eighty-Four is
commonly cited [Punie 2003, p. 27] for illustrating the potential for government abuse
through surveillance. In Nineteen Eighty-Four the Big Brother is an all-knowing, con-
stantly vigilant government that regulates every aspect of one’s existence. Control is
exerted by targeting the private life, employing various techniques of power to eliminate
any sense of privacy, namely the telescreen. However, in Digital Person, Solove pro-
poses a different metaphor which appears to be more adequate to the current threats
[Solove 2004, p. 36]. Franz Kafka’s Der Prozess portrays an indifferent bureaucracy,
where individuals don’t know what is happening and have no ability to exercise mean-
ingful control over the decisions taken about them. Transposing to present day, a large
bureaucratic organization holding significant amounts of information about individu-
als and applying data mining techniques to evaluate, let’s say, the terrorism risks an
individual poses, may decide, without objective reason, that a certain individual is a
threat.
As technology advances different actors get different potential for privacy abuse,
which has to be appropriately mitigated if these new technologies are to be beneficial
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to society. Together with the advancements that enable mass collection, storage, pro-
cessing and use of information, privacy mechanisms and practices have to be pushed
forward.
2.3 Privacy-related Bodies of Knowledge
2.3.1 Structuring Privacy Work
As happens with the privacy concept in society, the privacy-related technical literature
is quite fractured. For example, the term PETs is used to describe mostly security tech-
nologies, related to encryption. Data-centric privacy stems from a different area than
the so-called PETs, and developed on its own, with seldom intersection points. Fur-
thermore, privacy-relevant research topics related to new scenarios, such as Vehicular
Ad-hoc Network (VANET) and the IoT, are typically addressed vertically, focusing on
the scenario and rarely generalizing the use of studied privacy mechanisms. As the pri-
vacy issues involve more interaction with the user and less a theoretical attack model,
academia provides less answers. Notable exceptions come mostly from the behavioural
economics study of privacy.
In this section these multiple technical understandings of privacy are structured in
one landscape, making it possible to more adequately understand the relations between
different work, the impact it has in society, and where the work described in this thesis
adds to the state-of-the-art. We make use of the work of Pfitzmann and Hansen which
developed a consistent terminology for talking about privacy [Pfitzmann and Hansen
2010]. Although it evades a definition of privacy, it defines a number of concepts which
can be used to address it. The most relevant terms are presented in advance so that
they can be used to frame existing privacy work in this section, and throughout this
thesis. Given an adversary that observed some events and gathered information, let us
consider the following outcomes:
• anonymity - the adversary cannot distinguish the subject from other subjects
within a set of all possible subjects, the anonymity set;
• unlinkability - the adversary cannot sufficiently distinguish whether two or more
Items-Of-Interest (IOI) - e.g., subjects, messages, actions, . . . - are related or not.
The opposite terms are also used: linkability, naturally the opposite of unlinkability,
and (re-)identification, opposite of anonymity.
2.3.2 Cryptography
The obvious, most well known, privacy-related technical bodies of knowledge are those
related to cryptography, which typically focus on the security of ICT. Cryptography-
based techniques generally allow building in security on top of vulnerable infrastructure.
The attack model typically includes an adversary with physical access to the network,
storage or computing infrastructure used by the target system. The basic purpose
of the application of such techniques is preventing unauthorized reading or writing of
protected data from or to a device or network message, which is an essential requirement
from the privacy point of view.
Work in symmetric and public-key cryptography enabled the development of en-
cryption protocols, namely Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Secu-
rity (TLS) [Hickman 1995; Freier, Karlton, and Kocher 1996; Dierks and Rescorla
2008], which allows communicating over insecure IP networks with protection against
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payload eavesdropping and interference. These are the most widely deployed PETs
due to built-in support from major browsers and because these mechanisms are almost
transparent to the user [Goldberg 2007, p. 7]. Other relevant communication PETs,
for use in different contexts, include Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [Atkins, Stallings,
and Zimmermann 1996], a common solution for email encryption, and Off-The-Record
communication (OTR) . OTR is an encryption solution, implemented for use in Instant
Messaging (IM) , motivated by privacy flaws of the PGP approach: lack of forward-
secrecy and deniability [Borisov, Goldberg, and Brewer 2004].
Although most widely deployed in communications, cryptography can also be ap-
plied in storage and computing, scenarios that became increasingly relevant with the
popularization of virtualization and cloud computing. Both file system and disk level
encryption are commercially available, but they are not without problems [Osvik,
Shamir, and Tromer 2006; Halderman et al. 2009]. In this context the biggest promise
comes from homomorphic encryption schemes. Homomorphic encryption enables per-
forming computations on encrypted data, without the secret key, generating a result
that, when decrypted, is the same as if the computations had been applied to the un-
encrypted data. However, due to the inherent relationship between plain and cypher-
texts, homomorphic encryption is not secure enough against an attacker that employs
chosen cypher-text attacks - at best it can be secure against chosen plain-text attacks
[Fontaine and Galand 2007]. Some well known asymmetric encryption algorithms,
such as RSA and El Gamal, have homomorphic properties allowing multiplication op-
erations on encrypted data. Recently a breakthrough fully homomorphic encryption
scheme was proposed [Gentry et al. 2009], enabling a wide range of computations on
encrypted data, which has been subsequently improved [Gentry and Halevi 2011] and
inspired derivate work [Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan 2011]. However, the current
state of the art on homomorphic encryption still has practical application issues, es-
pecially regarding the large size of the cyphertext and computation times required
[Naehrig, Lauter, and Vaikuntanathan 2011].
It is also worth mentioning two privacy goals that have originated relevant
cryptography-based work: Private Information Retrieval (PIR) and Secure Multi-
party Computation (SMC) . PIR work aims enabling a user to fetch some data from
a server without disclosing what data he is interested in, either in an information-
theoretic sense (no leaked information), or in a computational complexity sense (the
adversary must solve a computationally intractable problem) [Yekhanin 2010]. A key
paper in this area proposes a multi-server solution for the information-theoretic goal
[Chor et al. 1998], which has been subsequently improved. For the less strict com-
putational formulation, a single-server solution has been proposed [Kushilevitz and
Ostrovsky 1997]. However, under most assumptions, using PIR solutions proposed so
far is still less efficient regarding the required network traffic than the trivial solution
of transfering the entire database to the client [Sion and Carbunar 2007; Olumofin and
Goldberg 2012]. SMC is a more general problem as there is no server and client - all
parties want to keep their inputs private while collaborating to do some computation
on those inputs. Famously introduced by Yao [Yao 1982], this is tangibly described
as the millionaire problem. Since then significant follow-up work has been produced
[Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson 1987; Du and Atallah 2001], sometimes dubbed gar-
bled circuits or Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) [Bellare, Hoang, and Rogaway 2012;
Naor and Nissim 2001].
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The problem of securely running programs in virtual machines hosted by an un-
trusted provider has also been targeted over recent years [T. Garfinkel et al. 2003;
Sailer, X. Zhang, et al. 2004; Sailer, Jaeger, et al. 2005; Perez, Sailer, and Doorn 2006;
Feldman et al. 2010]. However, all proposed solutions are at the architectural level and
would require significant changes to current systems in order to be implemented.
2.3.3 Anonymous Communication
Another class of PETs attempts to build anonymous communication systems over an
unsafe communications infrastructure. The attack model is similar but, instead pro-
tecting the payload of communication, the goal is to protect the origin and destination
of the payload in the unsafe network, generally accomplished by the use of some kind of
overlay network. Popular work by Chaum [1981; 1988] was used to implement anony-
mous remailers or mixes [Goldberg, D. Wagner, and Brewer 1997, p. 7] to protect
the users’ real email addresses. However, these practical efforts gathered little pub-
lic [Goldberg 2007, p. 4] and academic attention, and presented some vulnerabilities
when studied [Serjantov, Dingledine, and Syverson 2003]. Other systems, such as onion
routing [Goldschlag, M. Reed, and Syverson 1996; Goldschlag, M. Reed, and Syverson
1999], attempt to protect against IP-level traffic analysis. The second generation onion
routing [Dingledine, Mathewson, and Syverson 2004], dubbed Tor, managed to get
significant use [Goldberg 2007, p. 11] and some media attention [Glater 2006]. While
not without problems [Bauer, Grunwald, and Sicker 2009], it enables subjects to access
servers across unsafe networks while hiding which server is being accessed. A different,
but related, problem is the ability to publish content for public access in an anonymous
way, while maintaining content availability, even if the network over which it is being
served is compromised. These technologies are specifically designed to resist censorship
[Goldberg 2003]. Several such systems, which rely in distributed storage of files, have
been proposed [R. Anderson 1996; Dingledine, Freedman, and Molnar 2001; Clarke
et al. 2001], of which FreeNet is currently used [Goldberg 2007, p. 11] and has active
developers [FreeNet Project 2013].
When the attack is done on wireless networks, additional privacy considerations are
required. An adversary located close enough to a target, such that he can access to the
target’s radio transmissions, can easily observe low-level identifiers or determine accu-
rate location. H. Liu et al. [2007] extensively frames and describes indoor positioning
techniques, classified in triangulation, scene analysis and proximity, using on various
radio-based communications, namely cellular, WiFi (802.11), Bluetooth (802.15) and
RFID. A variety of fields partially addresses this issue, such as RFID and VANET
privacy fields, however the approach is typically vertical, from low-level to applica-
tion privacy issues. From the communications point of view, the privacy issues raised
by observing 802.11 identifiers are conceptually the same as the ones raised by the
abuse of RFID [Greenstein, McCoy, and Pang 2008]. Proposed techniques to mitigate
this identifier observation problem typically involve hiding or rewriting [Langheinrich
2009] the identifiers. RFID tags can be killed, can answer only to authorized readers,
or change their number according to some secret sequence every time it is read [S.
Garfinkel, Juels, and Pappu 2005]. Regarding 802.11, frequently changing [Gruteser
and Grunwald 2005] or completely removing [Greenstein, McCoy, and Pang 2008] low-
level identifiers has been proposed. Preventing radio-based location beyond this would
be work for an electronics or physics scholar, and falls out of scope of this thesis.
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2.3.4 Data-centric Privacy
Data-centric privacy bodies of knowledge consider clearly different attack models from
the previous set of fields. While previous related mostly to the gathering of data by
exploiting ICT infrastructures, in data-centric scenarios the data is accessible to the
adversary without an attack being required. In this field a successful attack consists in
extracting information about specific subjects using data analysis techniques. Most of
the times a mere re-identification, linking some database record to a subject, is sufficient
for privacy to be breached. Work in this area can consider two distinct attack models
that differ in the way the adversary accesses the personal data [Dwork 2006, p. 3]. In
one model, data acquisition is done non-interactively: the adversary has full access to a
sanitized [Chawla et al. 2005, p. 5] or anonymized dataset. The other model considers
an interactive approach: there is a privacy-preserving interface between the adversary
and the database, and the adversary accesses data by issuing queries [Dwork 2008,
p. 3].
Because entire datasets are typically used in data mining, work done under the
non-interactive model is usually called Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM). In
this field, an anonymized or sanitized dataset with some set of sensitive attributes is
made available, and the adversary attempts to re-identify records of the database or to
discover values of sensitive attributes of subjects. In some work re-identification alone is
considered to be a privacy breach [Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008], while others focus
on sensitive attribute disclosure [Sweeney 2002]. Also, other work [N. Li, T. Li, and
Venkatasubramanian 2007] considers that high enough probability that the sensitive
attribute has a specific value is also a privacy breach. The privacy-preserving techniques
studied in this field are typically sanitization algorithms which are applied to the whole
dataset before it is released. Examples of operations done in these algorithms include
value generalization, perturbation and suppression [Sweeney 2002; C. C. Aggarwal and
Yu 2004]. Because the typical use case associated with this model is data mining, the
privacy-preserving technique applied should not destroy the utility of the dataset for
mining purposes.
The interactive model has been used for significantly longer than the non-interactive
model, especially in the field of Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) [Chawla et al.
2005, p. 1]. In this model the data is accessed through a mechanism which is responsible
for privacy protection. This mechanism typically receives aggregate queries from a user,
which can be an adversary, and returns a response based on the personal data contained
in the database. The response is a perturbed version of the actual response from the
database, such that the privacy is maintained. This field recently recovered interest
from the scientific community [Dwork 2008] due to the work on Differential Privacy
[Dwork 2006]. In Differential Privacy, Dwork formally defines a very strong privacy
guarantee, which implies that it is not sufficiently distinguishable whether any given
record is part of the database or not. This work places data-centric privacy in a strong
mathematical foundation from which subsequent work quickly emerged over these last
years [Dwork 2011].
2.3.5 Location Privacy
Location is a type of personal information especially relevant for privacy purposes.
With the popularization of Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, wireless and
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mobile networks, location data became widely available and enabled the creation of
Location-Based Services (LBS) . This type of information is especially relevant for
several reasons. First it’s temporary in nature, so typically is supplied in real-time,
or at least with a timestamp, to the LBS. Second, it’s unique per subject and cannot
vary arbitrarily - a person cannot be in two places at the same time and cannot be
in opposite side of the planet in the following minute. Finally, it allows inferring a
great deal about one’s personal life and habits [Beresford and Stajano 2003]. Location
privacy has been a popular topic in the last decade, however this work frequently
considers both wireless communication privacy threats, addressed in Section 2.3.3, and
pure location privacy threats [Gruteser and Grunwald 2003]. In this section the focus
is on the second: privacy mechanisms that protect against adversaries with access
to some location information and that intend to use temporal correlation to infer
additional information about the user [Huang, Yamane, et al. 2006]. Having access to
location information, an adversary may perform [Gruteser and Grunwald 2003]:
• Restricted Space Identification - link a message to a known subject because the
message was sent from a geographic area to which only that subject has access
to;
• Observation Identification - link two messages sent from the same location as
originating from the same subject;
• Location Tracking - link a sequence of location observations to an subject by
linking the subject with only one of them.
Methods to protect against the use of these correlations include spacial and temporal
cloaking [Gruteser and Grunwald 2003], path confusion [Gruteser and Grunwald 2005],
silent periods [Huang, Matsuura, et al. 2005; Huang, Yamane, et al. 2006] and the
use of mix-zones [Beresford and Stajano 2004] - an application of Chaum’s anonymity
principles [Chaum 1981] in the location problem. There is also work that addresses
location privacy drawing from generic data privacy techniques [M Terrovitis and N
Mamoulis 2008].
2.3.6 Privacy in Distributed Systems
Despite the fields previously presented, privacy is rarely transparent to the user. Most
of the times privacy mechanisms impact the use of systems, and the way a system
is used carries privacy implications. A number of technologies exist to address typi-
cal privacy-related requirements, such as authentication and access control. While in
monolithic systems these are trivial problems, in distributed systems complexity in-
creases and protocols become necessary. However, as the problem-space moves further
away from theory and towards the users, academia seems to have less contributions.
One significant contribution is the conceptualization of privacy-enhancing IdM [Hansen
et al. 2004], outlining the functions of such a system. Maybe because these problems
are very functionality-related, they were promptly tackled by the industry with the
development of a number of protocols and standards. One of the most well known of
these protocols is OAuth, now in version 2 [Hardt 2012], which facilitates the imple-
mentation of authorization patterns by decoupling the entity issuing the authorization
from the entity hosting the resource. The development of OAuth started out of an
authentication project, OpenID [Recordon and D Reed 2006], and ironically hampered
its adoption as OAuth started being used as a pseudo-authentication protocol [Google
Inc. 2013b]. Another key standard in this area is Security Assertion Markup Lan-
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guage (SAML) [E Maler 2003], an extensible language capable of expressing assertions
vouched by some authority, mainly used for enterprise web Single Sign-on (SSO) and
web services security.
Despite these protocols enabling complex scenarios across security domains, they
initially require the user to authenticate to at least one of these domains. Despite
its well documented vulnerabilities, the most common authentication method remains
to be password-based [Hoonakker, Bornoe, and Carayon 2009]. The implemented au-
thentication method typically depends on the value of the service or account that the
user is authenticating to [Grosse and Upadhyay 2013]. While password authentication
is the most popular and cheapest method, some types of services require the use of
two-factor authentication. The challenges to widely deploy these are more related to
user experience and economic problems rather than technical ones.
Authentication is not only done from a client to a server, but also the other way
around. Setting up an Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) connection re-
quires the use of certificates [Cooper et al. 2008] to authenticate the remote server,
so that the connection is not vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. Cer-
tificates are validated by the Internet’s Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) , relying in
root Certification Authority (CA) such as Verisign, which typically have their certifi-
cates pre-installed in web browsers. However, the current PKI is not without problems
[Ellison and Schneier 2000]. A key problem is the manual and expensive nature of
the verification processes that should be required before a CA issues a certificate to
a website. A common approach to bypass this problem is the use of self-signed cer-
tificates for personal websites, however it’s difficult for a user to verify the self-signed
certificate belongs to the actual owner of the site and not to an adversary. Perspectives
[Wendlandt, Andersen, and Perrig 2008] is a decentralized method to verify self-signed
certificates, which assumes that attacks are either localized to a particular network
scope or of limited duration, using “notary nodes” to confirm the certificate is the
valid.
2.3.7 User Control of Information Flows
Beyond being able to authenticate to different systems, users need to be able to manage
the access control and privacy settings of the information provided to those systems.
However this is not a trivial task, and Facebook provided a number of examples of this
[Bilton 2010; Helft and Wortham 2010; Bilton 2012; Sengupta 2013]. Social networks
are most affected with such issues because they, like no other online community before,
bring together very different users sharing information linked to their own real-world
identities. The conflicting social queues of such diverse communities complicate the
natural privacy perceptions of users [Boyd 2002], leading users to share more than
they would want, typically resulting in embarrassment. Furthermore, Girão and Sarma
[2009] note that current security measures that rely on user decision points interrupting
the service interaction drive the user to increasingly ignore them. The key to mitigate
these problems is to conveniently communicate to the users an understanding of the
informations flows that can or will occur in the system, and to enable users to control
what information flows where. Lederer et al. [Lederer et al. 2004] identified a number
of design pitfalls that limit the user’s ability to understand and act upon information
flows:
• obscure the nature and extent of a system’s potential for information disclosure;
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• conceal the actual information flow - what information is disclosed to whom;
• excessive privacy configuration overwhelms users - privacy should be part of the
normal use of a system;
• lack of an obvious, coarse-grained, privacy control;
• inhibit users from applying established social privacy practices in a technology
context.
An example of bad communication regarding the potential information flows in sys-
tems is the complexity of web site privacy policies. McDonald and Cranor attempted
to quantify the cost of reading the site’s privacy policies and the result greatly out-
weighed the value of the targeted advertising market that personal information feeds
[McDonald and Cranor 2008]. Furthermore, the actual understanding of users regard-
ing what sites do with their personal information is far from reality [McDonald and
Cranor 2010]. A proposed solution for this problem was Platform for Privacy Pref-
erences (P3P) [Cranor, Langheinrich, et al. 2002] which would allow matching the
machine-readable privacy preferences of sites with the browser-configured privacy pref-
erences of users. However, P3P was not widely adopted because of its complexity and
low perceived added value. A very simple alternative approach was suggested [Raskin
2010; Raskin and Ranganathan 2010]: using symbols to transmit privacy policy mean-
ing, much like Creative Commons. This work was improved and documented within
Mozilla [Mozilla 2011], but shows no record of application. Another lightweight alterna-
tive, Do Not Track (DNT) [Mayer, Narayanan, and Stamm 2011], consisting of simply
including an Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) header in requests indicating to the
web server that he is not allowed to collect, retain, or use any data related to that re-
quest and associated response, is gaining momentum [Soghoian 2011a]. However, none
of theses solutions provide privacy by themselves, they mere improve privacy-related
communication between web users and service providers. They require to be supported
by legislation and that enforcement is conducted by regulatory authorities.
2.3.8 User Behaviour Regarding Privacy
Even if users understand the impact of their privacy actions, their choice is seldom pre-
dictable. There are several examples where public misconduct or sharing embarrassing
information happens with the purpose of getting others attention. Privacy economics
tries to understand and quantify the costs and benefits of sharing or hiding personal
information [Acquisti 2009]. Applying economics to users’ privacy choices revealed
what is known as the privacy paradox [Smith, Dinev, and H. Xu 2011, p. 12]: users
state they are concerned about privacy, but act in apparent contradiction with this
[Acquisti 2004; Acquisti and Grossklags 2005]. There are a number of hypotheses to
explain this phenomenon, namely the existence of a bias towards immediate benefits
comparing to long-term risks [Acquisti 2004], as well as the control paradox : control
over the publication private information decreases individuals’ privacy concerns and
increases their willingness to publish [Brandimarte, Acquisti, and Loewenstein 2012].
The behaviour of users when disclosing their personal information to companies is ob-
ject of analysis not only in privacy and security scientific communities [Grossklags and
Acquisti 2007] but also in marketing and accounting [Pavlou 2011]. Economics can
not only be used to study user behaviour but also to analyse the theoretical incentives
of actors in distributed privacy systems, using a game theoretical approach [Acquisti
2003; Domingo-Ferrer 2011].
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2.4 Conclusions
Internet users consume online targeted advertising based on browsing information
transparently collected about them, post personal information, pictures and videos
of them to social networking sites, and enable information to be gathered and used by
Apps in their smart-phones. The business model of the Web 2.0, offering users free
services in exchange for their data, is a major area of privacy-related discussion. Be-
havioural economists attempt to understand the apparently miopic behaviour of these
users, while technologists attempt to influence enterprises to declare their data han-
dling processes in a machine-readable way. On the enterprises side, security techniques
are employed in order to safeguard the wealth of collected data from internal misuse
and external attackers.
While these techniques can safeguard enterprise aggregated data from attackers,
they offer no protection against legal entities. The current surveillance practices of
US governmental intelligence and security agencies confirmed some of the fears of the
cypherpunk movement. Privacy techniques that guarantee privacy without requiring
any legal safeguards have to be applied by users themselves. However, these same
techniques that can protect individual liberties from overzealous security agencies and
the threat of a surveillance state, obviously also work against other legal methods,
facilitating the conduction of illegal activities online.
Existing privacy-related work is provided by different technical disciplines, address-
ing different levels of privacy problems, and in some cases different problems altogether.
However, all technical areas can contribute a little to each of the different privacy prob-
lems. In order to reach conclusions about the applicability and relevance of privacy
techniques a classification exercise needs to be conducted, especially relevant for the
privacy approaches of new use cases. The vertical style of privacy analysis abundant in
the fields of VANET, IoT and context awareness needs to be decomposed and framed
within existing focused work. In turn, focused work cannot be used independently of
each other because the models that allow them to be comprehensive and effective solu-
tions also restrict them to a set of assumptions and a problem level. Privacy has to be
addressed holistically, at all levels, from the computing and networking infrastructure
to the behavioural incentives of actors in the system, otherwise the techniques applied
at one level can be attacked at another.
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Chapter Three
Communications Perspective
This chapter presents a range of work which can contribute for controlling information
flows in distributed systems, a fundamental building block for privacy in a networked
world. The vision of an Identity Layer for a social-pervasive scenario is put forward,
developed under the Societies project.
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3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Networked World
Almost 40% of the world’s population uses the Internet and, considering developed
countries alone, the figure rises to 74.8% [Teltscher et al. 2013]. The services provided
through it are part of the everyday life of millions of people. However, the use of
Internet services leads to constant distribution of information about oneself. Simple
web searching and browsing provides valuable interests information that is turned into
revenue through targeted advertising, as introduced in Section 2.1.4. A search query,
meant to find some information online, as a post in a social networking site, meant to
communicate something with a group of friends, disclose information about users to
the providers of those services. Furthermore, mechanisms exist to enable one service
provider to access information stored in another provider, further increasing the data
distribution chain. Finally, individual service providers rarely clarify how the data
gathered this way is used, and whether it is further distributed.
The very use of the Internet, disregarding the actions of web service providers, can
enable an attacker with privileged access to the network to monitor one’s communi-
cations. While encryption is known to be an effective protection to communication
content against most adversaries, as introduced in Section 2.3.2, it does not hide the
fact that two parties were communicating. This information alone, disregarding the
communicated data, can be very revealing, and thus a threat to privacy.
At the centre of personal data communication issues is the field of IdM, addressing
the control and management of the linkage between different identifiers and attribute
values, as introduced in Section 2.3.1. It has implications both in the network perspec-
tive of privacy, where the linkability of different network-level identifiers is addressed,
as well as in the distributed systems perspective, as it can be used to enable attribute
value access authorizations and such functionality.
3.1.2 Chapter Outline
In this Chapter the main issues regarding personal data communication control are
addressed. Network-level privacy issues are over-viewed, the concept of identity in a
networked world is outlined and the mechanisms that allow users to control what data
is communicated about them, and how it is communicated, are discussed. Section 3.2
starts by discussing the benefits and limitations of encryption and existing techniques
to overcome privacy threats based on traffic analysis. Section 3.3 addresses IdM issues,
focusing on the management of multiple identities online in a distributed environment,
and describes the IdM approach taken in the Societies project. Section 3.4 focuses
existing solutions for controlling information flows between different systems, both a
priori and a posteriori of the moment of disclosure.
3.2 Communications Security and Anonymity
3.2.1 Encryption’s Achilles Heel: Key Authentication
Encryption plays a central role in communications security and privacy, as described in
Section 2.3.2. It enables data, or payloads, to be securely delivered across insecure net-
works, where attackers that can eavesdrop at all points of the network. This assumes
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that the sender and the recipient of the payload had previously agreed on an encryption
method and keying material. Encryption can be symmetric, where the same key has to
be known to both communicating parties, or can be based in public-key cryptography
where each party has a key pair, one public that everyone can access and one private
that must be kept secret from other parties. Besides encryption, public key cryptog-
raphy can be used for key exchange for symmetric encryption (e.g. in TLS [Dierks
and Rescorla 2008, p. 91]) and, less relevantly from a privacy point of view, for digital
signatures (e.g. in PGP [Atkins, Stallings, and Zimmermann 1996, p. 3]). Public-key
cryptography is based in the intractability of some mathematical problem: the private
key is almost impossible to derive from the public key. The most common mathemat-
ical problem used currently for public-key cryptography is integer factorization (e.g.
RSA [Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman 1978]). However, due to existing sub-exponential
time algorithms so solve integer factorization [Koblitz, Menezes, and Vanstone 2000,
p. 174], elliptic curve cryptography [Koblitz 1987] was proposed, using an alternative
mathematical foundation. Encryption protocols, namely SSL and TLS [Hickman 1995;
Freier, Karlton, and Kocher 1996; Dierks and Rescorla 2008], are the most widely de-
ployed PETs due to built-in support from major browsers and being transparent to use
[Goldberg 2007, p. 7]. These typically rely in public-key cryptography to authenticate
the server, so that the protocol is not vulnerable to MitM.
However, public-key cryptography is only as strong as the means to assert that a
certain public key is in fact controlled by a certain entity or person, i.e. the authenti-
cation of that public key. In the Internet, web servers authenticate to browsers using
a certificate [Cooper et al. 2008] that is signed by a CA - this is the Internet’s PKI.
However, as discussed in Section 2.3.6, the existing PKI has been criticized for many
years [Ellison and Schneier 2000]: the whole is only as strong as it’s weakest link, which
seem to be the CAs. Recent attacks to two such authorities, Comodo and DigiNotar,
enabled hackers to issue certificates signed by those CAs enabling them to pose as
high-profile websites [Leavitt 2011].
PGP [Atkins, Stallings, and Zimmermann 1996], the popular email encryption solu-
tion that also uses public-key encryption, solves the authenticity of public keys problem
with the web of trust. Instead of using a centralized trust model such as the current
web PKI, the model is distributed. It relies in individual users signing each other’s
public keys as if asserting that the key belongs to that person. When communication
is required between two users that don’t have prior contact, they can choose to trust
the remotely provided public key based on the introducers that have asserted the au-
thenticity of the key belonging to that user. As public keys are signed by more users,
trust webs emerge around communities [Abdul-Rahman 1997].
The centralized PKI solution relies too much in the security practices and ability
of CAs, the web of trust places this burden in the activity and security practices of
users. The centralized option is more practical as it does not require users to manage
trust, but a compromised CA has significantly more severe security problems than a
compromised PGP private key. A pragmatic compromise between accessibility and
security was found for Secure Shell (SSH) authentication [Ylonen and Lonvick 2006],
known as leap-of-faith authentication [Arkko and Nikander 2004]. On first use, users
have to decide whether an unknown key is valid or not, based on the key’s fingerprint
that can be confirmed by other means. If the key is considered valid than it is cached
and used to authenticate subsequent communications with that remote host.
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A recently proposed alternative to traditional PKI, dubbed Perspectives [Wend-
landt, Andersen, and Perrig 2008], builds upon leap-of-faith authentication. It de-
scribes a decentralized method to verify self-signed certificates, which assumes that
MitM attacks are either localized to a particular network scope or of limited duration.
The validity of keys is measured by its association to a specific server over some period
of time. Perspectives uses an infrastructure of notary nodes to provide geographi-
cal and temporal resistance to MitM attacks. Based on this work, a Firefox add-on
dubbed Convergence was released [Thoughtcrime Labs 2011]. While the attack model
considered here is not as strong as the omnipresent attacker, typically used in network
security, the work remains interesting as the restrictions placed on the attacker’s ability
are very reasonable. As Abraham Lincoln put it [Wendlandt, Andersen, and Perrig
2008], “you can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the
time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time.”
3.2.2 Communications Anonymity
Even if data payloads are kept secret with encryption, access to the unencrypted net-
work identifiers that enable communications, such as IP and MAC addresses, is suf-
ficient for threatening privacy in several ways [Matos 2012, Sec. 3.4.2]. A common
requirement is to be able to hide the origin and destination of communications done
on an insecure network. Chaum [1981] first tackled this problem, describing a system
of anonymous remailers or mixes to protect the users’ real email addresses. Based on
this work, a number of types of mixes were implemented and deployed [Goldberg, D.
Wagner, and Brewer 1997, p. 7]. One such implementation, known as Mixmaster re-
mailers, includes countermeasures against a number of passive eavesdropping attacks,
such as size and time correlation attacks. However, it shows vulnerabilities to active
attacks involving blocking most messages arriving to the mix or flooding the mix with
attacker-generated messages [Serjantov, Dingledine, and Syverson 2003].
Onion routing [Goldschlag, M. Reed, and Syverson 1996; Goldschlag, M. Reed,
and Syverson 1999], bring these principles to the IP level. The second generation
onion routing [Dingledine, Mathewson, and Syverson 2004], dubbed Tor, is currently
a popular solution for anonymity in internet communications, used by criminals [Roy
2013] and whistle-blowers [Greenberg 2013] alike. It does not waive the use of standard
encryption and other privacy techniques, but is considered a resilient technology for
preventing IP-level traffic analysis [Tor Project 2013]. Tor is a peer-to-peer protocol
which relies on the dimension of the network to anonymize communications. When
a Tor node starts it chooses 3 nodes to create a circuit that will be used for the
anonymization. IP packets are encapsulated in 3 encryption layers and sent to the
circuit, coming out in their original form at the exit of the third node. Each node of
the circuit only knows its predecessor and successor, not being able to determine both
the origin and destination of the actual message.
Obviously, it is not without problems. A simple denial of service can be done by
blocking access to the centralized directory servers [D. Anderson 2012]. Also there is a
class of attacks that relies in the performance over anonymity orientation of Tor [Bauer,
McCoy, et al. 2007; Bauer, Grunwald, and Sicker 2009]. In order to provide low latency
in routing, enabling the support interactive applications, Tor does not re-order, batch or
generate noise traffic, as email mixes do. Furthermore, the anonymizing routers forming
the Tor path are selected based on their perceived bandwidth capacities, skewing router
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selection toward routers with higher bandwidths. Adversaries can leverage on this
property by providing adversary-controlled routers with high bandwidth to the Tor
network. If an adversary controls the first and last routers of a path it can then apply
timing attacks correlating origin and destination.
3.3 Identity Management
3.3.1 Foundations and Definitions
Philosophically speaking, identity distinguishes one subject from another. It is also
a social construct of how a person conceives themselves and by extension how others
see that person [Mead 1934]. Pfitzmann and Hansen [2010] formally define Identity as
the negation of anonymity and the negation of unlinkability, based on the concepts of
anonymity and unlinkability introduced in Section 2.3.1. In other words, identity is
any subset of attribute values of an individual person which sufficiently identifies this
individual person within any set of persons. So in this context there is no such thing
as the identity, but several of them. A partial identity is a linkable subset of attribute
values of a complete identity, where a complete identity is the union of all attribute
values of all identities of this person. While one identity sufficiently identifies an
individual person (without limitation to particular sets of subjects), a partial identity
may not do so. A partial digital identity is the digital representation of a partial
identity.
Having defined identity, let us set the foundations for dealing with a special type
of attributes: identifiers. Identifiers are attribute values that are unique (at least with
a very high probability) within any set of subjects, negating of anonymity, and that
are relatively stable across time and context, providing some linkability. Pseudonyms
are a type of identifiers which typically are less stable and hold less side-information
than normal identifiers, such as one’s real name and e-mail address. Based on a name
or e-mail address it’s possible to use the data from the string itself to derive more
information without access to any additional attributes - e.g. it’s possible to infer
information from the domain of an e-mail address of from one’s family name. With
pseudonyms little side-information is included in the identifier string, or none at all
in case it is a random string. Regarding their stability across time and context, an
identifier such as name or e-mail is typically used for a long time (years) in a wide
variety of contexts - personal, professional, behaving as a customer and as a provider.
In contrast, pseudonyms are typically - but not necessarily - used only in specific
contexts or for a limited amount of time.
Pfitzmann and Hansen [2010] distinguished types of pseudonyms based in their
usage:
• person pseudonym: substitute for the subject’s name which may be used in
many different contexts - e.g., a number of an identity card, the social security
number, DNA sequence, a nickname, the pseudonym of an actor, or a mobile
phone number;
• role pseudonym: used only in specific roles - e.g., a customer pseudonym, a
personal e-mail address or professional e-mail address;
• relationship pseudonym: for each communication partner a different pseudonym
is used - e.g., distinct nicknames for each communication partner;
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• role-relationship pseudonym: for each role and for each communication partner,
a different pseudonym is used;
• transaction pseudonym: for each transaction a different pseudonym, unlinkable
to any other pseudonym and at least initially unlinkable to any other IOI, is used
- e.g., randomly generated transaction numbers for online-banking.
The subject which the pseudonym refers to is the holder of the pseudonym. When the
subject is a partial digital identity, the identifier is usually a pseudonym [Hansen et al.
2004] due to similarly having a limited scope.
3.3.2 Privacy-enhancing Identity Management
IdM is managing various partial identities, denoted by pseudonyms, of an individual
person, i.e., administration of identity attributes including the development and choice
of the partial identity and pseudonym to be (re-)used in a specific context or role.
Then, privacy-enhancing IdM is done in a way such that, given the restrictions of a set
of applications, unlinkability (as seen by an attacker) is sufficiently preserved between
the partial identities and corresponding pseudonyms of an individual person [Pfitzmann
and Hansen 2010, p. 34]. The re-use of a pseudonym allows continuity to be supported
in a specific context or role, by enabling linkability with former or future IOI. For IdM
to be privacy-preserving this linkability should only be possible if such is desired by
the user [Hansen et al. 2004]. Furthermore, outside of the context or role in which a
specific partial digital identity is used, that partial identity should be as identical as
possible to a non-existing identity.
A system that addresses these issues needs to enable role taking and making for
all applications, managing what pseudonyms are used and what attributes are released
within each communication or transaction. This management has to be aware that
secrecy is not always the goal. The uncontrolled creation and acceptance of pseudonyms
can lead to problems such as Sybil attacks [Douceur 2002]. To address these problems,
Martucci et al. describe a pseudonym-based trust-enabled identity scheme for the
Internet of Services [Martucci, Ries, and Mühlhäuser 2011] that only needs to rely
in a Trusted Third-Party (TTP) in the bootstrap and pseudonym issuing phases.
The trust approach is distributed, enabling users to freely decide whether to divulge
service provider recommendations or not, enabling privacy on that specific type of data.
The TTP in charge of issuing and managing pseudonyms is usually denoted Identity
Provider (IdP) .
Trust is not only important regarding the identifier, but also regarding the attributes
associated to it. Some use cases require that users use attribute values belonging to
one identity context in a different one. Through the use of cryptographic techniques it
becomes possible to prove something regarding an attribute value without disclosing
the associated pseudonym by using some credential issued by a TTP [Hansen et al.
2004]. In many IdM approaches the IdP accumulates both and the responsibility of
issuing pseudonyms and attribute credentials. Contrary to the rule, work done in
the Swift European project decouples these two functions, introducing the Attribute
Provider to deal with the second one [Barisch et al. 2010].
The use of a TTP is a common mechanism to balance privacy and trust require-
ments. However, according to the multilateral security principle [Rannenberg 1993;
Rannenberg 2000], all parties should be regarded as potential attackers. Different par-
ties may have different and sometimes conflicting security goals, and the level of trusted
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placed on other parties should be minimized. Centralized IdM solutions that rely on
an all-knowing IdP are therefore in disagreement with this principle [Hansen et al.
2004]. The level of trust placed in each TTP should be architecturally minimized by
distributing them across different parties, making misuse less attractive and limiting
the harm that can be done [Rannenberg 2000].
IdM is a complex topic which has implications in different areas. One of the broadest
approaches is probably the work in the Daidalos projects resulted in the concept of
Virtual Identity, a cross-layer partial identity of an entity [Girão, Sarma, and Aguiar
2006]. The entity can be a user, a group of users, or service and network providers.
The proposed architecture inDaidalos2 preserves linkability between different Virtual
Identities of the same entity, both from the service and network provider point of view.
The described federation model enables data associated with a Virtual Identities to
be interoperable across different administrative domains by semantically mapping it
[Aguiar et al. 2006].
Changes in identity systems are also associated to changes in communications
paradigms. For example, Sarma and Girão envision the Future Internet of Things
as an Identinet where each endpoint, independently of being a person, a service or
software, is represented by an identity. This Identinet provides some device indepen-
dence as what matters is the entity that the device is operating on behalf of. Also,
by employing identity management techniques, it has the potential to enable enhanced
security and privacy for users [Girão and Sarma 2009].
3.3.3 Identity in the Web
When addressed for the Web, identity problems mostly focus on authentication and
attribute access mechanisms. The term walled gardens is widely used to describe the
web of sites that came to be with the Web 2.0 model. Each of these sites holds
his own silo of user attributes, along with application data, requiring that users go
through a sign-up process every time they start using a new web application and
through a login process each time they use it. In 2005 the first signs of change to this
scenario emerged. First, Hardt coined the term Identity 2.0 in his OSCON keynote
presentation as the shift from these data silos to a user-centric IdM paradigm, where
the user presents one of his certifier-issued identities to access whatever resource or
application he wants. A few months later OpenID [Recordon and D Reed 2006], the
first authentication delegation protocol for the web, was released. The protocol allows
users to authenticate with the same credentials, typically username and password, to
a large number of web applications. These application providers, called relying parties
in OpenID terminology, don’t have access to the credentials, instead trusting an IdP
to assert that the user is who he says he is - the holder of a specific identifier.
However, OpenID was not without problems. It was designed having in mind
simplicity and scalability, in order to be suitable for the web, and chooses not to address
some complex problems such as trust and IdP to relying party (or service provider)
unlinkability [Eve Maler and Drummond Reed 2008]. Also, an empirical study [S.-T.
Sun et al. 2011] identified a number of shortcomings, most related to the authentication
user interfaces: many users did not understand how to use the system nor its benefits,
and some were tricked into phishing attacks. Furthermore, a significant ammount
of users expressed concern in using OpenID to authenticate both to high-value and
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untrustworthy relying parties. Finally, security problems have been identified due to
the lack of integrity protection in requests [Sovis, Kohlar, and Schwenk 2010].
OpenID was a landmark development in identity for the web, despite its limited
success, as the user relies solely on his unmodified browser for using the scheme. A
different class of IdM solutions for the web encompasses the use of enhanced browsers
or clients, as the one proposed by S.-T. Sun et al. [2011]. These include, most notably
but with modest adoption, the now defunct Microsoft InfoCard and Mozilla Persona,
built on the BrowserID protocol [Mozilla Developer Network 2012]. A third type of
solutions requires the existence of a personal server in order to enable user-centric
authentication, or to provide generic access to all kinds of user attributes. WebID
[Story et al. 2009; Inkster, Story, and Harbulot 2014] is a protocol that re-uses widely
deployed TLS and a personal web server in order to enable browser authentication,
by proving that the user of the browser controls a certain URL. More generically,
Personal Data Services, such as the Higgins project [Eclipse Foundation 2009], enable
service providers to request attributes from a user-controlled server. However, due to
the requirement of having a personal trusted server, the adoption of these solutions is
extremely impractical given the current over-centralized state of the web.
The adoption of any web authentication delegation mechanism requires web service
providers to delegate part of the user information they would normally have direct
access to. Being in possession of personal information is the value that major web
companies turn into revenue, as referred in Section 2.1.4. Furthermore being the holder
of the user identification services became a strategic objective for these companies. In
the past couple of years Facebook enabled third parties to delegate authentication to
Facebook, first for web sites and afterwards for mobile applications in iOS and Android
operating systems. Google, on the other hand, merged the YouTube user accounts to
Google Accounts, and requires that Android users are logged in with their Google
Account to be able to use key functionality like the Android application store Google
Play. Recently Google became an accredited IdP for some US government applications
[Schmidt 2011]. The strategy of these major IdP clearly involves increasing the number
of users and relying service providers as much as possible, contributing to changing the
Web 2.0 walled gardens into an iron curtain.
3.3.4 Federation and Single Sign-On
In the enterprise world, where solutions tend to be more comprehensive and planned,
rather than organic and flexible like in the Web, the problem of using only one set
of credentials to authenticate in many systems is referred to as Single Sign-on (SSO).
A subsequent step to SSO is the use of attributes from one system in another and
vice versa, sometimes across different security domains. For that reason it is necessary
to establish a mapping between the attribute names in the different domains - in
one system the user’s name attribute may be called realName and in the other there
may be two attributes, givenName and familyName. When two different domains can
interoperate in terms of user authentication and data they are said to be federated.
One of the most relevant developments in IdM for the enterprise was the Liberty
Alliance Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF), a set of protocols that collectively
provide a solution for identity federation management, cross-domain authentication
and session management. This specification was contributed to Organization for the
Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) , forming the foundation
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for SAML 2.0, which is currently used in the widely deployed Shibboleth SSO solu-
tion and adopted by the OASIS Web Services Security Technical Committee for the
WS-Security specification. SAML is an Extensible Markup Language (XML) based
language to communicate authentication, authorization and attribute information in
a secure and trusted way. The specified protocols associated to it enable web SSO,
among other secure information exchanges.
3.3.5 Towards an Identity Layer: SOCIETIES Communication
Framework
While the use of unlinked pseudonyms to separate different contexts has been well
studied, their adoption has been rather limited, as mentioned in Section 2.3.2. Deployed
IdM solutions are limited to enable SSO and trusted attribute communication. Reasons
for this might include the cross-layer issues that a pseudonym solution has to deal with,
as well as the need to address this problem in a cross-cutting manner [Hansen et al.
2004; Matos, Girão, et al. 2007; Matos, Sargento, and Aguiar 2007], instead of as an
integration problem.
Societies was an European project with a consortium of 16 partners, executed
from October 2010 to March 2014. It was the largest integrated project out of the fifth
call for project submissions for FP7, and was rated Excelent at the final review. The
project aimed to bring together social and pervasive computing into one integrating
platform. The proliferation of user owned networked devices has untapped potential
that can be capitalized by allowing device capabilities to be offered on the network as
services, information and resources. These devices would together form a Cooperative
Smart Space (CSS), a digital representation of a user or organisation, enabling the
sharing of user-owned services, information and resources. CSSs constitute the users’
bridge between the physical world and the digital social communities the user is a part
of. A community is a collection of CSSs and/or supporting infrastructure services,
who wish to collaborate for mutual agreed purpose for which the community formed.
The community’s digital representation is called a Community Interaction Space (CIS),
through which users can access and make available services, information and resources
[Doolin et al. 2012].
As part of the work developed for this thesis, in Societies an identity layer mech-
anism was devised and a prototype implemented [SOCIETIES 2011]. This identity
layer can best be described as a pseudonym-enabled federated identity layer, drawing
from the Identinet vision [Girão and Sarma 2009], enabling users to have more privacy
without loss of functionality. The service providers may still access to the user’s infor-
mation, necessary to fulfil some function, but their ability to build a general purpose
user profile with it would be severely hampered. Furthermore neither service providers
nor users would be restricted to a specific IdP. TTP must exist in order to enable
liability and assurance scenarios and to prevent Sybil attacks [Douceur 2002] but, in
agreement with multilateral security principles, these entities should have minimal re-
sponsibilities. This is achieved with an open federation of IdP, where different IdPs
can be used to interact with the same service providers, and where users can freely
change IdPs.
The described open federation is slightly different from the concept of federation
usually considered in Web and enterprise SSO. While this one mainly refers to the
semantic interoperability of user attributes between domains, the open federation we
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Figure 3.1: Open Identity Layer Architecture
consider is more about enabling open communication between domains independently
of the attributes being passed around. In the Societies architecture the attributes are
provided and consumed by entities and services, not the domain administering entity,
so the semantic interoperability responsibility lies with them. The domains just need
to provide the infrastructure for these different services and entities to communicate
securely and privately.
In an open federation scenario is useful to consider the term identity domain. An
identity domain is an identifier namespace administered by one IdP. Since identifiers
are unique in their domain, an identifier and domain pair absolutely identifies a partial
digital identity. Subjects can authenticate with the IdP, named Domain Authority
(DA) in Societies, w.r.t. identifiers that belong to the domain it administers. In
Figure 3.1, the two-layer IdM architecture is depicted, showing how different endpoints
in different domains can interact. The Domain layer provides the trusted identity,
discovery and communication services, while service providers and users interact with
each other, communicating data linked to different identifiers, on the Endpoint layer.
CSS is a distributed construct that represents a single user in the digital world. In
order to create a CSS account the user must choose a DA, based on his perceived trust
for that entity. The DA is the entity responsible for authenticating the user devices
associated to a CSS, and for making the devices, dubbed CSS Nodes, belonging to
the same CSS to be known to each other. It must provide functions to support the
creation of new CSS accounts, which may imply some offline verification process. It
must also provide support for the association of new CSS Nodes, normally done by
proof of ownership of existing Nodes.
Besides providing authentication and pseudonym issuing services, the DA also per-
forms other privacy and identity related functions that need to be somewhat centralised.
First it behaves as an anonymizing communication proxy between different entities, pre-
venting lower-layer identifiers to be used to link messages. Unless a CSS already has a
trusted communication context established, communication should go through the DA.
This approach requires the DA to be a message router, making it also suitable to per-
form the identity-based routing that is necessary for having identity-addressed network
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endpoints, as idealized by Girão and Sarma [Girão and Sarma 2009]. Furthermore, the
DA also enables entity search and service discovery.
While the DA is a centralised component from the point of view of the endpoints, it
is a distributed if we consider that they are automatically connected with other DAs in
an open federation, enabling communication, identity-based routing and entity search
across domains. This realises the concept of an identity layer as an open federation
decoupled from specific applications. Also it enables users to freely choose their IdP
based on their opinion or identity purpose, not having to choose the one most of
their friends use, or that their favourite applications support. This would enhance
competition between IdP in their core service value: privacy policies, security practices,
credibility, and so on.
In an open federation any entity can host a domain, enabling individual users to
run their own DA. However, the fewer users a domain has, the easier it is to identify
them since the domain of an identity is publicly known. When users choose a DA they
are effectively hiding in the crowd of users in that domain.
Pseudonym management is done on the user devices, on behalf of the user, with
support from the DA for pseudonym issuing. Three types of pseudonyms are defined:
• Public pseudonym: human-readable identifying strings, meant to make the user
globally contactable, managed explicitly by the user and not to be used as a
service consumer;
• Facet pseudonym: optionally human-readable string, meant to identify the user
in the continuous use of a service or communication with another party;
• Transient pseudonyms: random strings meant to make the user contactable
within the scope of a transaction or in the establishment of a trust relation that
leads to the issuing of a facet pseudonym.
Public pseudonyms are the ones meant to make the user contactable, similarly to
email addresses. These are managed explicitly by the user, and typically are used in
different social circles and communities. Users explicitly create and manage the public
data associated with them to make themselves as searchable as they wish. Facet
pseudonyms are used to contact one or a few related services or users. They are like a
chat room nickname or a web application username: they enable temporal linkability in
a restricted context. Transient pseudonyms are mostly used when the user is accessing
a stateless service, or a service where only limited temporal linkability is required. Its
use typically spans over a few transactions. Transient pseudonyms are also used to
contact a remote entity before a trust relation is established with that entity, which
may lead to the issuing of a facet pseudonym.
The implementation effort of this vision was much larger than the effort avail-
able in Societies for this purpose, so only a partial implementation was provided
to the project. The implementation, dubbed Communication Framework, relied in
an XMPP infrastructure to provide identity-based routing, abstracting the network
as much as possible - components only need to know what is the identifier of the
remote entity [Gonçalves and Gomes 2014]. XMPP is an Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) protocol and its open extensions, XMPP Extension Protocol (XEP) , are
supervised by the XMPP Standards Foundation. It is a bi-directional XML messaging
protocol, originally aimed for IM, built directly on top of Transmission Control Pro-
tocol (TCP) , which can provide an extensible messaging infrastructure, with built-in
federation mechanism, supporting endpoint authentication, resolution and presence,
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message routing, asynchronous messaging and some degree of reliability. In recent
years XMPP has been adapted for other applications than IM, such as VoIP [Ludwig
et al. 2009] and microblogging [Saint-Andre et al. 2012].
Furthermore, transparent data object serialization was provided so that components
could remotely communicate data objects abstracting how data is represented on the
wire. The implementation was done for Java 1.6, using OSGi and Spring Dynamic
Modules integrated in the Virgo platform [Eclipse 2011], and for Android 4.0. Open
source XMPP libraries were used in the implementations: Smack [Ignite Realtime
2002b] and Whack [Ignite Realtime 2002c]. For the transparent object serialization,
after unsatisfactory results with JAXB [Java.net 2003], SimpleXML [Gallagher 2006]
was adopted due to its Android compatibility. While the resulting prototype was
not enough to demonstrate the potential of an pseudonym-enabled identity layer, it
was enough to show its advantage from an architectural point of view [Gonçalves and
Gomes 2014]. Furthermore, Societies project partners used the code to develop their
research [Vardjan and Porekar 2013; Kalatzis et al. 2013] and the platform was tested
in user trials [Doolin 2013]. The source code is available at Github [SOCIETIES 2011].
3.3.6 The Importance of Data in Pseudonym Management
Freely providing the same attribute values under different pseudonyms can enable an
attacker to link these pseudonyms. For this reason, with the ability to issue and
communicate using pseudonyms, function that allows monitoring their association and
vulnerability to linkability has to be considered. Pseudonym generation and re-use
should take in account this function that analyses which pseudonyms are more suitable
for interacting with some service or entity. While the final decision should rest with the
user, the system should provide the necessary tools for the user to make an informed
choice regarding his pseudonym use [Hansen et al. 2004].
This function, dubbed Identity Selection in the Societies project, supports user
decisions by estimating the knowledge that observers have of the user’s pseudonyms. It
keeps track of interactions and disclosed information for each partial digital identity, as
it happens in associated research [Vardjan and Porekar 2013]. Because of all the data
the function has access to, it must run in a user-controlled device on behalf of him. The
most appropriate pseudonym is typically the one that minimises partial digital identity
linking risk while satisfying the requirements of data disclosure from the remote entity.
Users will typically re-use existing pseudonyms when interacting with the same remote
entities or releasing the same attributes [Hansen et al. 2004]. If the re-use of the natural
pseudonym for the given context is too risky the user should be properly informed in
order to take a decision. Some pseudonyms may be intentionally heavily re-used, e.g.
if the user wants to play the role of a well-known service provider. The system should
give the user the best conditions possible in order for users to take informed decisions,
but must not take invisible decisions on his behalf [Hansen et al. 2004]. Protecting
privacy is a lot about having a system behaving the way users expect it to.
Besides considering attribute disclosure history between entities there is also the
need to consider the nature of the disclosed information, namely uniqueness and sta-
bility. One possibility to do so is by taking an information theoretical approach. Shan-
non’s entropy [1948] can help us estimate how unique a piece of information is, how
much information it actually carries - e.g. if a user discloses his current city this gives
us more information about him than if he discloses his current country. Each disclosed
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value about the user may be translated in a quantifiable amount of anonymity loss
[Eckersley 2010]. Since we are dealing with multiple and most likely dependent data
items, in which the total anonymity loss is less than the sum of the individual values for
data disclosure, joint entropy would be a candidate information theoretical foundation
for these estimations. Specific attacks on unlinkability provided by privacy-enhancing
IdM using re-identification techniques have been identified by Claußet al. [Clauβ, Kes-
dogan, and Kölsch 2005]. Possible countermeasures have to re-identification done at
the data level have to come from the PPDM field, as introduced in Section 2.3.4 and
discussed in Chapter 5.
3.4 Data Flow Control
3.4.1 Access Control and Authorization
Adequately controlling data flows between systems is among the most fundamental
privacy requirements. Permission is usually required when a remote system is contacted
in order to provide some data stored there. The requesting party needs authorization
to access that data or the data server needs to perform an access control check in order
to determine whether to deny or allow the request. Authorization and access control
are different points of view to address the problem of protecting resource access in
distributed systems: authorization is seen mostly from the requesting party point of
view, leading to solutions that promote easy data access, while access control is seen
from the data server point of view, tending to privilege restraint.
Much like authentication, only recently distributed resource protection started be-
ing seen as cross-cutting function with re-usable logic and patterns. It has historically
been looked at as a functional requirement of a system, and implementations were usu-
ally case-specific. It was in order to improve interoperability in the area that Extensible
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) was developed. Version 3, super-seeding
the previous version from 2005, was recently released by OASIS, a standards organiza-
tion. XACML specifies an XML-based language for specifying resource access policies
in a standard way, designed primarily for use in an enterprise scenarios, typically with
Web Services, but flexible enough to be applied to different types of resources. A typ-
ical access control scenario involves three entities - a subject, a resource and an action
- which relate as follows: the subject requests performing an action on a resource. The
access decision, resulting from the access control policy and request, may depend solely
on these entities or also on attributes such as time of the day. Based on this model,
XACML defines an architecture comprising of 4 components:
• Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) - entity that gets the request that needs to go
through an access control check;
• Policy Decision Point (PDP) - central point of the architecture, receives XACML
requests from the PEP and generates a decision, and subsequent response based
on the existing policies;
• Policy Administration Point (PAP) - supplies access control policies to the PDP;
• Policy Information Point (PIP) - supplies relevant information to the PDP;
The main components are the PEP and the PDP. It is between them that the
access control requests and responses are exchanged. An XACML request represents
a question: whether a given subject can do a given action to a resource. The PDP
calculates the decision based on the policies it has defined. XACML defines an XML
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format for the policies. A policy refers to a target and contains a number of rules.
Based on the request information, the PDP navigates the policies looking for a match
in the target. When it does, it returns the associated access decision.
As introduced in Section 2.3.6, OAuth is an IETF protocol which decouples autho-
rization roles, allowing clients to access remote resources more easily. The first version
[Hammer-Lahav 2010] was developed out of need during the OpenID implementation
for the Twitter external Application Programing Interface (API) as there was no au-
thorization delegation functionality defined. It enables accessing protected resources
without requiring authentication credentials. OAuth2 [Hardt 2012], the second version
of the protocol, has faced difficulties in its standardization process with the withdrawal
of lead author and editor Eran Hammer due to disagreements over the direction of the
work. Hammer disagreed with the excessive enterprise orientation of OAuth2, resulting
in an overly complex specification, less interoperable and useful than its predecessor
[Hammer 2012]. OAuth defines four roles:
• resource owner - entity capable of granting access to a protected resource, typi-
cally the end-user;
• resource server - server hosting the protected resources;
• client - application making protected resource requests on behalf of the resource
owner and with its authorization;
• authorization server - server issuing access tokens to the client, after successfully
authenticating the resource owner and obtaining authorization.
Put as simply as possible, an authorization grant is given by the resource owner so
that a client can access some protected resource. In the presence of the authorization
grant, the authorization server issues an access token to the client, enabling it to fetch
the protected resource from the resource server.
The use of OAuth grew quickly with the popularization of web APIs, becoming
the de-facto standard for lightweight and flexible authorization delegation. Precipi-
tated by the success of OAuth, a new version of the OpenID protocol was developed,
OpenID Connect, relying heavily in OAuth2, an authorization protocol, to delegate
authentication. The underlying idea is that an authentication relying party requests
authorization to access the user’s identifier, as if it was any other attribute, from an
OpenID Connect provider.
While OAuth focus on the practical problems of authorization delegation, XACML
aims at flexible access control policy definition. They cover different aspects of the
distributed resource protection problem and thus is possible to use them together.
However, having been developed with different spirits and purposes, concrete use cases
will typically ask for the use of either one or the other.
3.4.2 Privacy Policies
Privacy policies define the company policies regarding data collected throughout the
use of a service. They describe what data is gathered and what happens to it: for
what purposes is used, for how long is kept and whether is shared with third parties.
While resource protection deals with permissions to access data, possibly preventing
a service provider from gathering said data, the privacy policy applies when either
the service provider can directly gather some data or has the authorization to retrieve
it from another party. Currently service providers mostly provide privacy policies as
legal safeguards, having no restrictions as to their format, length readability or content
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[McDonald and Cranor 2008]. Most of these policies are written in legalese and typically
thousands of words long - Facebook’s Privacy Policy increased from 1004 words in 2005
to 5830 in 2010 [Bilton 2010].
Lorrie F. Cranor, a reference author in the field, co-authored a study which does
an economic analysis on privacy policies [McDonald and Cranor 2008], estimating the
overall cost to read them and comparing it to the value of the online advertising market
- the market where these service providers typically operate. The opportunity cost of
the time required to skim once a year through the privacy policies of visited sites for
all Americans far outweighs the value of the online advertising market in the US. This
almost anecdotal study is a complement to another studies indicating that most users
do not read privacy policies [Privacy Leadership Initiative 2001], and that a majority
of users has the mistaken belief that the mere presence of a privacy policy means that
a corporation will not share their data [Turow 2003]. As referred in Section 2.2.5,
web service providers use a number of techniques to gather browsing information from
users even if the information is not directly conveyed, namely cookies, clickstreams,
and tracking techniques exploiting the uniqueness of browser signatures [Eckersley
2010] and IP addresses. Also, search terms are usually passed from search engines to
the sites the user browses to from the search page, using the HTTP referrer header.
As mentioned in Section 2.3.7, Cranor had been the lead author of the P3P specifi-
cation [Cranor, Langheinrich, et al. 2002] a few years before, which defines a machine-
readable language for privacy policies for web sites. The foundations for P3P are
economic: to change privacy from a credence good, that cannot be evaluated by the
consumer, to a search good, which can be evaluated before consumption. It’s the
same principle as for the nutrition labels that are mandatory in case of food products.
This change would contribute to the privacy practices of service providers to be easily
taken in account when choosing one, enabling providers to compete for better practices
[McDonald and Cranor 2008].
P3P defines an XML-based machine-readable representation of a privacy policy,
designed to describe web service provider privacy practices, namely the types of data
or data elements collected and how these will be used. The P3P XML schemas define
over 30 types of elements for representing the policy and over 150 user data types
that can be considered. For each data practice which can be identified, web service
providers shall identify:
• the type of data that is collected, based on the specification’s data types;
• the purpose of the data collection, which may include:
– complete the current activity for which the data was provided;
– for the technical support and administration of the Web site;
– for enhancing, evaluating, or otherwise review the site, service, product, or
market;
– tailor or modify content or design of the site where the information is used
only for a single visit;
– create or build a record tied to a pseudonymous identifier, used to determine
the habits, interests, or other characteristics of individuals for purpose of
research, analysis and reporting;
– create or build a record tied to a pseudonymous identifier, used to determine
the habits, interests, or other characteristics of individuals to make a decision
that directly affects that individual;
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– determine the habits, interests, or other characteristics of individuals and
combine it with identified data for the purpose of research, analysis and
reporting;
– determine the habits, interests, or other characteristics of individuals and
combine it with identified data to make a decision that directly affects that
individual;
– contact the individual, through a communications channel other than voice
telephone, for the promotion of a product or service;
– for the purpose of preserving social history as governed by an existing law
or policy
– contact the individual via a voice telephone call for promotion of a product
or service;
• which legal entities will be able to access the data, namely:
– the web service provider itself and/or entities acting as our agents or entities
for whom we are acting as an agent;
– entities performing delivery services possibly following different data prac-
tices;
– entities following our practices;
– entities following different practices;
– unrelated third parties;
– public fora such as bulletin boards or public directories;
• and its data retention policy, determining that information is:
– destroyed following the online interaction with the site and must not be
logged, archived, or otherwise stored;
– retained to meet the stated purpose, being discarded at the earliest time
possible.
– retained to meet a stated purpose, but the retention period is longer because
of a legal requirement or liability;
– retained under a service provider’s stated business practices;
– retained for an indeterminate period of time.
The P3P specification also defines how the machine-readable policy can be located
in a web site, enabling P3P-enabled browsers to transparently fetch it. The browser
would fetch the policy and process it against the user’s privacy preferences. In case the
web site’s policy is in agreement with the user’s preferences browsing would proceed
normally, otherwise the user would have some interaction with the browser, e.g. via
pop-ups, requesting acceptance of the policy point which is in disagreement with the
user preferences. However, a negative, privacy preserving, decision from the user would
lead to an interrupted browsing experience.
The initiative faced significant criticism, especially from privacy advocates, claiming
that P3P fails to establish privacy standards, lacks enforcement, is hard to implement
and it’s adoption will face a chicken and egg problem [Electronic Privacy Information
Center 2000]. To respond to such criticism, Cranor et al. evaluated the adoption of P3P
four years after its promotion to W3C standard [Cranor, Egelman, et al. 2008]. A list
of popular search terms was used to create 1160203 search hits from AOL, Google, and
Yahoo!. Of these results, 113880 were for sites that had P3P policies available, show-
ing an approximate adoption rate of 10%. The adoption is strongest for e-commerce
and US government websites. When only e-commerce related search terms are used
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the adoption rate rises to 21%, and among the search hits which have .gov as top-
level domain this value rises to 39%. The E-Government Act, which mandates that
government agencies published machine-readable privacy policies on their websites, is
highlighted as a particular influence in the adoption of P3P. The study also evaluates
the accuracy of the supplied P3P policies and found large numbers of syntactic errors
and discrepancies between P3P policies and their natural language counterparts. De-
spite acknowledging that better tools are required for managing machine-readable and
natural language privacy policies, the authors assert the errors were not critical and
the discrepancies did not impact significantly the evaluation of a policy.
In the web browsers side, only Microsoft Internet Explorer implements the stan-
dard, while Chrome, Firefox and Safari have simple cookie-related privacy settings.
These typically involve the deletion of cookies after the browser is turned off, blocking
cookies entirely or only from third parties. In 2010, Cranor and other Carnegie Mellon
University researchers studied the misuse of P3P’s compact policies by websites [Leon
et al. 2010]. A total of 33139 websites were studied and syntax errors or semantic
conflicts were detected in 11176 of them (34%). Almost all these errors (98%) resulted
in cookies remaining unblocked by Internet Explorer under default privacy settings.
The authors also found thousands of sites using identical invalid compact policies that
had been recommended as workarounds for Internet Explorer’s P3P implementation.
The Internet Explorer Team reported that Google similarly uses an invalid P3P policy
format [Hachamovitch 2012], in an announcement prompted by a different technical
issue - Google’s circumvention of Safari’s default cookie-related privacy settings [Mayer
2012].
Maier [2010], the president of TRUSTe, the leading privacy seal provider, explains
this as a rational developer response to the failure of P3P:
When a lack of mainstream P3P adoption resulted, some developers created
a way to remove a perceived consumer annoyance in IE browsers.
TRUSTe is a private company that awards online privacy seals to web sites, a privacy
practice endorsed by the FTC. TRUSTe requires companies to follow some basic
privacy standards and to document their practices. TRUSTe also investigates consumer
allegations that licensees are not abiding by their policies. However, this approach has
been criticized [McDonald and Cranor 2010] and one study showed that companies
with TRUSTe seals typically offer less privacy-protective policies than those without
TRUSTe seals [Jensen and Potts 2003]. The disagreements between TRUSTe and the
Carnegie Mellon University research group led by Cranor are obvious.
Maier further criticises the complexity of P3P by referencing a learned lessons paper
by someone involved in its standardization process [Schwartz 2009]. In this paper
Schwartz argues that as future PETs are developed they should be kept simple - there
should be no more than four privacy options and the default setting should be set
higher than average practices today. Furthermore he argues the previously mentioned
chicken and egg problem doesn’t exist because the clear way is working with the browser
vendors to implement the support for the PETs, as shown by P3P. Finally, even if PETs
become an alternative to legislation, the development of PETs will not be well-served
by parties that engage in it in order to influence the regulatory debate.
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3.4.3 Simpler Web Privacy
Simpler alternatives to P3P have been recently suggested, as introduced in Section
2.3.7. One such alternative [Raskin 2010; Raskin and Ranganathan 2010] relies in
the standardization of privacy options and their visual representation. Inspired by
the Creative Commons approach, symbols that transmit privacy policy meaning were
drafted, hoping to communicate privacy policy meaning to users quickly and effectively.
While the work was improved within Mozilla [Mozilla 2011], it shows no record of
application.
A lightweight alternative that recently gained momentum and backing from the
FTC [Soghoian 2011a], is DNT [Mayer, Narayanan, and Stamm 2011]. It’s technically
implemented by simply including an HTTP header in requests indicating to the web
server that he is not allowed to collect, retain, or use any data related to that request
and associated response. Browsers should include a simple configuration for the inclu-
sion of the header. The specification has been implemented in all major browsers and
by a number of advertising networks [Mayer and Narayanan 2013]. However, similarly
to P3P, DNT merely improves privacy-related communication between web users and
service providers. The enforcement of no tracking must be conducted by regulatory
authorities, such as the FTC, and supported by legislation. Criticisms to the approach
come unexpectedly also from the legal side, saying such initiatives deviate the legal
discourse from making fundamental trade-off decision about what are and aren’t ac-
ceptable web tracking practices, focusing on providing users with legal protection for
a choice they aren’t prepared to make [Tene and Polenetsky 2012, p. 357].
Another privacy-protection mechanism which is widely implemented in major
browsers is the private browsing mode. Unlike DNT, this mechanism is purely tech-
nological: it limits local browsing-related information, such as browsing history and
cookies. Keeping no browsing history records enables protection against local attack-
ers, that may want to check or retrieve the user’s browsing history having access to his
device. Volatile cookies, that are deleted when the user closes the private browsing win-
dow, protects against cookie-based linking of browsing activity, commonly performed
by targeted advertising networks. However, private browsing functionality is not the
same across all browsers, and even if the cookies are temporary other mechanisms are
available in private mode that can be used by a remote attacker to link private browsing
sessions with non-private ones [G. Aggarwal et al. 2010]. Also, concern has been raised
regarding the false privacy expectations that this mechanism may give users, possibly
encouraging them in engaging risky online behaviour [Soghoian 2011b].
A proposed solution to harmonize privacy and behavioural advertising requirements
is Adnostic [Toubiana et al. 2010], a browser extension that runs the behavioural tar-
geting algorithm on behalf of the ad network. The ad to be displayed is determined
by user’s browser, using browsing history information, and inserted in the page. Infor-
mation about the user’s preferences would only be released as he clicks ads to browse
the advertised product or service.
3.5 Conclusions
Privacy issues in communications can be seen from diverse perspectives, involving dif-
ferent fields in each perspective. The objective is often to prevent disclosure (i.e. collec-
tion) or dissemination (i.e. distribution) of data. Such preventive techniques focus on a
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priori privacy protection. Preventing disclosure of data is usually done to protect from
attackers in the network, as discussed in Section 3.2. One party want to communicate
some data to another party, and the goal is to protect the data and sometimes also the
fact that the two parties communicated. Preventing the dissemination of data, on the
other hand, is a distributed systems problem. It assumes that some remote system is
rightly storing some personal data from an individual, and aims controlling the access
to that data by other systems. Solutions for this type of problem were presented in
Section 3.4.1.
In many cases, however, technically preventing the disclosure or dissemination of
data is not a goal because the data is required by some service provider to fulfil some
service. In these cases mixed solutions with technological and regulatory components
emerge in an attempt to enforce a posteriori privacy protection, such as P3P and DNT.
The generic goal of these solutions is to give users tools to choose and communicate
whether they consent to some web service provider data capture and handling prac-
tices. However, as user behaviour is difficult to understand (see Section 2.3.8) and
privacy trade-offs difficult to communicate, the effectiveness of these approaches has
been frequently questioned.
Privacy-enhancing IdM is a field with the potential to balance privacy and func-
tionality, as described in Section 3.3.2. The generic nature that enables such flexibility,
involving many a priori privacy protection perspectives, is also the reason why it can
be attacked at every level. From the network side, identifiers can be used to attack the
unlinkability of different pseudonyms belonging to the same individual [Hansen et al.
2004]. From the data side, a set of attribute values can sufficiently isolate a number of
pseudonyms so that the same goal is achieved [Clauβ, Kesdogan, and Kölsch 2005].
A previously proposed network privacy architecture, that assumes IdM as part of
the application layer, defines out a vertical, cross-layer approach [Matos 2012]. Alter-
natively, an Identity Layer approach was explored in this thesis, as part of the work in
contributed to the Societies project. An Identity Layer tightly integrated with en-
cryption in order to minimize key authentication problems would effectively separate
the two attack levels - network and data - allowing them to be addressed in more re-
stricted attack models. Because cookies are the technical support of current identities
in the web, an Identity Layer would obsolete them providing means of storing data on
the user-side that cannot be used to excessively link his activities.
Furthermore, the benefits of an Identinet and of the distributed characteristics of a
service-oriented ecosystem built over such an Identity Layer are explored in [Gonçalves
and Gomes 2014]. Such system would differ from traditional service-oriented architec-
tures because it attempts to counter the current centralization status quo of the web
in favour of a service ecosystem composed by user-hosted peers that can behave at the
same time as service consumers and providers. Finally, information flow control mech-
anisms built on top of an Identity Layer facilitate client-side monitoring and auditing,
as shown by Vardjan and Porekar [Vardjan and Porekar 2013].
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Chapter Four
Context-awareness
and Ambient Intelligence
Context-aware systems are presented, covering enabled scenarios, existing architec-
tural approaches and privacy work specific for this area. The shortcomings of cur-
rent solutions, namely their unsuitability for real-time adaptation, are analysed. This
chapter contains contributions to the state-of-the-art, published in three conference
papers and a journal, regarding context-awareness scenarios, an event-based approach
to context management, and a low-latency access control system addressing the key
context-specific privacy issue while complying with the real-time nature of the context
delivery process.
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4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Context-awareness and Future Visions
The vision of AmI, which oriented European ICT research for the last decade [Punie
2003], is close to become possible. Users will daily interact with dozens of connected
devices, many times not explicitly as devices are embedded in human environments.
These devices may gather data from their surroundings and enable actuation on the
physical environment. The communication challenges for the realization of this vision
are being addressed under the M2M umbrella, namely wireless and wired communica-
tion to both low-powered and unconstrained devices, remote device management and
data communication [Wu et al. 2011]. Work in this area has attracted interest from the
Telecommunications industry as providing a connectivity service to these devices may
be a business model for the future. This connected objects vision is also frequently re-
ferred to as the IoT, despite this being considered an Internet-oriented vision. A more
unique perspective of IoT, under a Things-oriented vision, is the use of RFID tags and
readers in order to identify and electronically track objects and goods [L. Atzori, Iera,
and Morabito 2010], enabling a wide range of new use cases.
The goals of context-awareness are included in the AmI vision: contextual infor-
mation relevant for an application or service is gathered and used for adaptation and
improved user interaction. While AmI doesn’t restrict itself to context-awareness, it
makes extensive use of the reactivity that context-awareness enables. Similarly to
what happens in M2M and IoT, information is primarily gathered via connected ob-
jects capable of sensing the physical world around them. However, the service use
cases related to these two paradigms aren’t the typical sensing-actuating scenarios of
context-awareness. The emphasis is on data gathering and mining in order to enable
tailored value-added services. Where context-awareness commonly requires real-time
updates for its adaptation scenarios, in most M2M and IoT scenarios only up-to-date
information is required, where a delay of some minutes is acceptable.
4.1.2 Towards Ambient Intelligence
The term context-awareness was introduced more than a decade ago. Much has been
written and done related to this area since then, contributing to a state-of-the-art that
appears to be sufficient for the realization the scenarios that were laid out, some of
them included in the AmI vision. In a widespread adoption scenario different systems
would use context information acquired from the same sources, delivered by means
of a context delivery system, promoting reuse and transmission optimization of con-
text information. However the context-aware applications that managed to get some
commercial success are vertical, relying either on user devices or environment sensors
to gather their own context information and use it for a specific application. The
most relevant are probably LBS such as Google Latitude, Foursquare and Gowalla
(before being acquired by Facebook), which gathered significant user bases in just a
few years. However, these services are typically vertical and social-oriented: a user
manually shares at what venue or public place he is at the moment, based on a list of
existing venues in the area, crowdsourced from users of the service, and on the user’s
location. Users can usually also search for nearby venues (restaurants, pubs, . . . ). The
only context-aware adaptation that takes place in these services is assisting the user
finding venues based on his current location. The de-verticalization of context infor-
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mation gathering and consumption is a key step towards the realization of the AmI
vision, as having hundreds of vertical services consuming the same types of context
information directly from the sensors would be unmanageable and inefficient.
Another key requirement, even further away from being achieved, is reactivity. The
success of HTTP and of the client-server model is heavily influencing the approaches
taken for future data services. As example, a key proposed M2M standard [European
Telecommunications Standards Institute 2011] perpetuates the request-response model,
ideal for scenarios where centralized servers held all the required data. In order to
deliver information from sensors to applications in a timely manner, the distributed
interaction model must be primarily event-oriented instead.
Finally, privacy aspects are essential to the social acceptance of these future scenar-
ios [Punie 2003]. In a world where large quantities of information are made available
by a variety of devices, and that part of that information is used to provide, adapt and
improve services, it becomes key to align the amount of information required with the
amount of information disclosed. Technical mechanisms that minimize the quantity,
precision or freshness of communicated information, given the requirements of active
services, are especially relevant this scenario. Regarding non-reactive use cases using
historical context information, the privacy protection problem is similar to the one in
current database scenarios, addressable by methods introduced in Section 2.3.4 and
discussed in Chapter 5.
4.1.3 Chapter Outline
More formal context-awareness definitions are presented in Section 4.2, as well as com-
mon requirements and scenarios, including two scenarios developed within the scope of
this thesis. In Section 4.3, after analysing existing architectural solutions, architectural
instantiations of context-aware services, and an event-based context-management plat-
form, are presented. In Section 4.4 the state of the art in context privacy is analysed.
Drawing from access and disclosure control techniques from Section 3.4 the event-based
architecture is extended to support real-time complex context disclosure control mech-
anisms. This enhancement is presented in Section 4.4, with the other context privacy
work, and thoroughly discussed in Section 4.5.
4.2 Foundations of Context-Awareness
4.2.1 Definition
The most often used definition of context is given by Abowd et al. [1999]. These
authors refer to context as
any information that can be used to characterize the situation of an
entity (a person, place, or object) that is considered relevant to the interac-
tion between a user and an application, including the user and applications
themselves.
According to this description, if we disregard application domains, context information
can be practically any information as long as it is related to some entity. The generality
of this definition is pointed out by Winograd [2001] despite the value brought by the
emphasis on the relationship of that information with an entity - person, place or thing.
The classification of specific context information is then a frequent topic in litera-
ture, probably because of this definition problem. Again, Dey and Abowd define four
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primary types of context information: identity, activity, time, and location. These pri-
mary types of context information answer the questions of “who?”, “what?”, “when?”,
and “where?”, and they can be used to get other sources of context information. Other
popular classification method is the distinction of different context dimensions. Prekop
and Burnett [2003] and Gustavsen [2002] call these dimensions external and internal,
and Hofer et al. [2003] refer to it as physical and logical context. The external/physical
dimension refers to context that can be measured by hardware sensors (i.e. location,
light, sound, movement, touch, temperature or air pressure) whereas the internal/log-
ical dimension is mostly specified by the user or captured by monitoring and inferring
user interactions (i.e. the user’s goals, tasks, work context, business processes, the
user’s emotional state).
Frequently associated with the context information definition discourse are the
scenarios enabled by context-awareness. There are three categories of features that
context-aware applications can exhibit [Abowd et al. 1999]:
• presentation of current context information to a user;
• automatic execution or adaptation of a service; and
• storing interrelated context information for posterior processing.
While the first and third feature categories can easily be identified in M2M and
IoT scenarios, the human-interactive nature of context awareness is unique to the AmI
vision. This is also the one that has the stricter set of requirements, as will be discussed
in the next Section.
4.2.2 Capabilities and Requirements
In order to drive context-awareness closer to reality, some authors proposed a set
of functionalities and capabilities that should be present in such a system. Pascoe
[1998] identified four core capabilities in order to support context-awareness in wearable
systems in a generic way:
• contextual sensing: simple detection of environmental changes using sensors;
• contextual adaptation: application behaviour change given these changes;
• contextual resource discovery: discovery and exploitation of context resources;
and
• contextual augmentation: associating digital data with a particular context.
While it is clear that these capabilities are somewhat generic, Pascoe’s validation and
examples are restricted to location information, the type of information used in his
validation scenario. Furthermore, the scenario application allowed users to visualize
location and attach that information to notes taken by the user. The described system
is not distributed and there is no reactive or adaptive feature in the application.
Dey, Abowd, and Salber [2001], based on their more generic context-awareness
vision introduced in previous work [Abowd et al. 1999], propose a wider set of require-
ments for a context-enabling framework:
• Separation of Concerns: separation of how context is acquired from how it is
used (i.e. one sensor can provide context to a number of different applications
and applications can easily get context information from different sensors);
• Context Interpretation: high-level socially relevant context is inferred from low-
level physical context information (e.g. a meeting can be detected based on co-
location, sound levels and schedules);
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• Transparent and Distributed Communications: because sensors may be physically
distributed, a network and a global time synchronization mechanism are required,
so that context is communicated in a comparable and combinable way;
• Constant Availability of Context Acquisition: because context acquiring compo-
nents run independently of applications, and their information may be needed at
any moment, these components must be always running;
• Context Storage and History: context acquiring components should maintain a
history of all obtained context in order for prediction and tailoring functionality
to be implemented;
• Resource Discovery: in order for an application to communicate with a context
acquiring component, it must know what kind of information the component can
provide, where it is located and how to communicate with it (protocol, language
and mechanisms to use).
These authors recognise the need for transparent communications and time synchro-
nization mechanism, but say nothing about timely delivery. A limit on context delivery
latency is a key hidden requirement for adaptation scenarios, as described in previous
Sections. The maximum delivery latency depends on the type and precision of the
transported context information: more precise and dynamic context information has
tighter latency constraints. As example, the user location expressed in terms of city
doesn’t need to be updated in the exact second that the user leaves the city limits,
while the precise indoor location used for smart-building adaptation, such as lighting
and door lock controls, does. Assuming that the adaptation scenarios are for improving
human interaction with systems, the latency limits are bound by human perception
and reaction times. From the field of cognitive psychology, the value of 190 millisec-
onds for human visual reaction time [Kosinski 2008] is considered as a context delivery
latency reference throughout the work presented in this Chapter.
4.2.3 Scenarios and Business Value
From all the scenarios possible with context-awareness, the ones explored in work re-
lated to this thesis are taken as examples of the provided functionality and business
potential. These scenarios were studied and developed by building upon context man-
agement work done in the c-cast project, and were published in conferences [Simões
et al. 2009; Gonçalves, Delahaye, and Lamorte 2010].
The Context-aware Triggering System [Simões et al. 2009] has the ability to trigger a
reaction to a specific occurrence or a set of events. This is a key functionality in context-
aware systems, due to its reactive nature, and can be considered both as a standalone
application or as a building-block for other services. Two use cases are presented,
respectively one for each of the two approaches: a geo-fence messaging application and
a targeted advertisement trigger service. The geo-fence messaging application considers
the contacts the user has, as well as their demographics, presence and location, in order
to trigger automatic messages which can promote social encounter or as heads up for
arrival to a meeting or gathering. The business value of this application is especially
directed to Telecommunication companies as the automatic messages would be charged
to the user as a regular text message or data in their mobile phone.
The second use case is a targeted advertising scenario where advertising companies
can send targeted campaigns towards their customers or even aiming at new clients
that are willing to receive commercials in exchange for some other benefits (discounts
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or gifts). The use case focuses on users in proximity of a number of sell-points or shops.
The information about the available goods and promotions is available. Although the
advertisement is triggered by location, the advertisement selection also take the goods
and promotions information as well as the user preferences into consideration. Let
different shops have their triggers and respective content set-up under approximately
the same location, an airport. Several context information types associated with the
defined triggers are pro-actively being monitored by the context triggering application.
At some point in time, a user triggers (due to location) several different ads which are
then ranked in order to decide which ad to deliver. Advertisement is the main source
of revenue for web companies, so the value potential of this service is very appealing.
Context-aware Content Rating [Gonçalves, Delahaye, and Lamorte 2010] is the
intelligent context-aware ranking of multimedia content, both professional and user-
generated. Techniques typically used in recommender systems rely in the manual
rating of content by users in order to recommend content. However, regardless if
the recommendation techniques are content-based (i.e. recommends based on content
similarity) or collaboration-based (i.e. recommends based on user similarity), they are
vulnerable to the new user/item problem: until the new item is rated by a substantial
number of users, or the new user rated a substantial number of items, the recommender
system would not be able to produce meaningful recommendations [Adomavicius and
Tuzhilin 2005]. Furthermore these recommender systems create a static user profile that
does not consider the specific context the user is in. Context-aware Content Rating
enables rating of content suitability based on metadata and context-information alone.
Instead of using content ratings, service providers can rate content based on:
• location - the user is to get more content related to where he is located;
• presence and calendar - if the user is busy or has free time he may be interest to
get only essential information or time-sink content;
• proximity - if the user is co-located to another users then he may be interested
in similar content those users are consuming;
• preferences - if the user is interested in politics, sports, finance or other category
he should get more content about that.
One use case is tourist cultural content delivery: as a tourist goes around town in
the bus, historic site presentation videos are played in order, based on his location and
profile information. In between the historical videos, restaurant or hotel advertisements
are played, based on location and on the advertisement contracts.
While these scenarios are promising in terms of user experience and business value,
the privacy problem that context awareness might cause are a key obstacle to their
commercial implementation. In Section 4.3 the architectural foundations for imple-
menting these scenarios are discussed, and in Section 4.4 privacy aspects of context
management systems are addressed.
4.3 Architectures for Context-Awareness
4.3.1 Context Management State-of-the-Art
From these requirements it is defined a conceptual context-enabling framework that
is composed of five building blocks: widgets, interpreters, aggregators, services and
discoverers [Dey, Abowd, and Salber 2001]. The applications make use of these to
implement context-aware behaviour relying on a comprehensive set of functionalities.
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Context widgets acquire context information. Interpreters transform and raise the
level of abstraction of context information, possibly by combining multiple pieces of
context. Aggregators gather context information related to an entity for easy access by
applications. Services execute behaviours on the environment using acquired context
- they are actuator abstractions. Finally, discoverers allow applications to determine
the capabilities of the environment and to take advantage of them.
This widget model is one of the models analysed by Winograd [2001], in addition
to his blackboard model and to a networked services model described by Hong and
Landay [2001]. This networked services model aims to decrease the coupling towards
the context acquisition components. The context acquisition components act as servers
and can be accessed at will, independent of location, by dynamic discovery or configu-
ration. The blackboard model is a flexible and loose-coupled data-centric model where
information sources can be added transparently, but not the most optimal because all
context messages are generic and every communication requires two hops. H. Chen,
Finin, and Joshi [2003] and H. Chen, Finin, and Joshi [2004] defined a Context Bro-
ker Architecture (CoBrA): an agent based architecture for supporting context-aware
systems using a central agent called Context Broker (CxB) . This architecture, sim-
ilarly to Winograd’s blackboard, defines a generic context model. Additionally, it is
responsible for acquiring context information for resource-limited devices, reason about
context information, detect and resolve inconsistent context information, and protect
user privacy by enforcing policies that the users have defined.
Some EU-funded projects that addressed context management also opted for a
broker-based architecture, namely MobiLife [Floréen et al. 2005] and C-CAST [Zafar
et al. 2009]. The main difference of both these approaches when compared to Wino-
grad’s blackboard model and Chen’s CoBrA is the main method of obtaining context
information: MobiLife and C-CAST define it as a query initiated by the peers, in-
stead of a notification from the CxB when context changes occur. Similarly to Chen’s
CoBrA, these Context Management Architecture (CxMA) define a generic context
model and decouple context acquisition from consumption, but delegate reasoning to
external components. Furthermore, both projects define the Context Provider (CxP)
and Context Consumer (CxC) architectural entities as part of addressing separation
of concerns - the CxP feeds context information into the system, and the CxC fetches
it.
Another EU-funded project, MUSIC, developed a middleware platform [Paspallis
et al. 2008] which exposes an API to supply, query for and be notified about context
information. Also under this project a new context model was specified [Reichle, M.
Wagner, Khan, Geihs, Lorenzo, et al. 2008], as well as a Context Query Language
(CQL) [Reichle, M. Wagner, Khan, Geihs, Valla, et al. 2008] which enables filtering and
aggregation of results while querying for some context information. This language was
later adapted for use in the c-cast CxB architecture. Another example of middleware
solution is Gaia [Román et al. 2002]. Gaia makes use of five core services: Event
Manager Service, Context Service, Presence Service, Space Repository Service and
Context File System. The Event Manager decouples context suppliers and consumers,
allowing them to communicate via channels where message persistence is guaranteed.
The Context Service provides the system with tools to handle the chosen generic context
model. The Presence Service maintains information about the existing entities in the
environment. The Space Repository Service allows the system to know about existing
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computing and output resources and their properties. Finally, the Context File System
provides storage that builds virtual directory structures based on context, allowing
files to be accessed easily based on some context information. Another example is the
SOCAM middleware [Gu, Pung, and D. Q. Zhang 2004] that makes use of an ontology
based context model and defines three basic components, Context Providers, Context
Interpreters and Service Locating Service, in order to support context-aware mobile
services. The Context Interpreters that take in low level context to provide higher
level context, using reasoning and a context knowledge base, and are integrated in the
platform similarly to the approach adopted in C-CAST, by using the typical CxC and
CxP interfaces. The Service Locating Service provides discovery functionality for the
existing resources.
These CxMA target the problem of enabling context-awareness functionalities in a
reusable and convenient way for different scenarios and applications. However, in order
for the proposed solution to be easily adopted, the architecture should enable context
and service providers controlled by different entities and belonging to different secu-
rity domains to establish trust relationships and to interoperate. These requirements
are generally captured by the notion of the federation mechanisms which should be
considered in a CxMA.
Another issue with the analysed CxMA is the reaction time of the resulting context-
aware systems. The most interesting types of context information to use are usually
quite dynamic and variable in time (ex. location, temperature, ambient noise levels,
. . . ). For these to be used in AmI adaptation scenarios, context-aware services need
to be notified of relevant context changes in near real-time. As mentioned in Section
4.2.2, the human notion of real-time can be drawn from the field of cognitive psychology.
For a CxMA to enable services to receive context changes in under 190ms it clearly
cannot rely in polling mechanisms for fetching content. A CxMA supporting adaptation
scenarios must have an event-oriented mechanism that as primary method of context
dissemination.
Furthermore, the benefits of a generic context representation adopted by some of
the proposed solutions are not clear. Introducing a new generic context representation
language increases the complexity of the solution, without reaping a clear benefit. Ex-
isting extensible data formats exist that have diverse characteristics required by the
different solutions. These should be used in order to maximize interoperability. Finally,
the discovery mechanisms proposed are typically complex, and sometimes coupled with
the actual context information querying process. For greater flexibility, context dis-
covery and delivery should be decoupled.
4.3.2 Context-awareness in Service-oriented Systems
The earliest contributions to the state of the art from the work presented in this thesis
are related to the development of the c-cast context-awareness architecture [Zafar
et al. 2009]. Based on this work two architectural work-tracks emerged, introducing
context-awareness pre-existing architectures [Simões et al. 2009; Gonçalves, Delahaye,
and Lamorte 2010] in order to implement the scenarios described in Section 4.2.3.
In order to do this, a service-oriented approach was taken, integrating the context
management platform in more complex systems composed of service enablers. Each of
these enablers brings a different, self-contained set of functionality to the system.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the Context-aware Triggering System Architecture
The first context-awareness integration resulted in the development of the Context-
aware Triggering System, using IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) [Simões et al. 2009].
This system relies in five service enablers in order to deliver rich context-based trigger-
ing functionality, as shown in Figure 4.1: Rich Presence Enabler, Messaging Enabler,
Session Management Enabler, Content Management Enabler and Context Enabler.
The Context Enabler is the c-cast Context Management platform used as a building
block to deliver reactive Telecommunications services. The service enablers communi-
cate using a service integration layer, dubbed Service Broker / Orchestrator, provid-
ing discovery and configurable service-oriented communication between the enablers.
Below the enablers an IMS platform is used for executing the trigger actions, indepen-
dently if they involve simple messaging or a multimedia session.
The second context-awareness instantiation in a service-oriented system was a mul-
timedia content rating system [Gonçalves, Delahaye, and Lamorte 2010], aimed at
recommending multimedia content, both professional and user-generated, relying on
contextual information instead of manual ratings. Four enablers are required for this
system, depicted in Figure 4.2. Similarly to what happened in the Triggering System,
Content Management, Context Management, and Content Delivery functions are pro-
vided by enablers. The content rating is provided by the Content Selection Enabler
which takes enriched content meta-data from an advanced Context Management En-
abler and compares it against the context information based on configuration provided
by the specific content service.
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Figure 4.2: Overview of the Context-aware Content Rating System Architecture
4.3.3 Event-driven Federated Context Management
All the described CxMA enable the de-verticalization of context-aware applications, a
key function of context-aware systems, but employ different paradigms and technologies
in doing so. The most common case is having a request-response paradigm, which is
typically implemented in recent years using Representational State Transfer (REST)
approach. REST is a style for providing data services over HTTP (i.e. web services),
where a Create/Remove/Update/Delete (CRUD) data operation is directly mapped to
an HTTP request: the data resource is identified by the requested path, the operation
by the request method, and the arguments for the create or update case are supplied
in the request body. It is a minimalist approach to data services, using Domain Name
System (DNS) for service discovery, not providing a service registry or an explicit
interface definition.
Message-Oriented Middleware (MOM) is another architectural paradigm which had
significant attention and dissemination, but that has been recently somewhat forgot-
ten due to the massive adoption of HTTP-based web services. A MOM infrastructure,
such as Java Message Service (JMS) [Hapner et al. 2002], allows diverse software com-
ponents to communicate asynchronously. A coordinating component, usually called
message broker, will handle endpoint resolution, message persistence and routing. The
most striking difference between MOM and traditional web service is the messaging
model: web services normally use the request-response model, while MOM supports
more flexible and generic asynchronous messaging, which includes the publish-subscribe
model.
As referred in Section 3.3.5, XMPP has been adapted for applications other than
IM, such as VoIP [Ludwig et al. 2009] and microblogging [Saint-Andre et al. 2012],
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Figure 4.3: Global Architecture and Context Flow
and was recently proposed to be used for sensor control [Waher 2013]. Also, it can be
used as a lightweight approach to MOM, more interoperable and dodging technological
lock-ins of proprietary systems. However, unlike a typical enterprise MOM, it does not
provide transaction management and may be less scalable.
In order to meet the context delivery latency requirements identified in Section
4.2.2, an event-driven context management platform was developed, building upon the
learned lessons of the c-cast context management architecture. The XCoA platform
[Gomes et al. 2010] uses XMPP as the main communication protocol because it re-
sponds to several requirements identified in the previous section, such as federation
and PubSub [Millard, Saint-Andre, and Meijer 2010], through the direct use of an ex-
isting standard. The extensibility of XMPP is one of its most important features, since
it can be extended to support context information exchange.
Figure 4.3 shows the global architecture with the PubSub and XMPP elements
involved. Context agents, posteriorly renamed to Context Source (CxS) to be consis-
tent with other CxMA, can be very diverse - from sensors in mobile devices to social
network profiles. Some CxS can be specific to a CxP as the Wireless Sensors Net-
work Provider that communicate using a specific protocol. In the typical case CxP
receives context information from CxS located on Android-based applications, which
reads information from the available sensors, such as GPS, presence, mobile cell info,
movement and luminosity.
In XCoA, the context information is sent from CxS - implemented as XMPP clients
- on the user’s terminals, sensors or networks connecting to CxP. The CxP listen
for a specific context type from any agent and are built on the concept of XMPP
components - entities void of IM and presence functionality. Avoiding IM and presence
packets avoids overhead, enabling CxP them to scale better. Finally, the CxC can be
either XMPP clients or components depending on the number of enablers they intend
to support. Some CxP can also be consumers (e.g. the Location CxP fetches GPS
or mobile cell information from other CxP and then publish the corresponding civil
address as its own context information). In Table 4.1 we can see the mapping between
the CxS involved and the XMPP implementation used to represent them.
For the XMPP server we used Openfire which is open source and Java based. The
choice was made not only because Openfire has already many XEP included, but also
because Java is a very common programming language. One important feature is the
support for federation mechanism, that permits server to server communication. Open-
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Context Actor XMPP Structure
Sources Clients
Providers Components
Consumers Clients or Components
Table 4.1: Relationship between roles in context management and XMPP structures
Figure 4.4: Context Consumption
Figure 4.5: Context Acquisition
fire also allows to install or remove plugins in a very easy way and even develop new
plugins, if needed, to add new functionalities. Most of the CxP are implemented in
Java, using Smack as the XMPP library [Ignite Realtime 2002b]. All the CxP are
external components, connected to the CxB - an XMPP server with PubSub function-
ality. CxP can either publish context information to the CxB, where context is cached
and committed to a history repository, or listen for specific context queries that can
be issued directly by CxC. These two communication schemes are presented in Figure
4.4.
We use IQ (Info/Query) XMPP stanzas for the communication between CxS and
CxP, since it provide a simple structure for request-response interactions similar to
the GET, POST, and PUT methods used on HTTP. Context information is collected
from context agents through two different processes according to the nature and re-
liability of the context (Figure 4.5). The provider does the validation of the context
information and then replies back with success or error. After receiving a valid XML,
providers will publish consistent and aggregated information into the context broker.
This intermediate step intends to address reliability and scalability concerns.
The described workflow cannot be used in all use-cases. As an example for social
profile and social network providers we have resorted to external service providers:
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Figure 4.6: Example of a Context PubSub Node Tree
Facebook and Orkut. These service provider offers a public API from which the de-
veloped providers can extract context information. These very specific CxP connect
the service providers to the context management platform, proxying their information
to the CxB. Information retrieved is then transferred to the CxB Cache and history
using the same method described for the GPS use case.
CxC connects to the CxB in order to discover CxP. Context information is then
retrieved directly from CxP through a polling mechanism or through a PubSub mech-
anism implemented by the CxB.
XMPP PubSub function is a relevant part of the platform, providing a framework
of event notifications. There are two key elements in this model: the publisher and
the subscriber, mediated by a service that receives publication requests and broadcasts
event notifications to all subscribers. This allows the subscribers to receive context
information without the need to poll the server. The service is contained in the broker’s
XMPP server and is also responsible on managing the entities authorized to publish or
subscribe. All the information is stored in a node to which publishers send data that
is then fetched by subscribers upon notification. The information is stored in a tree of
two types of nodes:
• Collection nodes - can have more nodes inside but no published information;
• Leaf nodes - can be inside collection nodes and contain published data.
Regardless of node type, every node in the tree must have an unique name. Because
of this limitation it was necessary to define some rules for the node creation. In Figure
4.6 is depicted part of a PubSub tree where we can see root nodes, that exist for
every provider (location, GPS, profile, . . . ), inside of each we can create collection
nodes identified by the name of it’s parent - the CxP - concatenated with the unique
identifier of the correspondent user.
Using XMPP allows the users to have multiple connected devices at the same time.
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In Figure 4.6 the user otero@c3s.av.it.pt has published from two devices: home and
mobile. For the leaf nodes we add the device identifier on where the context applies.
Therefore, we can have a user with multiple context information for different devices,
stored under leaf nodes identified by provider, user and device. In some cases, because
of the nature of the provider, it doesn’t make sense to have different context when the
user publishes from different devices (e.g. social profile context) and so there’s only
a leaf node named node@domain/default. All CxC subscribing some user’s context
information should be aware not only of the correct CxP but also of what device to
subscribe to. The subscription can be made anytime and the context information will
be broadcasted to all subscribed clients or components.
Example 1 A Context Update from a GPS CxS
<iq type="set" to="gps.c3s.hng.av.it.pt" id="set1">
<query>
<gps xmlns="http://c3s.hng.av.it.pt/gps">
<latitude>45.21134</latitude>
<longitude>7.67054</longitude>
<accuracy>580</accuracy>
<altitude>19.3</altitude>
<bearing>18.3</bearing>
<speed>5</speed>
</gps>
</query>
</iq>
Example 1 shows the XML sent by the GPS CxS from an Android terminal to
the GPS CxP. The presented XML is an XMPP IQ stanza the defines a request to
be processed by the GPS provider. The provider does the validation of the context
information and then replies back with success or error. After receiving a valid XML,
providers will create (if not already present) the previously describe tree in the XMPP
PubSub component, and publish the exact same information - in the example only
whatever comes inside the <gps> node.
4.4 Disclosure Minimization in Context Information Systems
4.4.1 Location Disclosure Control
From the different types of context information currently used in services, location
is the one that draws most attention since it is a very dynamic and relevant type
of context. LBS have become increasingly more popular, taking as example popular
web and smartphone location applications. Barkhuus and Dey [2003] had already
published a case study back in 2003 that concluded that users are less concerned
about their location being tracked as long as they found the service to be useful,
and history seems to prove them right. Despite this significant success, there is still
no comprehensive technological solution for adequately addressing privacy in systems
that make use of context information. Access control in LBS is typically done by
whitelisting users and other applications [Tsai et al. 2010], allowing them to access
the location information. Furthermore, most of these applications require explicit user
action for publishing information. The user has to say where he is from a location-
aware list of places, an action commonly referred to as a check-in. This is also a form of
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privacy protection since permanently tracking the user without further control is very
intrusive. However, in an AmI scenario location information will be published not only
to other people but also to the entities that control the devices around us, embedded
in the environment. This implies two things: first, the check-in technique currently
used in many LBS is not an option, and second, the latency performance requirements
for the context distribution become tighter.
These methods are the most common ones but they are not the state of the art on
location context privacy. Toch et al. [2009] and Benisch et al. [2010] consider a location
privacy preference model that uses not only whitelists but also the location information
value, time of day and date. In their study, Benisch et al. measure the accuracy with
which different privacy settings are able to capture the subject’s preferences. Results
show that using detailed privacy preferences such as date, time and location values
leads to a 3 time increase in the accuracy of the settings, compared to whitelist-based
settings only.
4.4.2 Context Quality and Obfuscation
Controlling who accesses the information is not the only way to protect location data.
For example, Ardagna et al. [2007] use obfuscation techniques, which consist of deliber-
ately providing less precise or even erroneous information. There is much done regard-
ing the definition of specific obfuscation techniques for each context type. However,
addressing context privacy generically has not been thoroughly explored. Wishart,
Henricksen, and Indulska [2007] present a generic model for obfuscation which is strik-
ingly similar to the generalization techniques of PPDM introduced in Section 2.3. This
type of obfuscation requires ontologies to be defined for each context type, as there are
potentially different levels of detail that can be considered. Location can have many
detail levels, such as “room”, “building”, “city”, while other context information might
be of binary nature only allow or deny its access.
Sheikh, Wegdam, and Sinderen [2008] takes a different approach on context privacy
by considering Quality of Context (QoC) - indicators describing how closely a piece of
context information relates to reality. Sheikh argues that privacy is managed as a com-
promise between the different QoC expectations of the stakeholders - context owner,
source and requester. This approach is aligned with the generic identity and privacy
approaches previously presented. Sheikh et al. identify five measures of QoC: precision,
freshness, spatial resolution, temporal resolution and probability of correctness. The
required QoC is specified per service or service situation based on these parameter, so
that services are not provided with access to context of a higher quality than is needed
for the functioning of the services - the minimal disclosure principle.
4.4.3 Access Control in Event-Driven Context Management Architecture
In an event-driven CxMA, such as XCoA, context is distributed by publishing to
PubSub nodes to which CxC are subscribed. The nodes here play the role of resources:
in a request-response case a request would be sent to a resource containing the targeted
information. In traditional access control, such as described for the web in Section 3.4,
the access decision is done per request based on the requesting subject, the action being
performed, the targeted resource, and environment parameters such as date and time.
However, in context distribution, in both for request-response and publish-subscribe
cases, the resource is volatile: the values it contains change over time, in many cases
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Figure 4.7: Architecture with Privacy-related Access Control
rather quickly. Since we are aiming at considering the context values themselves for
the decision, not only the resource identifier, the traditional access control model needs
to be extended. In addition to this, the real-time nature of the context distribution
process cannot be debilitated by the implemented access control mechanism.
In order to address the problem of low-latency access control, the architecture
initially presented by Gomes et al. [2010] was enhanced. This access control scheme
supports decisions based on both resource value and metadata, as suggested by the
privacy work of Toch et al. [2009]. The enhancement comprises of a new functional
component, the Privacy Aggregator, depicted in Figure 4.7, and a few changes in
existing components, namely in CxP and CxB. This component is the user’s contact
point for choosing privacy settings, and it is necessary for two main reasons. First,
communicating the privacy setting implications to the user is an important problem
[Sadeh et al. 2009] that needs to be tackled with specific solutions [Benisch et al.
2010]. Second, for the conception of the Privacy Aggregator relates to the concept
and architectural definition of a CxP. Since different CxP may belong to different
entities, and a user typically interacts with more than one CxP, having one of them
accessing the privacy preferences meant to another CxP is not acceptable. The Privacy
Aggregator works as a broker for specialized settings distribution. After the user sets
his privacy options, the Privacy Aggregator is responsible for separating them per CxP
and configuring them.
Furthermore, the Privacy Aggregator is bound to perform a key role in chaining
different CxP for obfuscating context. From a CxP description of context inference
and translation capabilities, the Privacy Aggregator can build relationships between
the available context types. Some of these relationships will be obfuscations, and will
replace the statically defined ontologies of previous work. For example, if a CxP exists
that uses GPS location information to infer the city the user is in, then the Privacy
Aggregator associates this with the GPS CxP and take it in account when asking the
user for privacy settings for the GPS context type. The Privacy Aggregator should be
controlled by the user or by some entity that the user trusts (e.g. IdP).
Not only is PubSub better than request-response for context dissemination, due
to the real-time requirements of context-awareness scenarios, but also more flexible
regarding access control. Request-response access control is done per request, and
even if no environment parameters are considered - meaning that access decisions can
be cached - there is always a check required per request. In publish-subscribe the access
control can be enforced on subscription time, which happens typically a small fraction
of the number times that context is required. Adopting his approach required changes
in the original CxB. The CxP will then filter and explode requests to the nodes that are
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supposed to receive them, acording to the privacy policy that the Privacy Aggregator
supplied.
The flexibility of the privacy settings enabled by this scheme fit the user’s privacy
expectations better than the ones currently in use, enabling users concerned with pri-
vacy to share more [Sadeh et al. 2009] [Benisch et al. 2010]. Furthermore, a CxMA
must have low context delivery latencies so that it can be used for adaptation sce-
narios. We believe that these two points are key enablers for the era of AmI. The
low-latency access control scheme [Gonçalves, Gomes, and Aguiar 2012], introduced
here and detailed in Section 4.5, is a relevant contribution to the work presented in
this thesis.
4.5 Low-Latency Access Control
4.5.1 Description
The access control scheme introduced in Section 4.4.3 enables real-time value and meta-
data based access control in an event-driven CxMA. Towards that goal, the concept of
Context Profile was introduced, to ease the definition of the context privacy settings.
A Context Profile refers to a context type and some optional privacy parameters: con-
ditions expressing the values, dates and times for which the information can published,
and an optional publishing delay. Then, in his privacy settings, the user associates
each context profile to groups of entities that may be interested in taking the role of
CxC. It is possible to define several Context Profiles for the same context type, even
with privacy settings that are not mutually exclusive. Consequently the same con-
text information may be distributed under different context profiles. Since the access
control is done at subscription time, each context profile will necessarily correspond
to a different publish-subscribe node, even if the same information is being published.
While this brings an increase in the number of required nodes, or resources, and some
replication of information, it will also reduce the context dissemination latency. It is a
slight trade-off from horizontal scalability - the same server with the same processing
power will typically support less users and load - to latency performance - context
change notifications are as real-time as possible. By making this design choice, the
only access control processing required at publishing time is the part of it that makes
use of contextual information: context values, date and time of day.
The most relevant sub-components and interactions are depicted in Figure 4.8. The
Privacy Aggregator provides the Context Profiles and associated users or user groups
to the appropriate CxP, which implied changes in the original CxP. Since a Context
Profile is context type specific it must be supplied to the CxP that publish that type
of context information, and only to those. The CxP is responsible for managing the
publish-subscribe nodes it publishes to. It must create and destroy them, based on
privacy configuration changes, and manage its associated access control policies - it
plays the role of an XACML PAP. It also is responsible for the contextual checks
required for discovering the appropriate nodes where to publish. This last process
happens once per context update. The CxB only needs to enforce the defined node
access control policies, both when discovering and subscribing to nodes. It plays both
the PDP and PEP roles, although these may be decoupled.
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Figure 4.8: Design specification based on cardinality relationships between context
update, subscription and consumption
4.5.2 Implementation
A prototype of the described system was implemented in order to demonstrate that it
is possible to use complex privacy settings in context distribution without relevantly
impacting the delivery latency and scalability. For this purposed we focused on the
context distribution elements of the architecture because these are the ones that have
an impact in the context delivery latency an that face the most relevant scalability
challenges. The Privacy Aggregator was minimally implemented, only providing the
specialized privacy settings XML to the Provider. The components were implemented
based on existing and new libraries. The implemented architectural components and
main implementation modules are depicted in Figure 4.9. The Context Model is the
module that allows parsing and understanding context information and it can be ex-
tended for different types of context. The Context Privacy Model is the module that
allows parsing and understanding the defined context privacy settings.
The context privacy settings define context profiles, as explained before. In the
Context Privacy Model implementation XML was used to serialize and transport the
settings. The settings represent conditions to be matched to context values, date and
time, in order to evaluate whether some context update is to be published under that
profile or not. Although an extension mechanism was put in place for representing these
conditions, in this implementation only regular expressions were used. An example of
the preferences file is shown in Example 2.
In this example there are two GPS location profiles defined. The first one publishes
location only in if the location is within certain boundaries, in this case nearby the city
of Aveiro, where the user lives as depicted in Figure 4.10. The second profile publishes
Figure 4.9: Main implementation modules
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GPS location within a certain date/time window: from 9:00AM to 19:59PM, from
Monday to Friday. The first profile is made available to the user’s home appliances
(air conditioning, water heating, ...), here identified by home@openfire, for them to be
able to detect when the user is coming home. The second profile is made available to
his work colleagues, here represented by every entity in the openfire domain.
Example 2 Context Privacy Settings XML Representation
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<privacy user="jmgonc@openfire" xmlns="http://iex.ptin.pt/ctx/privacy">
<privacyProfiles>
<profile id="1" name="GPS Tracking for Home Appliances">
<publishedContextNamespace>http://iex.ptin.pt/ctx/gps</publishedContextNamespace>
<parameterRules>
<parameterRule>
<parameter>latitude</parameter>
<condition lang="regexp" var="">40\.6[2-5]\d*</condition>
</parameterRule>
<parameterRule>
<parameter>longitude</parameter>
<condition lang="regexp" var="">-8\.6[2-7]\d*</condition>
</parameterRule>
</parameterRules>
<timeRule>
<timeOfDayCondition lang="regexp" var="">.*</timeOfDayCondition>
<weekdayCondition lang="regexp" var="">.*</weekdayCondition>
<dailyExceptionCondition lang="regexp" var="">0</dailyExceptionCondition>
</timeRule>
<publishingDelay>0</publishingDelay>
</profile>
<profile id="2" name="Friends Place Tracking">
<publishedContextNamespace>http://iex.ptin.pt/ctx/gps</publishedContextNamespace>
<parameterRules>
</parameterRules>
<timeRule>
<timeOfDayCondition lang="regexp" var="hour">9|1\d</timeOfDayCondition>
<weekdayCondition lang="regexp" var="weekday">[2-5]</weekdayCondition>
<dailyExceptionCondition lang="regexp" var="day">0</dailyExceptionCondition>
</timeRule>
<publishingDelay>0</publishingDelay>
</profile>
</privacyProfiles>
<accessGroups>
<accessGroup id="1" name="Home Appliances">home@openfire</accessGroup>
<accessGroup id="2" name="Work Colleagues">openfire</accessGroup>
</accessGroups>
<profileGrouplinks>
<link groupId="1" profileId="1"/>
<link groupId="2" profileId="2"/>
</profileGrouplinks>
</privacy>
The CxP was implemented using Java SE 6 and two existing Java open source
libraries: Smack 3.2.0 [Ignite Realtime 2002b] and Sun XACML 1.2 [Sun n.d.]. The
implementation is able to interpret the context privacy settings, and to create Pub-
Sub nodes and associated access policies in XACML which are supplied to the XMPP
Server. The XACML policy only defines which users are allowed to perform a read ac-
tion on a given resource (PubSub node). When context updates come in from Context
Sources, the provider identifies which are the suitable nodes to which this information
is published, first by checking the entity to which the context refers to, and then by
enforcing the necessary parameter checks on that context information.
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Figure 4.10: Area in which GPS Location is published for the first Context Profile
The CxB is implemented using Openfire [Ignite Realtime 2002a], which defines
a plugin architecture that makes it easy to enforce access control on node discovery
and subscription. Such a plugin was coded, also using the open source Java library
Sun XACML 1.2. The policy for each node is loaded by the plugin to a simple PDP
implementation. Whenever a discovery request for PubSub nodes or a subscription
request arrives, the user and resource information are passed to the PDP in order to
get a decision on whether a resource is accessible or visible to that user.
4.5.3 Performance Validation
In order to evaluate the performance impact of the implemented access control scheme,
a testbed of virtual machines was setup. The performance metrics considered were
processor load and end-to-end latency, in order to demonstrated that the implemented
access control enabled system exibits the following key characteristics:
• does not significantly impact the scalability of the system - the processor load
should only increase by a fraction of the original;
• is suitable for AmI adaptation scenarios - the introduced latency should be a
fraction of the human visual reaction time of 190ms.
The host machine is an Intel Core i7 with 12Gb of RAM running VMWare ESXi
3.5. Four virtual machines were created with 512MB of RAM and a single virtual
core, to ease the processor load measurements. In all of them Ubuntu Linux 11.04
Server edition was installed. Each of the four machines runs one of the components:
CxS, CxP, CxB and CxC. For the CxS a simple Java-based XMPP client was coded,
that generates random location context at a configured rate. Similarly, the CxS is a
Java-based XMPP client that subscribes to the target PubSub nodes and writes to a
file the received context marked with a timestamp. The CxB and CxP were already
described. The baseline CxP is a simple provider that publishes every context that
receives to nodes that it has configured without any further processing. The CxS and
CxC are synchronized automatically before each test using a local NTP server.
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Figure 4.11: Context Provider Average Processor Idleness as Load Increases
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Figure 4.12: Context Broker Average Processor Idleness as Load Increases
In each test session a number of CxS published context at a fixed rate, and the CxC
got that content and wrote it with timestamps to a file. Furthermore, the processor
usage in both the CxB and CxP was measured, for both access control and baseline
cases. The processor measurements are based on the idle processor output from vmstat
[H. Ware and Frédérick n.d.]. The output shows average values for a sampling period
that was set to 2 seconds. Since all the virtual machines only have one core, we don’t
have to worry about multi-core processor measurement issues. The result gathering
was repeated in 5 sessions to detect odd events. Tests show that the same behaviour
was observed in all test sessions, with relative standard deviation well below 10% for
all cases, except in CxB processor measurements with 500 context updates per second
on the access control case. In this case the relative standard deviation reaches almost
15%, due to the CxB not being able to handle all the load at times. In fact, the
CxB processing load at around 500 contexts updates per second was the encountered
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Figure 4.13: End-to-End Context Delivery Latency in Milliseconds with Load Increases
bottleneck for the tested deployment. Figures 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 show the relevant
findings.
As we test with higher load, the average processor occupation rises linearly, both
for the CxP, as seen in Figure 4.11, and for the CxB, shown in Figure 4.12. In fact,
in the CxP case, the average processor occupation is practically the same in both
implementations. The only difference is a slightly larger memory footprint of the
Access Control CxP. In the CxB, however, the linear increase in processing demand
for the access control case is clearly faster than for the original implementation.
To properly analyse the rise in latencies, we have removed the latency data referring
to the first 2 minutes of each session, both for original and access control cases. The
reasoning for this is that the system takes some amount of time, in every case under
2 minutes, to stabilize its performance. We came to this value from the processor
measurements, which show substantially higher loads in the first seconds of each session.
Furthermore, since this is meant to be a system that is always running, the relevant
results are the ones we obtain after the start-up. The results are depicted in Figure
4.13, which shows that context submitted to access control clearly takes more time
to reach the destination, under any load. However this additional delay is estimated
in around 20ms, a value perfectly in line within the human perception of real-time,
representing roughly 10% of the human visual reaction time of 190ms. A bottleneck
on the Context Broker was detected when load increases above certain values, however
this is not relevant for the presented results as performance only starts being affected
with loads above 500 requests per second.
4.6 Conclusions
Context-awareness is a key aspect of the AmI vision and distinguishes itself from work
in M2M and IoT by its reactive nature. The technical feasibility of two flexible scenarios
has been validated by using a context management platform integrated in a service-
oriented ecosystem, within the scope of this thesis [Simões et al. 2009; Gonçalves,
Delahaye, and Lamorte 2010]. While pre-existing work in context management targeted
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the functions necessary to deliver these future services, namely by decoupling context
acquisition from consumption, it did not recognize the importance of the reactivity
aspect in these systems. For that reason, a new event-oriented architecture is presented
and validated with an implementation [Gomes et al. 2010].
Furthermore, the context-specific privacy issue of aligning information that is pub-
lished and consumed was targeted. By extending the proposed event-oriented archi-
tecture, a low-latency access control system was developed. The system is capable of
distributing context information in a privacy-friendly way, while it fulfils the real-time
requirements of the context distribution process. The system considers fine-grained
context privacy settings, allowing the user to set the context type and the valid pa-
rameters for which information should be published.
Further work in this track should include complex access control effects that could
be implemented with probabilistic comparison functions. For example, a profile might
be created that allows GPS updates based on a probabilistic distribution centred on
some coordinates, result on a fade effect of the updates as the user moves away from
those coordinates. Another work track relates with the inclusion of parametrizable
obfuscation CxPs in the platform, configured by the Privacy Aggregator, and the use
of additional QoC metrics for the access control decision.
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Chapter Five
Data Perspective
Data analysis techniques that enable re-identification, as well as existing countermea-
sures, are presented. The limitations of current dataset sanitization techniques are
identified, namely the issues with the high-dimensional case. One of the most relevant
contributions to the state-of-the-art presented in this thesis is a sanitization technique
that works in the high-dimensional case, and is discussed in this chapter.
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5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Personal Data Aggregation
Personal data aggregation is at the centre of the digital economy. Consumption profiles
are build in order to deliver targeted advertising, recommendations and even to be sold
as a commodity. Despite obtaining revenue directly from the use or sale of personal data
being new, data aggregation problems have been discussed already since the 1970’s. A
number of government agencies and private companies, such as credit bureaus, have
long made use of personal information to conduct their activities. The census are an
example of personal data aggregation by a government agency which puts the public
interest in collision course with individual privacy. Using an Statistical Database (SDB)
it is possible to harmonize these two competing requirements, exposing the census data
only through aggregate queries - calculate means and sums. However, even accessing
only the aggregated view of data, it is possible to extract information regarding specific
subjects [Adam and Worthmann 1989].
Today, the focus is more directed to data mining. User behavioural information of
product and movie ratings, social network friends and likes, search terms, purchases
and website visits are used to devise behaviour profiles that can be used for recom-
mendations, targeted advertising or identifying a business opportunity. The field of
Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) aims to address privacy when data is used
or made available for these purposes. The data used in these scenarios is typically made
available to third parties in an supposedly anonymized form. However, the employed
anonymization mechanisms are usually naive, relying on the replacement or deletion of
common identifiers like name and email address. Such methods are vulnerable to re-
identification attacks using information that is apparently harmless, such as zip code,
sex and birth date. Sweeney determined that with those three attributes it is possible
to identify 87% of the US population [Sweeney 2000]. Other notable examples of sup-
posedly anonymized data releases which prompted legal and public-relations problems
for the involved companies are the AOL search queries and the Netflix Prize case, as
described in Section 2.1.3.
For the Netflix Prize data mining competition a dataset was released for participants
to use, containing the ratings that 480 thousand users gave to 17 thousand movies as
well as the dates in which the rating was given. The user’s identification information
was suppressed in order to anonymize the dataset, leaving only a meaningless user id
number. In 2008 Narayanan and Shmatikov successfully re-identified a number of users
in the Netflix dataset by cross referencing that information with information crawled
from IMDb, showing that the dataset was vulnerable to privacy attacks [Narayanan
and Shmatikov 2008].
Restricting access to gathered personal data is an exercise of balancing of two
contradictory requirements: the privacy of the subjects in the dataset and the utility
of analysing the data. Perfect privacy is achieved by destroying the data, while utility
can be maximized by publicly releasing all the data. Normally neither extreme happens,
and the data is made available via aggregate queries or after some sanatization process
(such as naïve anonymization) is performed. Independently of the case, this privacy-
utility trade-off is of key importance for the privacy protection mechanism.
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5.1.2 Chapter Outline
In Chapter 3 the communications related issues were addressed, namely techniques that
allow communicating personal information that refers to the same subject in a way that
it its unlinked to him and to other information communicated about him. However,
using context information referring to the same subject, it is possible to bypass these
PETs by identifying the subject to which some information refers to, based only on
data analysis. These re-identification data-centric techniques are mainly addressed in
the bodies of knowledge identified in Section 2.3.4: PPDM and SDC.
In this Chapter the models and theoretical foundations of these fields are pre-
sented, and existing data-centric privacy preserving techniques are discussed. Also
a communications-inspired re-identification countermeasure is presented, which rep-
resents a major contribution of the work presented with this thesis. This counter-
measure fits the privacy-preserving data publishing assumptions and targets the high-
dimensional case, in which the each user may have information available for a very
large number of attributes, as it happens in context-aware systems.
5.2 Models and Foundations
5.2.1 Concepts and Models for Data Privacy
Privacy, in the context of datasets containing personal information, typically has an
adversary that uses the access to the database and some auxiliar, typically public,
information on the target subjects, in order to get more information about them. The
attack can be performed in two different ways:
• by matching a dataset record with a known subject, re-identifying that record;
• by retrieving some unknown potentially sensitive data about a subject, disclosing
that attribute.
The re-identification of the record obviously implies the disclosure of all the attribues
in the record, however it requires the adversary to sufficiently isolate the record from all
others, based on the available auxiliary information. An attack at the attribute level,
while rendering less rewards for an adversary, is less demanding than an identification.
It simply requires the set of match-candidate records, based on the available auxiliary
information, to have a distribution of values for the target attribute that enables value
inference with high enough probability. Some literature also considers that detecting
the presence of a user in a database, even if not devising the specific record that
corresponds to him, also constitutes a privacy harm, especially it the released database
is of sensible nature [Nergiz, M. Atzori, and Clifton 2007].
In order to enable mathematical abstractions, data is usually modeled as a matrix
where each row, or record, refers to a subject and each column, or dimension, to
an attribute. This means that each dataset record, referring to a subject, can be
represented as a point in multi-dimensional space. The goal of a re-identification attack
adversary, sometimes designated as “isolator” [Chawla et al. 2005], is to “single out” a
point in this multi-dimensional space. Chawla et al. [2005] mathematically formalized
this goal. For an isolator I, a dataset D of n points in m-dimensional space, and an
auxiliary information z, let I(D, z) = q. Let σ be the the distance to the dataset
point x nearest to q. Let B(p, r) be an m-dimensional ball of radius r around point
p. Consider now two parameters: an isolation parameter c and a privacy threshold t.
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If the m-dimensional ball of radius c× σ and centered at q contains at least t dataset
points, that is |D⋂B(q, c× σ)| ≥ t, then the isolator fails, otherwise it succeeds. This
definition does not consider isolation in a few dimensions, as the authors note. An
extended definition involves projecting the points of D in a k-dimensional hyperplane,
with k ≤ m, and calculating the isolation in the hyperplane.
Let’s similarly define sanitizer : an algorithm that takes some dataset D, a set of
n points in m-dimensional space, and outputs a dataset D′ with some number of n′
points in a possibly different m′-dimensional space. Most of the solutions presented
in the PPDM field can be considered sanitizers. Their objective is that the resulting
dataset D′ is more private than the original, with a moderate cost of utility. However
both privacy and utility are significantly context dependent and difficult to quantify.
The vulnerability to re-identification of a dataset, sanitized or not, can be estimated
as a probability of isolation on a dataset D given some auxiliary information z and
parameters c and t. The auxiliary information and parametrization is highly dependent
on the attack model: they represent the previous knowledge of the adversary and his
goal when attacking the dataset.
The utility of a dataset, sanitized or not, depends on the purpose for which it is used.
There are several possible purposes, namely predicting unknown values or classifying
records. Some processing workload is applied on the data so that the required infor-
mation is calculated or predicted. However, when sanitizing a dataset the workload is
not known, making it difficult to generically evaluate proposed sanitizers. Some work
uses some proxy metrics to estimate the loss of utility, which typically aim at minimiz-
ing the changes done from the original to the sanitized dataset. Others measure the
loss of utility empirically by considering the error of statistical aggregates. However,
the utility metrics that give best applicability guarantees are those which evaluate the
impact on common data-mining workloads [Brickell and Shmatikov 2008]. With the
popularization of recommendation systems a common workload involves estimating the
values of empty attributes for each record.
As referred in Section 2.3.4, Dwork’s Differential Privacy [2006] represents a strong
mathematical foundation for data-privacy work, which worked as the bases for much
new work in the area in recent years [Dwork 2011]. In Differential Privacy, Dwork
formally defines a very strong privacy guarantee, which implies that it is not sufficiently
distinguishable whether any given record is part of the database or not.
5.2.2 From k-Anonymity to t-Closeness
The work by Sweeney on k-Anonymity [2002] is probably the most common reference in
PPDM. It coins the terms “quasi-identifier” and “equivalence classes”. Quasi-identifiers
are attributes which alone do not identify the user, but used together can be leveraged
to do so. These attributes are typically easy to obtain by other means, and therefore
considered to be part of the adversary’s auxiliary information. Examples of such at-
tributes are the previously referred zip code, sex and birth date (see Section 5.1.1).
Opposite to quasi-identifiers, a dataset also contains sensitive attributes, the ones that
the adversary aims at discovering the value.
Informally, a dataset satisfies k-Anonymity if and only if for each record of the
data set there are at least k-1 other record with the same quasi-identifier values. This
way, the adversary cannot distinguish which of the k records belongs to the target
subject. In order to enforce this, the quasi-identifier values are generalized, masking
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their real values with more generic ones when necessary. These groups of at least k
elements, in which rows are indistinguishable regarding their quasi-identifiers, are called
equivalence classes. k-Anonymity effectively targets the quasi-identifiers, improving
resilience against re-identification attacks, but disregards the sensitive attributes.
A follow up approach dubbed l-Diversity [Machanavajjhala et al. 2007] captures
this shortcoming by presenting an approach that resists to two types of attacks to
which k-Anonymity is vulnerable: the Homogeneity and the Background Knowledge
attack. In these attacks sensitive attributes can be leaked even if the adversary cannot
associate the individual with a single row of the equivalence class, it just requires that
the sensitive values are not diverse enough. For example, if all the records in the target
equivalence class have the same value for a sensitive attribute then there is sensitive
attribute disclosure.
N. Li, T. Li, and Venkatasubramanian [2007] further analysed these issues and
establish a privacy model that formalizes the privacy breach as the change of knowledge
of the adversary as he comes in contact with a dataset. This approach, dubbed t-
Closeness, considers three adversary information states:
1. the adversary’s prior belief (auxiliary information),
2. the adversary’s belief after knowing the overall distribution on sensitive attributes
in the released database,
3. the adversary’s belief after knowing the distribution on sensitive attributes of the
rows that match the target person.
The information state 2 has more information than 1, and is especially relevant to
presence privacy cases, such as in [Nergiz, M. Atzori, and Clifton 2007]. However,
since this only applies to a small subset of cases, Li et al. assume that the overall
distribution of sensitive attributes is very similar to the one from the global population,
which configures public data, and disregard the information state change between 1 and
2. Consequently t-Closeness focuses on protecting privacy by reducing the difference
of information between information states 2 and 3. This implies approximating the
distributions of sensitive attributes of each equivalence class to the overall sensitive
attributes distribution. It is not enough that the sensitive attributes are diverse for
each equivalence class, as l-Diversity states, but that their sensitive value distribution
should is similar enough to the overall sensitive value distribution. This is justified by
the skewness attack: if the overall probability of an individually having some disease is
1%, and inside the target equivalence class half of the subjects have that disease, then
the adversary managed to gather significant information about the target subject.
5.2.3 High-Dimensional Datasets
Dataset can be classified regarding their dimensionality, based on the multi-dimensional
space abstraction: in case it has few attributes it’s a low-dimensional dataset, while if
it has many attributes it is high-dimensional. An example of a low-dimensional dataset
would be the yellow pages (name, address and phone number), while an example of
an high-dimensional dataset is the Netflix dataset, in which each of the 17 thousand
movies is a different attribute and the rating is the value. Such datasets with thousands
of attributes are usually sparse: each record typically has a (non-null) value defined
only for a small fraction of the attributes. The number of non-null values in a record or
attribute is denoted as support of that record or attribute. Another common charac-
teristic of high-dimensional datasets is that the distribution of the attribute support is
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typically long-tailed: there is a small number of attributes that have non-null values for
many records while there is a large number of attributes that only have non-null values
for a few records. A side effect of this is that records are very distinguishable, even by
merely considering which attributes are defined and which ones aren’t, representing an
anonymity threat even if attribute values are obfuscated or omitted [Narayanan and
Shmatikov 2008; C. C. Aggarwal 2005].
5.2.4 The Quasi-Identifier Assumption
Most work in PPDM relies on the assumption that attributes can be classified as
quasi-identifying or sensitive, where quasi-identifiers are attributes that are relatively
easy to gather from other sources - which compose the adversary’s auxiliary informa-
tion - and sensitive attributes are the target of the privacy attack. However, in many
situations the quasi-identifier and sensitive attribute separation cannot be clearly de-
fined. Considering diverse real life scenarios, the sensitive attributes in one case may
not be sensitive in another case: an individual’s home address is sensitive information
in a database of high profile art collectors, while it is a quasi-identifier in most other
databases. Also, without assuming limitations on the adversary’s access to information
about an individual, any big enough set of attributes can be considered quasi-identifier
as together the attributes are likely to re-identify that individual.
Re-identification attacks are usually agnostic to the semantics of the attributes and
rely instead on two properties that are common to many types of personal information
[Narayanan and Shmatikov 2010]. First is the stability of data across time, enabling
datasets that are not temporally coincident to be used together in re-identification, and
thus making it easier to have available auxiliary information. Secondly, if the quantity
and precision of the data attributes is high enough, then it becomes highly unlikely
that two individuals have the same set of values. This is especially easy in the high-
dimensional case, prompting the discussion of what personally identifiable information
truly is, and whether any type of information can be distinguished between personally
identifiable and non-identifiable simply by its semantic.
Regarding the sensitivity of attributes in high-dimensional datasets, e.g. the movies
rated and the items bought, while some movies/items have more potential to promote
privacy harms than others, it is not clear which attributes are sensitive and which may
be part of the auxiliary information. They are potentially all sensitive depending on
the disclosure context: buddies would potentially crack jokes if they knew the rating
given to some musical movie or the future employer could have second thoughts about
hiring if he knew the rating given to certain ideology-charged movies, and so on.
5.3 Privacy-Perserving Data Mining Sanitization Techniques
5.3.1 Existing Sanitization Techniques
The concepts of k-Anonymity and t-Closeness are privacy conditions, goals to be
achieved by sanitizers. It is generally assumed that all sanitizers perform record order
randomization so that no information is contained in the order by which records are
presented in the dataset. A sanitizer typically use one or two types of operations on
a dataset in order to reach the defined privacy guarantees. The following types of
operations can found in literature:
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• generalization: values of attributes are changed to a more general version of the
value (e.g. birth date attribute is changed to birth year);
• suppression: records or values which are very distinguishable are simply removed
from the dataset;
• forgery or synthetic data generation: generated records or values are added to
the dataset;
• perturbation: noise is introduced in the individual value of the attributes, which
can be cancelled out when retrieving an aggregate result;
• swapping: exchanging sensitive values between records while maintaining statis-
tical properties;
• partitioning: records (horizontal partitioning) or attributes (vertical partitioning)
are separated.
Suppression and generalization are the two techniques proposed by the original k-
Anonymity work [Samarati and Sweeney 1998], in order to achieve the defined privacy
condition. Generalization is a technique used also in context obfuscation, as explained
in Section 4.4.2, which transforms a value in a more general version of that value,
according to some domain hierarchy. As generalization reduces dataset utility, the
objective is usually to meet k-Anonymity, or other privacy goal, while minimizing the
amount of generalization done. As a consequence of this, and also because they require
a domain-specific hierarchy for each data type, generalization is not a method that can
be transparently applied to any dataset: it typically requires a manual data analysis
phase to build or apply domain hierarchies and to parametrize minimization.
Suppression is used typically as a last resource technique for dataset outliers. If
generalization alone would be applied to satisfy some privacy goal, the presence of these
outliers could force significantly more aggressive generalization, reducing the amount of
information in most records, thus dataset utility. It usually proves more utility-friendly
to drop the outliers altogether rather than to excessively generalize the whole dataset.
In some situations it could be more utility-friendly to add synthetic data points, to help
hiding some records uniqueness, than to suppress them. The data should be generated
so that the resulting dataset maintains the statistical properties of the original dataset
[Fung et al. 2010, p. 22].
Perturbation, also called additive noise in SDC literature [Fung et al. 2010, p. 22],
works by altering individual values of some attribute, according to some known distri-
bution, making it possible to recover generic statistical properties of the original data
but difficult to recover original values since the noise introduced for a specific value
is unknown [Dakshi Agrawal and C. C. Aggarwal 2001]. A variant of perturbation,
inspired in synthetic data generation, called condensation [C. C. Aggarwal and Yu
2004], considers the relations between attribute values, and preserves the most rele-
vant inter-attribute correlation data. The data is “condensed” in a predefined number
of groups and then randomly re-generated based on each group’s statistical properties.
This allows correlations between different groups to be preserved while making individ-
ual data records indistinguishable within the groups. Changing the number of groups
allows to adjust the trade-off between anonymity and data utility.
Data swapping involves exchanging values of sensitive attributes among individual
records while the swaps maintain low-order frequency counts, i.e. entries in the the
marginal table. This introduces uncertainty about the true values of sensitive attribute
value while maintaining key statistical properties of the dataset. The method originated
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in SDC [Dalenius and Reiss 1982] and has been only casually applied in the PPDM
field [Fienberg and McIntyre 2004].
One of the advantages of partitioning-based techniques is that the resulting dataset
values remain unchanged - what changes are the associations between them. The
simplest forms of partitioning are atomization and permutation, which achieve k-
Anonymity by separating the dataset in a quasi-identifier dataset and a sensitive
dataset. The quasi-identifier dataset matches the records to a GroupID, and the sensi-
tive dataset matches each GroupID to the sensitive attribute values [Fung et al. 2010,
p. 20]. The groups of this approach are analogous to the equivalence classes in the
traditional generalization approach of k-Anonymity. Also T. Li et al. [2012] propose
Slicing: a vertical and horizontal partitioning method that complies with l-diversity.
5.3.2 High-Dimensional Sparse Dataset Anonymization
In Section 5.2.1 we defined sanitizer as an algorithm that takes a dataset and out-
puts another dataset, potentially with a different number of records and dimensions.
Now let anonymizer be a sanitizer which specifically aims at protecting against re-
identification of records. Some work has been done regarding the anonymization of
sparse high-dimensional data. Ghinita, Tao, and Kalnis [2008] propose Correlation-
aware Anonymization of High-dimensional Data (CAHD) to protect non-null occur-
rences of sensitive attributes in an high-dimensional dataset. The rationale is to form
a group of similar records for each sensitive occurrence and associate the sensitive oc-
currence to a group rather than to a specific record. Yabu Xu et al. [2008] formulate the
privacy problem in a way that allows them to relate some amount of auxiliary informa-
tion with the probability of sensitive attribute disclosure, and propose a suppression-
based algorithm so that the dataset complies with a privacy requirement formulated
that way. In subsequent work [Yabo Xu et al. 2008] the concept of frequent itemsets
are used in order to minimize the utility lost in the suppression process. However in
all this work the quasi-identifier and sensitive information assumption is present. T.
Li et al. [2012] argue that because vertical partitioning is used, slicing can be used in
high-dimensional scenarios and test the algorithm on the Netflix dataset. However, as
also noted by Manolis Terrovitis, Nikos Mamoulis, Liagouris, et al. [2012], Slicing can-
not handle sparse data. For the Netflix validation performed by Li et al., the dataset’s
null values were replaced with the average rating of the movie, removing sparsity -
the main source of distinguishability between records [Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008;
C. C. Aggarwal 2005].
The high-dimensional case has also been targeted by privacy work that does not tar-
get data publishing, but instead interactive data access. Chawla et al. [2005] presents an
important base in this field by considering all attributes as dimensions of a hyper-cube
of records and formulating mathematical definitions for privacy and sanitization. Also,
two sanitization methods are proposed: one that relies in histograms to transmit the
data - coarsely groups records to provide relevant statistical information - and another
that uses perturbation to make records less identifiable (or isolated, in their terminol-
ogy). Promising work has been recently done towards achieving Differential Privacy
[Dwork 2006] in high-dimensional datasets. McSherry and Mironov [2009] adapt the
most common prediction techniques used for the Netflix Prize to return differentially
private recommendations. The experimental results show impressive RMSE results,
however the responses are differentially private regarding the detection of ratings and
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not users, which would require much more aggressive noise addition, as the authors
themselves note. However, the interactive data access model that these approaches
assume has fundamental implications on the adversary model and data applications,
which differ from the data publishing model targeted in more detail within the scope
of this thesis.
Most of the work that targets high-dimensional data publishing relies on the as-
sumption that attributes can be classified either as quasi-identifying or sensitive. How-
ever, as discussed in Section 5.2.4, this assumption is rarely applicable in real scenar-
ios. Unlike previously discussed high-dimensional data publishing work [Yabu Xu et al.
2008; Yabo Xu et al. 2008; Ghinita, Tao, and Kalnis 2008; T. Li et al. 2012], many
other authors drop this assumption altogether in the high-dimensional case: any at-
tribute can belong to the adversary’s auxiliary information and all attributes are to be
protected. Notably, Manolis Terrovitis, Nikos Mamoulis, and Kalnis [2008] proposed
a new version of k-anonymity for set-valued high-dimensional data, km-anonymity, be-
cause k-anonymity assumes the existence of quasi-identifiers, and because the methods
to achieve it do not scale to the high-dimensional case [Meyerson and Williams 2004].
Given an adversary with auxiliary information of at most m attributes about a record,
a km-anonymous dataset must contain at least k records undistinguishable with respect
to those attributes. The authors also describe a generalization-based method to make
set-valued high-dimensional datasets km-anonymous. This privacy guarantee is also
adopted in a cluster-based generalization technique [Gkoulalas-Divanis and Loukides
2012].
Recently a number partitioning-based techniques to address the high-dimensional
case have been suggeted. R. Chen et al. [2011] describe a probabilistic top-down
partitioning algorithm to generate differentially private data releases. Unlike most
work done under Differential Privacy that considers an interactive approach to data
access, Chen’s goal is to publish a dataset via differential privacy. Also, in work
following up the use of generalization in the high-dimensional case [Manolis Terrovitis,
Nikos Mamoulis, and Kalnis 2008], Terrovitis et al. choose to use disassociation, a
horizontal and vertical partitioning approach, to guarantee km-anonymity in a dataset
of web query terms [Manolis Terrovitis, Nikos Mamoulis, Liagouris, et al. 2012]. Finally,
Zakerzadeh, C. Aggarwal, and Barker [2014] published a vertical partitioning approach
to achieve k-anonymity in high-dimensional datasets. The type of partitioning used
differs from the one used by Manolis Terrovitis, Nikos Mamoulis, Liagouris, et al.
[2012], as it is applied uniformly to all records. They note that while all the theoretical
difficulties of the dimensionality curse [C. C. Aggarwal 2005] remain true, their impact
can be reduced by relying on common properties of real-life datasets.
5.4 Privacy in Personalized Recommendations
5.4.1 Recommender Systems
The use of recommendation techniques in e-commerce sites is now widespread. Getting
automatic recommendations for which items are worth looking at is essential when
navigating a large search space. The term collaborative filtering was coined by the
developers of one of the first recommender systems, and is commonly used to refer to
such systems even if the system does not drive its users to collaborate explicitly [Su and
Khoshgoftaar 2009]. In the context of recommender systems, dataset records represent
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users, attributes represent items, and the values usually are the ratings given by users
to items.
Recommender systems can be functionally classified into three major groups [Gu-
nawardana and Shani 2009]:
1. generic recommenders, which recommend sets of “good” items to the user;
2. utility optimization recommenders, a generic recommender tuned to the goals of
the business implementing it;
3. prediction recomenders, which attempt to predict user opinion (i.e. rating) over
a set of items.
Generic recommenders can be done based on aggregate data, not requiring access
to the full dataset. Some web sites simply keep track of the rating average of each
item and the aggregate number of ratings in order to produce “popularity-based” rec-
ommendations.
Unsurprisingly, most literature on recommender systems focuses on prediction rec-
ommenders. These rely on the assumption that if some users rate some items similarly,
they will also rate other items in a similar way. In order to identify these similarities,
prediction recommenders analyse large ratings datasets, such as the one from Netflix
Prize [Su and Khoshgoftaar 2009]. Data mining is performed by the system on such
high-dimensional datasets in order to estimate the missing values, which can be used
to predict the rating that users would give to each item. Throughout this work let
us refer to recommendations given by prediction recommenders as personalized recom-
mendations.
5.4.2 Privacy in Recommender Systems
In the context of recommender systems, existing privacy work can be classified based on
the topology of the recommender system: centralized or distributed. In the centralized
case, the goal of privacy work is to keep the recommender system from knowing the
exact rating while still providing with useful recommendations. Similarly to the work
in privacy preserving data publishing, the recommender system, which may be the
adversary, has unrestricted access to the dataset after it has been published.
Privacy work addressing centralized recommenders is similar to the work seen in
privacy-preserving data publishing. Approaches typically rely in the application of
some perturbation to the ratings given by users before they are supplied to the cen-
tralized entity. Polat and Du [2003] use perturbation, as do Berkovsky et al. [2007]
along with simpler obfuscation techniques. Their privacy model aims to hide from the
centralized recommender, with sufficient probability, the real rating the user provided
to each item. However, these attack models do not consider auxiliary information.
In the case of distributed recommenders, a dataset of ratings given by numerous
individual users is never collected and processed by a central entity. Users of such
systems collaborate in a peer-to-peer manner in order to rate items such that the
best rated items are recommended. The privacy goal here is keeping the values of
ratings known only to the user that gave them. The adversaries are the other users
that collaborate in rating the item. A well established approach for the peer-to-peer
case is the use of some homomorphic encryption scheme in the collaborative filtering
protocol, as do Canny [2002] and many others after him (e.g. Zhan et al. [2010] and
Pathak and Raj [2011]). Homomorphic encryption enables a number of users sharing
their encrypted ratings with each other and being able to retrieve the aggregate ratings.
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Table 5.1: Recommender Privacy Scenarios
Privacy Scenario Accessible Data RecommenderApplicability
Aggregate
data release
Rating average and
count per item
Generic
recommendations
Interactive
aggregate queries
Sanitized aggregate
query responses
Generic
recommendations
Distributed
recommenders
Aggregate
rating matrix
Personalized
recommendations
High-dimensional
data publishing
Sanitized
high-dimensional dataset
Personalized
recommendations
Furthermore, Canny [2002] describes some degree of personalization is possible using
this scheme by locally correlating user preferences and the aggregate ratings model.
It’s also possible to consider the interactive data access model in the context of
recommender scenarios. In this case the attacker and the recommender also doesn’t
have access to the full dataset, only to aggregate queries performed on it. Differen-
tial Privacy, widely recognized in the data privacy community as a very strict privacy
guarantee, is built on this model which is obviously capable of producing generic rec-
ommendations through aggregate results.
Table 5.1 synthesizes the applications of different privacy protection models to
recommender scenarios, assuming that the recommendations and the adversary ac-
cess data under the same model. A naïve case is also considered in which a trusted
centralized recommender stores only anonymous item rating averages and vote count
data. Generic recommendations are possible in a number of different scenarios, some
of which provide significantly stricter privacy guarantees than the ones possible in a
data publishing setting.
5.4.3 Utility Metrics in Privacy Preserving Data Publishing
Generic recommendations can be provided based on aggregate data alone, but person-
alized recommendations require complex data analysis, enabled, among other methods,
by performing data mining on published rating data. However, privacy work under the
data publishing attack model has consistently used utility metrics that capture generic
statistical properties of datasets.
In order to illustrate this point, let us enumerate the utility metrics used in high-
dimensional privacy-preserving data publishing work that doesn’t rely on the quasi-
identifier assumption, previously described in Sections 5.3.2. Manolis Terrovitis, Nikos
Mamoulis, and Kalnis [2008] estimated the impact of their generalization method by
using Normalized Certainty Penalty (NCP), which merely captures the degree of gener-
alization the method enforces. Similarly, Gkoulalas-Divanis and Loukides [2012] rely on
generalization-minimization utility measures which can be applied to non-hierarchical
generalizations. All these techniques focus on the abstract measure of utility loss,
failing to relate it to a dataset use application.
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The utility metrics used in the most promising high-dimensional work mostly vali-
date statistical aggregates of the dataset. R. Chen et al. [2011] evaluates utility through
the relative error of counting queries. Manolis Terrovitis, Nikos Mamoulis, Liagouris,
et al. [2012] rely on two different metrics:
1. top-K deviation: the ratio of the top-K frequent itemsets of the original dataset
that appear in the top-K frequent itemsets of the anonymized data;
2. relative error in the support of term combinations, limited to combinations of
size two.
Finally, Zakerzadeh, C. Aggarwal, and Barker [2014] measure utility in terms of changes
in classification accuracy using a classification dataset [Chapman and Jain 1994] with
168 attributes.
Table ?? synthesizes the used privacy metrics in previous work. Having applicabil-
ity in mind, utility must be evaluated through the analysis of increased error in typical
workload results, and should not be a secondary performance metric. Generic recom-
mendations are possible without the collection and publishing of data. These practices
are usually justified by functionality that is not possible to achieve with access to
aggregate data alone.
5.4.4 Personalization Utility
A realistic measure of utility in personalized recommendation scenarios is the prediction
error of data mining algorithms used to perform them. The evaluation process of such
algorithms usually involves splitting the dataset into a training set and a test set,
running the algorithm on the training set to try and predict the values of the test
set. The error can be measured in terms of root mean square error (RMSE) of the
predicted values compared to the real values. While this measure typically evaluates
the prediction performance of the algorithm, when the same algorithm is used against
two related datasets, the original and a sanitized version, the utility loss incurred in
the sanitization process can be estimated.
In the context of personalized recommendations a utility baseline must be consid-
ered: the utility of performing recommendations based on aggregate data. If the utility
loss of a sanitization process brings the RMSE of predictions to the values that can be
achieved by making naïve predictions based on aggregate data, then the sanitization
process is useless as it makes more sense releasing aggregates than the dataset. For
this reason, a new utility metric that enables us to measure the utility of datasets over
this baseline value is proposed.
Let us formally define Personalization Utility. Let P be the prediction function
of a personalized recommender system, and A a naïve prediction function which pre-
dicts that all users rated items with the average rating given to that item. Let now
RMSE(P,D) be the RMSE resulting from applying prediction function P to dataset
D, and RMSE(A,D) be the RMSE of using impersonal rating function A to predict
ratings in dataset D.Then, Personalization Utility of prediction function P for dataset
D, µ(P,D), captures the degree to which P adapts to the preferences of individual
users in dataset D:
µ(P,D) = 1− (RMSE(P,D)/RMSE(A,D))
This new utility metric enables the comparison of sanitization processes to be ap-
plied in recommendation data publishing scenarios. µ(P,D) is positive if personaliza-
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tion benefits predictions, and is proportional to the importance of personalization in
the recommendation.
Because data publishing is primarily justifiable in personalized recommendation
scenarios, a minimum acceptable value for utility must be considered: the utility pro-
vided by recommendations based on aggregate data. More formally, for a sanitization
algorithm S, let S(D) = D′ be the sanitized dataset. If µ(P,D) > 0, then, for S to
be acceptable in the context of personalized recommendations, µ(P,D′) must also be
positive.
5.4.5 Measuring Privacy
Privacy-preserving data publishing work has given strong privacy foundations in sani-
tizing datasets, by making rows undistinguishable or protecting against attribute dis-
closure, while preserving some utility. Most work in this area establishes a privacy
guarantee as a fixed objective and sees utility as an optimization target. However,
this utility is commonly evaluated through a proxy metric instead of being measured
in a personalized recommendation context. Because of this, most methods destroy
utility well beyond the limit defined in Section 5.4.4. An alternative, departing from
the privacy preserving data publishing tradition of a static privacy guarantee, would
be considering a privacy metric and attempting to improve the overall privacy-utility
trade-off in data publishing for personal recommendation scenarios.
Instead of a discrete mathematics privacy guarantee, let’s consider a probabilistic
model, enabling resistance to error in the adversary’s auxiliary information. Also,
instead of protecting absolutely against one type of attack, consider that the ultimate
goal of the adversary is to enrich his knowledge on the user.
After gaining access to a database which may contain a record that refers to that
user, the adversary attempts to match his auxiliary information against the records in
the database. In case a record is found that sufficiently matches the auxiliary infor-
mation, the adversary considers the re-identification successful. If not, the adversary
considers that his attack failed, either because the user is indistinguishable or not
present in the database.
The attack model used to measure privacy in this work was based on the re-
identification of Narayanan and Shmatikov [2008]. The strength of this attack model is
well supported in the original paper, and has been a reference for subsequent theoretical
work [Merener 2012]. One of the reasons why the attack is so successful draws from the
common long-tailed support distribution of sparse high-dimensional datasets: there is
a small number of attributes that have non-null values for many records while there
is a large number of attributes that only have non-null values for a few records. This
long-tailed distribution makes records very distinguishable even by merely considering
which attributes are defined and which ones aren’t. This represents a privacy threat
even if attribute values are obfuscated or omitted [Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008;
C. C. Aggarwal 2005], rendering value obfuscation techniques almost useless since the
very existence of a value is often enough to convey the information necessary for a
re-identification attack.
A natural metric for studying re-identification attacks in a probabilistic setting is
the success probability of the re-identification. This success probability is expected to
increase with the increase in auxiliary information, so it is presented as a function of
the amount of auxiliary information available to the adversary. However, this metric
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does not capture the information-centric notion of privacy breach described in Section
5.2.2. A trivial case where there is no privacy breach with a successful re-identification
is the one in which the auxiliary information already contains all of the user’s attributes
that are non-null for the attacked dataset, as the adversary’s knowledge on the user
remains unaltered. For that reason, let us define a new privacy metric that does.
An adversary has access to an attacked dataset D, and to auxiliary information
auxx about user x - a set of ratings that user x gave to items present in D. Let I be
his re-identification attack function, which outputs the set of ratings present in dataset
D correctly identified to belong to user x, and an empty set otherwise. Then, let the
Adversary Gain (AG) of an attack on dataset D targeting user x be:
AG(D, auxx) = |I(D, auxx)| − |I(D, auxx) ∩ auxx|
A key benefit of this metric is that it allows us to take an economical look on an
attacker’s incentives. In a variety of scenarios, security and privacy does not need to
be absolute, but instead good enough to render attacks economically unviable. If AG
can be brought under certain values, this will surely be the case. Assuming the cost
of performing one attack is greater than the reward of acquiring one rating, a target
value of 1 for AG would be an acceptable value. However, an estimation of acceptable
AG values is out of scope of this work, as it would require data on attack cost.
5.4.6 Rationale of Record Fragmentation
Most work in recommender systems attempts to identify similarities between users in
order to perform recommendations. The underlying assumption is that if some users
rated n items similarly, they will also rate other items similarly [Su and Khoshgoftaar
2009]. The characteristic that makes recommenders perform well are similarities be-
tween users, and it must be possible to process a dataset in a way to leverage those
same similarities to make users more indistinguishable in the dataset, achieving better
privacy at a very reduced utility cost.
In the context of computer communications and networks, the concept of
pseudonym has been extensively used to designate a temporary or scoped identifier of
a subject [Pfitzmann and Hansen 2010]. An historic reference to “digital pseudonym”
is made in a 1981 paper by Chaum [1981] while describing the use of public key cryp-
tography in such a way that it allows users to send verifiable messages while protecting
their identity. Subsequently Chaum described the use of digital pseudonyms for inter-
acting with multiple organizations while preventing that these organizations collude
in order to build a profile of the user [Chaum 1985]. The pseudonym used with one
organization is unlinkable with the one used with another organizations. Furthermore
the user can prove the possession of some credentials obtained from one organization to
another without revealing the pseudonym he uses to interact with the first. While the
typical case is to use one pseudonym per organization the use of one-time pseudonyms,
and more generally multiple pseudonyms per organization, is also mentioned.
In this work the concept of pseudonyms is used in the context of privacy-preserving
high-dimensional data publishing. Each record - representing an individual - is split
into several records with different identifiers, i.e. pseudonyms, and the values of non-
null attributes are distributed among the new records, i.e. fragments. As a direct
consequence the linking between different attribute values is broken. No values are
changed, inserted or deleted: sets of values are simply unlinked from each other. Each
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Figure 5.1: Record Fragmentation Example
(a) Original Dataset
UID M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
1 3 5 4
2 2 5 5 1
3 4 1
4 3 3 2 4
5 4 5 4
(b) Fragmented Dataset
Nym M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
1 4 1
2 4 4
3 2 1
4 3
5 5 5
6 5
7 3 2
8 3 4
9 5 4
(c) Pseudonym Mapping
Nym UID
1 3
2 5
3 2
4 1
5 2
6 5
7 4
8 4
9 1
record is fragmented in several pseudonymous versions of it. The linking of these
fragments using pseudonym mapping information restores the original data, thus is to
remain unpublished. From a data privacy perspective, record fragmentation is vertical
partitioning applied per record. Previous work has employed different forms of vertical
partitioning to improve privacy, however it was either applied in the dataset as a whole
[Zakerzadeh, C. Aggarwal, and Barker 2014] or to horizontal partitions of the dataset
[T. Li et al. 2012; Manolis Terrovitis, Nikos Mamoulis, Liagouris, et al. 2012]. In
record fragmentatio each record is an horizontal partition and vertical partitioning
is applied independently to each of them. This approach also has similarities with
Gkoulalas-Divanis and Loukides’ clustering-based anonymization [Gkoulalas-Divanis
and Loukides 2012]: these fragments are conceptually similar to their clusters, but
instead of using generalization, only suitable for high-dimensional itemset datasets,
dissassociation is used.
Record fragmentation is illustrated in Figure 5.1: each record of the original dataset
is split in several, forming the sanitized dataset and the mapping between the identi-
fiers of the two datasets. Let’s assume that the sanitized dataset is accessible to the
adversary while the mapping dataset is either destroyed, stored securely, or distributed
among the users - each user holds the pseudonyms that refer to him.
The choice of which values are presented together and which are separated in dif-
ferent fragments is done based on the statistical properties of the dataset. Following
the principles used in condensation approaches [C. C. Aggarwal and Yu 2004], it is
desirable to keep inter-attribute correlations as much as possible in order to reduce the
utility loss. In order to do so, a meaningful distance measure between dataset values
is required. However, it has been argued that the distances to the nearest and farthest
neighbours from a given target in high-dimensional space is almost the same for a vari-
ety of data distributions and distance functions [C. C. Aggarwal 2005; C. C. Aggarwal,
Hinneburg, and Keim 2001; Beyer et al. 1999]. For that reason some dimensionality
reduction technique should be applied before using distance functions. Also, records
with greater support can be fragmented more times than records with smaller support,
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in order to avoid the new user problem of recommender systems as much as possible.
On the privacy side, the aim is to reduce the amount of information conveyed by
the presence of a (non-null) value. The amount of information is directly related to
the frequency of the value: if only a few records have a value assigned for a specific
attribute, then that attribute is more distinctive than others. Separating rare occur-
rences of values is key to make records less distinguishable, increasing resilience to
re-identification attacks [Merener 2012].
5.4.7 Record Fragmentation Algorithm
In order to formally describe the algorithm, the matrix model of datasets is used. Let
dataset D be an N x M matrix where each row ri is associated with an individual and
each column cj with an attribute. Record di,j refers to the value that the individual
associated with ri has for the attribute associated with column cj.
In order to estimate column distance, so that the fragmentation can be done mini-
mizing the error, matrix factorization was used as a dimensionality reduction technique.
In a preprocessing step D is factorized in f features, originating two matrices: the RF
N x f matrix, showing the correlation between rows and features, and the CF f x M
matrix, with the correlation between features and columns. Also during preprocessing,
the support - the number of non-null values of each row or column - is respectively
captured in vectors RS and CS. The algorithm then generates the dataset D′, an P
x M matrix, in which P is the total number of pseudonyms used, greater than N, the
original number of individuals. Each row of D′ is basically a fragment of an original
row ri of D.
To perform the fragmentation, values are clustered together based on their column
characteristics. A number of the lowest support columns for which an original row has
values defined are fixed as centroids for each new record. The number of lowest-support
columns that are elected as centroids depends on the chosen privacy-utility trade-off
parameters. After the centroids are assigned, a simple one-pass value assignment is
performed based on a distance measure between the column of the value and the defined
centroids. This is a lightweight approach to grouping allowing column-neighbour values
to be kept together, especially when compared with possible alternatives which include
clustering algorithms like K-Means.
The algorithm starts by iterating over the N rows ri of D, each generating a number
of new rows in D′. Given an original row ri, the collection of j for which di,j is non-null
is temporarily stored and sorted in ascending order by their cardinality value csj. The
resulting vector J is used to create the new rows iteratively. In case the cardinality
value csj of the current iteration is below a certain threshold t, then a new row d′p is
created in D′, otherwise the row creation iterations for that original row ri stops.
Let X be the number of successful iterations, and consequently the number of
assigned pseudonyms for original row ri. For each ri a X x f temporary centroid matrix
CFi is built by assigning the column features cfj for the X first values of J . Finally the
algorithm iterates over the records di,j of row ri, assigning each of them to one of the
new rows d′p. For that the feature vector cfj is considered and its distance is calculated
to each of the rows in CFi, which represent the centroids. The record is assigned to
the centroid to which it has lowest distance and assigned to the corresponding new
row.
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Algorithm 1 Pseudonymization Algorithm
initialize D′;
for all ri do
initialize CFi;
x = 0;
for all csj referring to di,j in ri, by ascending order of values do
if csj ≤ t then
add row d′p associtated with x;
add row CFix with the values csj;
increment x
else
break;
end if
end for
for all di,j in ri do
for all x in CFix do
tempx = dist(j, CFix)
end for
xmin = x for the value of x that minimizes tempx
add record di,j to row d′p associated with xmin;
end for
end for
randomize row order of D′;
The result of the algorithm is dataset D′, an P x M matrix such that P ≥ N, and
that has the same number of non-null records as D. The distance function dist used in
the conducted experiments was Euclidean Distance but other distance measures could
be considered. Experimenting with different distance measures would likely slightly
influence the RMSE, but the results obtained with Euclidean Distance were enough
to demonstrate the potential of this approach, as shown by the results in Section
5.5. Instead, it was decided to experiment with different thresholds t, because this
parameter has a key influence in the privacy-utility trade-off.
A function was used to calculate the threshold value t in each iteration, instead
of a fixed value. This allows us to tune the amount of created fragments per row.
The considered threshold function takes in 2 parameters. The first is an estimation
for a threshold attribute cardinality value, tc, indicating whether a non-null value is
considered a rare occurrence. The second is a target number of fragments for a user, np,
depending on the cardinality of that user. The function itself is linear: the threshold
value is the estimated attribute cardinality when the number of attributed pseudonyms
matches the target number of fragments, and it varies with the number of attributed
pseudonyms, x.
Thr(tc, np, x) = tc ∗ (x/np)
The second parameter is itself also a function that maps user cardinality to the
target number of fragments. For this end, a logarithm-based function was used, which
can be parametrized in order to allow increasing or reducing the target number of
91
fragments for the same user cardinality, |u| , respectively leading to more privacy
or more utility. Logarithmic was picked over linear because it preserves the long-
tail of the user cardinality frequency function, which is characteristic for this kind of
datasets, otherwise the application of the algorithm would be trivial to detect. The
two parameters, logp and linp, allow varying the NPseudo function both linear and
logarithmically.
NPseudo(logp, linp, |u|) = linp ∗ log(1 + (|u|/logp))
The impact of parameter variation in pseudonym attribution is empirically analysed
in section 5.5.7.
5.5 Record Fragmentation: Experiments and Results
5.5.1 Netflix Prize Dataset
During the duration of the Netflix Prize contest anyone could download the Netflix
Prize dataset and tools, write their movie recommendation algorithm, test the results
locally with a probe set and submit the results for the qualifying set. The prize was
awarded to the algorithm that produced the predictions with the lowest Root-mean-
square error (RMSE) for the qualifying set. The baseline for the contest was Netflix’s
original algorithm, Cinematch, which scored 0.9514 RMSE, and the objective was to
improve that result by 10%. The Grand Prize was won by an aggregate team of
previously competing teams called BellKor’s Pragmatic Chaos [Netflix 2009]. Their
algorithm scored 0.8567 RMSE, a 10.06% improvement on Cinematch.
The dataset consists of movie ratings, from 1 to 5, submitted by Netflix users, with
the submission date, organized by movie id. The movie ids are sequential and range
from 1 to 17770, unlike user ids, which range from 1 to 2649429 but amount to only
480189 distinct values. The dataset accounts for a total of 100480507 ratings, which
represents 1.1% of the possible rankings for the considered number of users and movies.
5.5.2 Movielens Dataset
In order to compare the results in different datasets, another freely available well-
known movie ratings dataset was considered. Movielens is a dataset made available by
the University of Minnesota, crowdsourced via their web site [GroupLens 1997], with
the purpose of gathering data for research in recommendation systems and providing
movie recommendations to users. There are currently three releases of the dataset
made available to the public [GroupLens 2011] which have different sizes with the
biggest having 10000054 ratings - significantly smaller than the 100 million ratings
from Netflix. These ratings are given by 69878 users to 10677 movies, which means
Movielens is slightly less sparse than Netflix having 1.3% non-null values.
For the experiments described, the Movielens dataset was converted to the Netflix
format, so that the same setup and code could be used. This included rounding the
ratings up because Netflix supports integer ratings from 1 to 5 while Movielens supports
10 possible values for ratings: 0.5 to 5 with 0.5 steps. Because the goal is simply to
compare the recommendation accuracy between the original and resulting datasets, the
pre-experiment rounding process isn’t an influencing factor.
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5.5.3 Reference Re-Identification Algorithm
Narayanan and Shmatikov presented a generic algorithm for re-identification in sparse
datasets and applied it to the Netflix dataset with interesting results [Narayanan and
Shmatikov 2008]. The algorithm has two variations named Scoreboard and Scoreboard-
RH, and they both rely in the overwhelmingly low similarity between users of the
dataset. The mere information about which movies users rated makes them very dis-
tinguishable, especially because of non-mainstream movies which are not rated by many
users. Even with incorrect and incomplete auxiliary data or dataset perturbation, it is
possible to re-identify many users with a good probability. Narayanan and Shmatikov
defined similarity between two rows as a kind of cosine similarity. Sim maps a pair
of records to the interval [0,1] according to their similarity. The Scoreboard-RH algo-
rithm is a more robust version than Scoreboard and it defines a scoring function Score
which assigns a numerical score to each record in the database D based on how well it
matches the attacker’s auxiliary information aux about an individual.
Score(aux, di) =
∑
j∈supp(aux)wt(j)× Sim(auxj, di,j) where wt(j) = 1log |supp(j)|
After Score is calculated for all the rows di Scoreboard-RH takes the two highest
scores and calculates how different they are in relation to the standard deviation. If
the value is bigger than a defined “eccentricity” parameter φ, then the best match is
considered to be a successful re-identification. Otherwise the algorithm outputs no
match.
max1−max2
σ
> φ
In order to evaluate how susceptible the resulting datasets are to re-identification,
Scoreboard-RH was implemented. Original work considered that Sim would output 1
on a pair of movies rated by different subscribers if the ratings and dates are within
some threshold, and 0 otherwise. For simplicity purposes, and to consider the same data
in the utility and privacy analyses, dates are disregardede in this implementation of
Scoreboard-RH, relying only on the ratings information. Apart from that, this version
of Scoreboard-RH was instantiated similarly to the one of Narayanan and Shmatikov:
• the Sim function will output 1 in case the rating of a movie in the two rows
matches and 0 otherwise;
• the eccentricity parameter φ is set to 1.5.
Re-identification is successful in case the algorithm outputs any pseudonym that
refers to the user to which the supplied auxiliary information belongs to. This
Scoreboard-RH implementation uses a random sampling approach to evaluate the re-
identification success: auxiliary information of a certain size referring to a random
individual from the original data set is randomly sampled and used to match it in a
target dataset. The estimation of the results is done for a 95% confidence interval
and 2% error margin, so the sampling is repeated according to the number of sam-
ples required using the normal approximation for a binomial proportion interval (Wald
interval). This meant 300 iterations in the best case and above 2400 in the worst case.
5.5.4 Reference Recommendation Algorithm
Motivated by the Netflix Prize competition, there was source code contributed by
contestants that could be used to perform basic operations with the dataset. Two con-
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tributions deserved attention: the Netflix Recommender Framework [Meyer 2006] and,
based on it, the Kadri Framework [Kadri 2008]. These frameworks provide functions to
efficiently process the Netflix dataset text files, as well as implementations of some rec-
ommendation algorithm primitives, namely average, matrix factorization, K-NN and
prediction blending. Another function provided by these frameworks is the possibility
to scrub the probe data from the dataset: the probe data is removed from the training
set, effectively separating the training and test sets, increasing the reliability of the
RMSE results.
Using these frameworks, a reference prediction algorithm was created by blending
movie average and matrix factorization predictions. These algorithms ignore date in-
formation, relying only on movie ratings, similarly to what was done regarding the
re-identification algorithm, described in Section 5.5.3. This reference prediction algo-
rithm scored 0.921299 RMSE on Netflix, a better result than the original Cinematch
algorithm.
5.5.5 Reference Privacy Preservation Algorithm
From all the identified previous work, the one most similar to record fragmentation
is disassociation [Manolis Terrovitis, Nikos Mamoulis, Liagouris, et al. 2012]. As ex-
plained in Section 5.4.6, both methods use forms of horizontal and vertical partitioning
to fulfil their objective of protecting privacy in high-dimensional datasets. The main
difference is that disassociation has km-anonymity as its objective, a static privacy
guarantee, while record fragmentation has a target number of fragments function, rep-
resenting the privacy-utility trade-off.
Disassociation was chosen also because km-anonymity is one of the most relaxed
privacy guarantees defined, and yet not relaxed enough to cope with personal recom-
mendation scenarios. The partitioning applied with disassociation generates a dataset
where the great majority of records have a support of 1 or 2, as explained in the choice
of the evaluation parameters [Manolis Terrovitis, Nikos Mamoulis, Liagouris, et al.
2012, p. 952]. This may be enough for associating query some items together but not
to perform personalized recommendations. In order to validate this concern, the disas-
sociation algorithms, VerPart and HorPart [Manolis Terrovitis, Nikos Mamoulis,
Liagouris, et al. 2012], were implemented targeted at achieving the most relaxed pri-
vacy guarantee possible with that method: 22-anonymity. Because m was set to 2,
it wasn’t necessary to implement the Refine algorithm, as it only has an impact for
m > 2.
5.5.6 Implementation Detail
One of the issues of processing the Netflix dataset is technical: it’s not easy to load
such an amount of data in a quick and memory-efficient manner. For that reason a
Netfix Commons library was created in Java to solve that problem, loading the dataset
to memory and providing an API to access the data. Heuristics were used to improve
access times to data without requiring more memory for the representation. Both
Scoreboard-RH and Record Fragmentation implementations created for this work use
this library.
The preprocessing and main steps of the algorithm described in Section 5.4.7 were
implemented separately. The preprocessing step that involves matrix factorization and
attribute cardinality count, which in the Netflix case is the number of ratings per user,
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Figure 5.2: Frequency of the Number of Ratings per User for Users with Under 1000
Ratings
was implemented in C++ using the Kadri Framework. This generates 3 text files each
containing a matrix: user-features, movie-features and user ratings. The main step
of the algorithm was implemented in Java. It requires access to the 3 text files from
preprocessing and to the original data set, and it generates the fragmented version of the
dataset in the same format as the original one, a probe file in accordance to the resulting
dataset, and a pseudonym mapping file to match the attributed pseudonyms to the
original user ids for evaluation purposes. For performance purposes, a safe cardinality
value for movies was introduced in the implementation. If the movie has a number of
ratings above this value then it is not considered to be a centroid. This significantly
reduces the number of movies that must be sorted by cardinality, consequently reducing
the time that quicksort takes.
5.5.7 Dataset and Partitioning Analysis
Support analysis to both datasets shows similar long tail patterns both regarding users
and movies: a few movies/users have many (non-null) ratings while the majority of
users/movies have only a few ratings, as shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. Netflix shows
frequency maxima in users and movies for low cardinalities: 18 and 119 respectively.
Movielens has their maximum frequency values for the lowest cardinalities possible: 20
for users and 1 for movies - the Movielens site imposes that each user rates at least
20 movies on registration so that it can deliver meaningful recommendations, avoiding
the new user problem.
The algorithm preprocessing step described in 5.4.7 was run only once on each of
the original datasets to create the required matrix files. Then the main algorithm was
run several times, each of the runs generating a fragmented version of the original
dataset. Different privacy-utility trade-off parameters were used in each run, resulting
in different fragmentation levels. As described in Section 5.4.7, the considered trade-off
parameters were:
• the movie cardinality safe value, until which movies are considered to initialize
group centroids;
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Figure 5.3: Frequency of the Number of Ratings per Movie for Movies with Under 1000
Ratings
• the target movie cardinality value, the last value for which a movie is elected as a
centroid in case the user was assigned exactly the target number of pseudonyms;
• the target number of fragments function, for which were assumed different pa-
rameters for the logarithm function.
The first two parameters were set based on the movie cardinality of the dataset,
as shown in Figure 5.3. The movie cardinality safe was set to a conservative value of
5000, merely for improving the algorithm processing times, expected not to influence
the number of created fragments. The target movie cardinality value was set to 500 by
looking at the Netflix movie cardinality distribution, as it represents the start of the
long tail and divides the movie domain in half: approximately 48% of the movies have
less than 500 ratings. In order to simplify, since both an increase in the target movie
cardinality and a linear increase on the target fragments is equivalent, let’s consider
these first two parameters to be fixed and vary the target number of fragments function
for the trade-off.
The fragmentation experiments were run on a virtual machine with 1 virtual core
and 4GB of RAM allocated, running Java HotSpot VM on Ubuntu Linux, hosted by
a Intel Core i7 machine. The measured run-times for the Netflix dataset were ap-
proximately 10 minutes for the least aggressive fragmentation and 1 hour for the most
aggressive one. For the Movielens dataset the run-times were from 2 to 11 minutes.
These results confirm the expected linear run-time scalability with respect to the tar-
get number of fragments, as well as an overhead related to the size of the dataset for
input/output operations. In the same conditions, the implementation of 22-anonymous
disassociation took orders of magnitude longer to be completed: approximately 9 hours
for Movielens and 95 hours for Netflix. Note that these results suggest that the algo-
rithm run-time grows linearly with the number of ratings, as Netflix has approximately
10 times more ratings than Movielens, but conclusive results would require further
work.
The target number of fragments function, as described in Section 5.4.7 is based on
a logarithm function to which two parameters are applied, one allowing to vary the
96
0 200 400 600 800 1,000
0
200
400
600
Number of Non-Null Values in Record
Ta
rg
et
N
um
be
r
of
Fr
ag
m
en
ts Frag1
Frag2
Frag3
Frag4
Frag5
Frag6
Figure 5.4: Functions for Target Number of Fragments
Table 5.2: Number of Rows in the Original and Fragmented Datasets
Dataset Netflix Movielens
Original 480189 69878
Frag1 746153 157421
Frag2 1441715 330961
Frag3 3057962 735668
Frag4 5039491 1324378
Frag5 7292946 2008289
Frag6 9111456 2676293
2Dis 82685159 8437233
function linearly and other logarithmically. The tested functions, numbered from 1 to 6
based on how they affect the privacy-utility trade-off, are depicted in Figure 5.4, being
1 the most utility-friendly and 6 the most privacy friendly. The fragmented datasets
resulting from applying the algorithm with each of these functions are named based on
the function numbering. Table 5.2 shows the number of rows of the resulting datasets
that differ based on the used function parameters, both for the Netflix and Movielens
cases, compared with the number of rows resulting from 22-anonymous Disassociation.
As expected (see Section 5.5.5) the number of rows generated by 22-anonymous disas-
sociation comes very close to the number of total ratings. The average row support of
22disassociated Netflix is 1.215, and for Movielens is 1.185, illustrating the strictness
of the method.
5.5.8 Utility Evaluation
In order to evaluate the results in terms of utility, the recommendation algorithm imple-
mentation described in Section 5.5.4 was run in the original and fragmented datasets.
As discussed in Section 5.4.4, the RMSE value itself does not convey a direct under-
standing on the utility loss in the context of personalized recommendations. For that
reason the Personalization Utility (µ) metric is used. In order to calculate it, the aver-
age movie rating was considered the naïve prediction function, thus the following RMSE
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Table 5.3: RMSE of the Predictions for the Different Datasets
Netflix Movielens
Dataset RMSE µ RMSE µ
Average 1.05282 0 0.946021 0
Original 0.921299 0.124923 0.874797 0.075288
Frag1 0.931068 0.115643 0.855595 0.095585
Frag2 0.944055 0.103308 0.850197 0.101292
Frag3 0.978027 0.071041 0.852461 0.098899
Frag4 0.979276 0.069854 0.862424 0.088368
Frag5 0.981908 0.067355 0.869907 0.080458
Frag6 0.985127 0.064297 0.875914 0.074108
2Dis 1.053909 -0.001034 0.948689 -0.00282
values as reference: 1.05282 for Netflix and 0.946021 for Movielens. These RMSE values
of the naïve prediction are the same for all datasets because both record fragmentation
and Terrovitis’ Disassociation both rely exclusively on partitioning, leaving the ratings
themselves and their association to movies unaltered.
The RMSE results, as well as the utility metric µ, are depicted in Table 5.3. It
can be seen that, generally, the higher the fragmentation, the more significant is the
utility loss. However this is not true for the more utility-friendly Movielens generated
datasets, where a RMSE reduction is observed. This is explained by a side-effect of
the algorithm and chosen metrics. Similarly to what is observed for the condensa-
tion method, where the classification accuracy improves due to a noise reduction effect
[C. C. Aggarwal and Yu 2004], in the fragmentation case keeping nearest movies to-
gether initially increases prediction accuracy. The minimum error is reached at certain
fragmentation level, where the information being removed from the dataset is no longer
mostly noise and starts to be useful information, observed to be close the average of
5 fragments per record. After that point the utility-improvement effect fades as the
fragmentation becomes more aggressive, exhibiting degraded utility at the most frag-
mented case tested. Disassociation, because it strictly enforces a privacy guarantee,
even its most relaxed instantiation, 22-anonymity completely destroys µ. Otherwise
successful prediction algorithms become less useful, when applied to a disassociated
dataset, than considering the movie average for prediction.
5.5.9 Re-Identification Evaluation
To evaluate the risk of re-identification, Scoreboard-RH was run using the implemen-
tation described in Section 5.5.3, with the auxiliary information being built randomly
from the original dataset. This enables the evaluation of re-identification success with
increasing sizes of auxiliary information, at the cost of some generality: for higher val-
ues of auxiliary information the random sampling becomes skewed as not all users can
be considered, only the ones that have at least the required number of ratings.
The re-identification success of the fragmented datasets behaves similarly as it does
on the original dataset, as seen in Figure 5.5: re-identification success rises rapidly as
available auxiliary information size increases. The re-identification success reaches a
limit for auxiliary information sizes of 20 to 25 for all the versions of the Netflix dataset.
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Figure 5.5: Re-identification Success Rate on Original and Generated Netflix Datasets
by Size of Available Auxiliary Information
The difference is the limit value: while for the original dataset the success rate reaches
100%, as previously shown by Narayanan and Shmatikov, for the fragmented ones the
limit is lower, proportionally to how aggressive fragmentation was.
Similar behaviour is observed for the original Movielens dataset (Figure 5.6), with
Scoreboard-RH reaching 100% re-identification success for the same values of auxil-
iary information size. The fragmented datasets also exhibit comparable behaviour
with increases in re-identification success for increasing size of auxiliary information
until the limit is reached at approximately the same values. However in this case, as
fragmentation increases, the “limit” clearly becomes a decreasing function: more auxil-
iary information apparently leads to less re-identification success. This is originated by
the skew effect previously referred: auxiliary information generation is more skewed to-
wards users with more ratings for higher sizes. The decrease of re-identification success
with the increase of auxiliary information size merely shows that users that originally
had more ratings are better protected against re-identification. Although this can be
observed more clearly in Movielens fragmented datasets, it is also noticeable in Netflix’s
most aggressively fragmented datasets.
Because 22-anonymity only guarantees protection against an adversary with knowl-
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Figure 5.6: Re-identification Success Rate on Original and Generated Movielens
Datasets by Size of Available Auxiliary Information
edge of at most 2 items, as the auxiliary information size increases the probability of
it containing more than 2 non-disassociated items also increases. Consequently, the
22-disassociated dataset behaves in an inverse manner to the fragmented ones, with
re-identification probability steadily rising with increases in auxiliary information, but
at very low values.
Because of the auxiliary information sampling skew effect, the re-identification suc-
cess limit was considered to be the average of the auxiliary information size saturation
region, where global maxima are found for most aggressively fragmented datasets. In
Figure 5.7 the limit values of re-identification results - success, inconclusive or wrong
result - for each of the datasets are shown. Inconclusive results grow faster for low
fragmentation datasets and then stabilize around 30%. Scoreboard-RH shows signifi-
cant resilience to wrong results for low fragmentation datasets, but as fragmentation
increases wrong outputs become more noticeable, especially after inconclusive results
stabilize. Netflix and Movielens datasets show similar behaviour, with the Movielens
dataset showing itself as more privacy-friendly than Netflix.
Unsurprisingly, 22-disassociation is extremely effective against Scoreboard-RH, re-
turning an inconclusive result around 95% of the times for both datasets. However,
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Figure 5.7: Scoreboard-RH Limit Results per Dataset
Scoreboard-RH does manage to successfully re-identify the target in a few occurrences,
demonstrating its strength. Furthermore, in real-life scenarios it may be beneficial that
the adversary isn’t able to trivially detect the use of a sanitization algorithm. While
AG shows no difference between wrong and inconclusive results, from an economical
point of view it’s worse for an adversary to have false positives (wrong results) than
true negatives (inconclusive results) [Herley 2012].
5.5.10 Adversary Gain Evaluation
As argued in Section 5.4.5, because re-identification rate is an incomplete privacy
metric, the AG metric was also calculated. This metric estimates the worth of the
attack from the adversary’s point of view - higher values mean less privacy. The goal
of a sanitization algorithm doesn’t have to be no AG, but a low enough value that
makes attacks economically unviable.
Figure 5.8 shows the AG significantly decreases for fragmented datasets, especially
for the Movielens case. Generally, relative to the original case, the reduction in AG is
significantly greater than the reduction of µ for the user. This indicates that record frag-
mentation has a positive effect on the overall privacy-utility trade-off. 22-disassociation
renders an absolutely residual AG, as positive AG can only occur for successful re-
identification of rows with more than 2 items, which comprise of a very small fraction
of the disassociated dataset.
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5.6 Conclusions
The fields of PPDM and SDC enable benefits of data mining and statistics while pre-
serving the privacy of individuals whose data is part of the analysed datasets. Work
such as k-Anonymity [Sweeney 2002] and t-Closeness [N. Li, T. Li, and Venkatasubra-
manian 2007] have addressed privacy for databases that contain sensitive information
as well as and other information that can be used to re-identify the user. They focus in
privacy guarantees that stop attackers with auxiliary information to retrieve sensitive
information about users. Another approach is the one of Differential Privacy [Dwork
2006] which lays out a strong mathematical foundation for subsequent data-privacy
work [Dwork 2008].
However, existing work in privacy preserving data publishing for the high-
dimensional case is currently not useful for recommendation scenarios. The proposed
privacy guarantees destroy the benefits that can be harnessed by publishing datasets,
because similar recommendations are possible by simply accessing aggregate data.
However, the user patterns that make personalized recommendations possible may
also provide some degree of privacy protection to those users. Driven by this idea, a
new utility metric is presented, to be used in personalized recommendation scenarios,
as well as a privacy metric, to take the place of a static guarantee. An anonymiza-
tion method that relies on per-record vertical partitioning is also described, inspired
by distributed systems work in pseudonyms, that aims to validate that is possible to
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significantly improve privacy while maintaining personalization capabilities.
Personalized recommendations rely on predicting unknown ratings in a dataset,
using data mining algorithms. Personalization Utility measures how well a database-
algorithm pair adapts to the preferences of individual users. It’s possible to evaluate loss
in Personalization Utility introduced by different sanitization methods, by choosing a
reference prediction algorithm and running sanitized datasets against that algorithm.
The benefit of this metric is that it enables saying whether a sanitization method
is applicable to personalized recommendation scenarios or not. Since personalized
recommendations are a key application of data publishing, this should be a relevant
contribution.
Static privacy guarantees are useful to work with, but ignore the economical aspects
of security related topics. It is beneficial to measure privacy instead of guarantee it for
two key reasons: 1) for some scenarios the utility cost of guaranteeing privacy is simply
too high to be applicable; 2) for some scenarios it may be enough to improve privacy
just to the point that it becomes economically unviable to attack it. Personalized
recommendation scenarios are an example of such cases: current privacy guarantees
render entire datasets as useful as aggregate data and the disclosure of a few movie
ratings is not critical. In order to fill this gap Adversary Gain is proposed, which, based
on some reference re-identification attack, quantifies the adversary reward: in average,
how many new attributes will an attack render.
The presented sanitization method limits the probability of re-identification attack
success independently of the available auxiliary information size. The method per-
forms well regarding both metrics, reducing very significantly Adversary Gain at a
reduced Personalization Utility cost. The method is completely truthful: all values are
unchanged (no generalization or noise), there are no artificial values included in the
result (no synthetic data), and no original value is omitted (no suppression). Instead
it unlinks sets of values that belong to the same record, fragmenting them into several
records based on simple metrics of privacy and utility optimization: separation of rare
occurrences and link preservation of “neighbour” attributes, based on some distance
function. While similar fragmentation methods are employed in related work, some
methods rely in the quasi-identifier assumption [Ghinita, Tao, and Kalnis 2008; T. Li
et al. 2012], and the others aim to achieve privacy guarantees that are too destruc-
tive for personalized recommendations [R. Chen et al. 2011; Manolis Terrovitis, Nikos
Mamoulis, and Kalnis 2008; Manolis Terrovitis, Nikos Mamoulis, Liagouris, et al. 2012;
Zakerzadeh, C. Aggarwal, and Barker 2014].
With this exercise the information-space between personalization and identifica-
tion was explored, using an approach inspired in communications privacy work on
pseudonyms. It is shown that, using this method, privacy can be improved while pro-
viding personalized recommendation services. The database is sanitized it in a way
that greatly reduces adversary benefit, discouraging attacks. The pseudonym mapping
which results from the process can be destroyed or stored in a secure, inaccessible
location, because it isn’t required to perform recommendations. It can also be dis-
tributed among the users’ recommendation clients, enabling the combination of several
estimations belonging to pseudonyms of the same user locally. Directions for future
work include the development of an interactive version of the algorithm, enabling new
ratings to be added to a sanitized dataset.
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Chapter Six
Real Privacy for a Real World
Privacy-enhancing technologies must attend to the particularities and dilemmas of the
real-world. In a world where privacy itself is undergoing discussion and transformation,
it becomes of key importance to identify the issues and forces at play in this process
so that future privacy challenges are catered for. Technological development will both
influence and be influenced by these forces.
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6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Privacy Crossroads
Privacy is currently being addressed in a number of distinct contexts. The data han-
dling practices of enterprises are currently being limited in the EU [Reding 2012], the
surveillance practices of intelligence agencies are being questioned [Macaskill and Dance
2013], the US Congress has recently shown reserves regarding potential privacy issues
raised by announced Google technology [Barton et al. 2013], and privacy impacts from
the generalized use of social networks have been discussed [Hampton et al. 2011]. As
the discussion of these issues progresses, the very concept of privacy is being adapted
to the current times.
In order to propose privacy solutions in future scenarios it is useful analyse the
current privacy dilemmas that society is facing. The nature and implications of each
of these privacy-related discussions are very different. However, they are all related to
technology, and become inter-related from a technological point of view. A decision of
technological nature or impact aimed to address a privacy issue may influence the
outcome of the privacy discussion in other contexts in unclear ways. Technology,
through different bodies of knowledge, is at the centre, inter-connecting all these issues.
6.1.2 Chapter Outline
In this Chapter a multi-disciplinary analysis was conducted on the most relevant pri-
vacy issues. The different issues were analysed in their context of interest, enabling
to better understand how they relate to each other and how they will shape future
privacy. The macro-disciplines considered for analysis were economics (Section 6.2),
law (Section 6.3) and social sciences (Section 6.4). Technological development will
both influence and be influenced by these fields. Within technology, different fields will
also influence and be influenced by each other, and thus a holistic view of privacy in
technology is drawn in Section 6.5.
6.2 Economics of Privacy
6.2.1 An Economic Cause to Privacy Issues
In Section 2.3 a significant number of PETs are mentioned, in order to illustrate the
different fields of work related to privacy. Furthermore, in Chapters 3 and 5 some
of these fields are further explored, presenting ways to preserve or improve privacy
guarantees in different situations. However, only a few work tracks address one of the
current key types of privacy issues, as identified in Sections 2.1.4 and 6.4.1: the use of
personal data for economic benefit.
The direct correspondence between data gathering and revenue has fuelled web-
based companies for the last decade. In 2012 Google declared 43686 million US dollars
of advertising revenue, representing 95% of total revenue [Google Inc. 2013a]. In its
turn, Facebook declared 4279 million dollars of advertising revenue, amounting to 84%
of total revenue [Facebook Inc. 2013]. This clearly illustrates the importance of targeted
advertising in major web companies’ business model.
A darker side of the personal data business is conducted by data brokers such as
Axciom, Experian and Alliance Data. Axciom, the biggest of these companies, aggre-
gates consumer data from multiple sources (e.g. public data available electronically,
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online service registration, questionnaires, magazine subscriptions, . . . ) and stores it
in a consumer database that has approximately 1500 facts about 500 million people
worldwide [Mason 2009]. The facts include:
1. contact information - name, postal address, email and phone number;
2. demographic and socio-economic data - age, income, marital status, children,
education, net worth, occupation, . . .
3. property data - home ownership, length of residence, home value, purchase
amount and date, likely equity;
4. lifestyle - self-reported hobbies, interests and activities;
5. purchase activities - travels booked online, . . .
This data is then used in order to better target advertisement, to the right customers,
using the right marketing channel at the right timing, increasing its return on invest-
ment [Suther 2009].
Beyond helping companies target better their marketing investment, data brokers
are also reported to sell raw data. A cybercrime resource site which sells informa-
tion used for identity theft, superget.info, got its data from a data broker named
CourtVentures which had a consumers data exchange agreement with another data
broker named US Info Search, the original source of the data available through su-
perget.info. CourtVentures was acquired by the data broker Experian in 2012, which
confirmed an ongoing investigation into the matter [Krebs 2013]. This case clarifies
the nature of data-handling practices of data brokers - consumer data is collected,
exchanged, aggregated and sold without regard for data subjects. Also, beyond the
potential privacy harms, it becomes clear that the data broker industry increases indi-
viduals’ exposition to identity theft crimes.
6.2.2 Understanding User Behaviour
Despite personal data being used for the ends described in Section 6.2.1, the number
of social network and mobile application users continues to grow, as does the revenue
of the three key data brokers. Motivated by the seemingly complex and elusive privacy
decisions of individuals, the field of privacy economics aims to understand and quantify
the costs and benefits that data subjects consider when making privacy choices.
Some scientists in this field assume that people have stable privacy preferences
and based on those make well reasoned, coherent privacy trade-off decisions [Acquisti
2009]. These studies view individuals as fully informed and utility maximizing rational
economic agents. However, empirical privacy-related research has identified behaviour
inconsistent with that model. Data subject claim to be concerned about privacy but act
in apparent contradiction with this claim [Acquisti 2004; Acquisti and Grossklags 2005],
in a phenomenon coined the privacy paradox [Norberg, D. R. Horne, and D. A. Horne
2007]. These systematic inconsistencies suggest that richer theories are required to
explain user behaviour. Theories that can accommodate subjects’ struggle with incon-
sistent privacy preferences and frames of judgement, contradictory needs, incomplete
information about risks and consequences, and bounded cognitive abilities [Acquisti
2009].
Alessandro Acquisti, from the Carnegie Mellon University, has been a key researcher
in de-constructing the user rationality assumption by putting forward evidence that
cognitive and behavioural biases highly influence users’ privacy decisions. Depending
on how these decisions are framed or presented, and what comparisons they evoke,
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subject choices will vary greatly for essentially the same privacy trade-off. The identi-
fied biases are similar to the ones identified in the consumer choice domain [Acquisti
2009].
One study with three experiments focused on the presence of privacy-related queues,
conditioning user’s privacy concerns for the same decisions [L. K. John, Acquisti, and
Loewenstein 2009]. The authors concluded that triggering latent privacy concerns with
consent warnings and confidentiality assurances reduced disclosure, while if faced with
a frivolous, playful, context subjects will admit to more questionable behaviour. In
the third experiment sensitive questions were asked point blank or in a covert way,
resulting in significantly more disclosure when the questions were asked covertly.
Another study focused on two consumer choice biases: the endowment effect and
the order of choice presentation [Acquisti, L. John, and Loewenstein 2009]. Both effects
were observed but results were especially conclusive for the endowment effect: subjects
who started from positions of greater privacy protection were five times more likely
than other subjects to forego money to preserve that protection.
The most recent study in this area [Brandimarte, Acquisti, and Loewenstein 2012]
identified what was coined as the control paradox : subject control over the publication
of their private data is inversely related to their privacy concerns and directly to their
willingness to publish sensitive data. Subjects share more and worry less about privacy
when they are in control over the publishing process, suggesting that they mostly
value the publication privacy trade-off, while disregarding privacy threats derived from
posterior data access and use.
6.2.3 Mitigating the Issues
Assuming the set of economic incentives that motivate personal data gathering and use
by companies will not change, it is still possible to mitigate the potential privacy issues
that originate from them. This type of privacy issues has a peculiar characteristic that
is rarely considered in technical work: the actors that control the ICT infrastructure
where the targeted data is stored are themselves are the perpetrators of the privacy
attacks. From the user’s point of view, data is stored in these systems in order for the
user to consume some information or communication service, but according to these
service provider’s privacy policies that data can be used for the company’s economic
benefit.
A technical approach that considers this scenario is P3P, analysed in Section 3.4.2.
The goal of P3P was to communicate to the user, in a practical way, the contents of web
sites’ privacy policies so that the users could make informed choices about accessing
the said web sites. Economically, the privacy practices of web sites, i.e. how they use
data that visitors provide them, can be qualified as a credence good: they cannot be
evaluated by the consumer, not even after consumption (site visit) - i.e. the user doesn’t
know how the data gathered about or supplied by him will be handled after accessing
a web site, and may come back again even if the data is used for purposes he wouldn’t
accept. P3P would transform privacy in the web into a search good: users could easily
compare it with what they consider acceptable levels or privacy even before the site
is visited. However, as already explained in Section 3.4.2, the adoption of P3P hasn’t
been very successful.
This formulation of privacy, considering all systems as a potential source of attack,
is rarely considered in other work. One notable exception is multilateral security,
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which “considers different and possibly conflicting security requirements of different
parties and strives to balance” [Rannenberg 2000]. While security typically focuses on
protection of system owners against external attackers and misbehaving internal users,
protecting external users from operators is not considered a significant issue. The goal
is to balance the competing security requirements of different parties that interact with
the system. This implies considering that all involved parties are potential attackers.
Rannenberg proposes four design strategies for approaching multilateral security:
1. Data Economy: create and transmit as little data as possible (similar to the data
minimization principle [Pfitzmann and Hansen 2010, p. 6]);
2. Careful Allocation: data allocation in a distributed system should be decentral-
ized, in order to make misuse less attractive and to limit the consequences should
it occur, and the party that requires the data security should have the control
over said data
3. User ability to control: if users are faced with a trade-off decision between some
of their goals, they should be able to understand the situation and control the
outcome;
4. Usability of security mechanisms: system should be usable by users at different
stages of interest, understanding, and competence.
While these strategies are interesting, an analysis methodology is not provided in mul-
tilateral security work. A key reason for this is the nature of the formulations: multi-
lateral security and strategies are phrased in terms of requirements - conflicting ones
by different parties, and strategical ones for better overall privacy.
Spiekermann and Cranor recently put forward a set of privacy-by-architecture guide-
lines [Spiekermann and Cranor 2009], more concrete than the multilateral security
strategies. They propose two dimensions of architecture that fundamentally impact
privacy: network centricity and identifiability. Network centricity is the degree to
which a system relies on a infrastructure owned by the network operator or service
provider. More network centricity typically means potentially less privacy for clients,
but also facilitates the use of inexpensive client devices with minimal storage and pro-
cessing capabilities. Identifiability can be defined as the degree to which data can be
directly attributed to an individual. Spiekermann and Cranor define four privacy stages
for identifiability [Spiekermann and Cranor 2009, p. 8]: identified, pseudonymous but
linkable with reasonable effort, pseudonymous and unlinkable with reasonable effort,
and anonymous.
Network centricity in the privacy-by-architecture approach, similarly to multilateral
security, is not measurable. Metrics to analyse the privacy-friendliness of a system
from its network distribution and actor incentives point of view have not yet been
studied, from all the state-of-the-art that was possible to gather. However some metrics
could be given, as it happens with some work in peer-to-peer networks [Buragohain,
Divyakant Agrawal, and Suri 2003] and networks of email anonymizers [Acquisti 2003],
by economics and game theory. This approach was already theorized by Acquisti
[2002] where he suggests that economics can be used to assist in the design process
of mechanisms to solve impasses, or assist the user in deciding what data should be
shared and protected. However, the evidence showing that modelling user behaviour
as a rational agent is a flawed approach, presented in Section 6.2.2, suggests that
modelling a representative utility function requires additional empirical research.
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Privacy-by-architecture by reducing identifiability, on the other hand, is a well
studied and promising approach for mitigating problems caused by economic-driven
data aggregation, while maintaining economic benefit for companies. The use of PPDM
techniques, discussed in Chapter 5, can enable the reduction of identifiability with
reduced functional and economic impact. Specifically, the contribution to PPDM from
this thesis, Record Fragentation, discussed in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, has the potential to
balance the utility of the gathered high-dimensional data with the risk of privacy harms
in case the data is leaked. Datasets resistant to re-identification and with reduced
data value for the purposes identity theft and building personal dossiers, would be
significantly less appealing to badly intentioned parties.
Despite the described approaches it isn’t likely that companies will adopt such
mitigation PETs under the current set of assumptions - the cost of re-architecturing
existing systems is simply too big. Organizations will only increasingly adopt these
technologies if the gain from attracting privacy sensitive costumers, avoiding reputation
damage or meeting regulatory requirements is equivalent to the costs [Rubinstein 2012].
6.2.4 Changing the Game
The business models described in Section 6.2.1 define companies’ incentives towards the
treatment of personal data. The emergence of other, more privacy-friendly, business
models would decisively contribute to better privacy practices by companies. While
this doesn’t happen, service providers will continue to rely in architectures which re-
quire users’ personal data to be transmitted to their infrastructure, instead of opting
for a more client-centric architecture. The network centricity of a service may have
important strategic implications for its business model and position in the value chain
[Spiekermann and Cranor 2009].
As telecommunication operators, that once aggregated all communications services,
in time became dumb pipes, maybe web service providers are to become mere logic
providers. A project that provides tools to do just that is Remote Storage [2013]:
accessing a web page will simply download the application’s presentation and logic code,
maintaining the properties that made the web a success, while data is stored locally.
However, as telecommunication operators are struggling with finding new business
models that provide revenue in a converged communications scenario, also providers
which give their Internet-based services for free have no clear business alternative to
advertising and data licensing.
This key role of personal data in the digital economy is currently well perceived
by legislators in the EU. European Commission Vice-President Viviane Reding, EU
Justice Commissioner, began contextualizing the EU Data Protection reform as follows
[Reding 2012]:
Personal data is, in today’s world, the currency of digital market.
The goals of the EU Data Protection reform aim to improve consumer trust and data
portability among e-commerce and Internet businesses, as well as increase transparency
of the data handling practices of these companies and reduce bureaucratic burden for
them. Transparency of data handling practices may be a key incentive balance change
for a number of companies. The public image or even legal problems of some practices
may turn out to be an effective deterrent for the most intrusive types of personal data
business.
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6.3 Role of Law and Regulation
6.3.1 Regulating the Digital Economy
As introduced in Section 2.1.4, personal data is a key asset in the business model
of most web companies. So far, US politicians opted to leave consumer privacy is-
sues almost entirely to self-regulation, with limited policing by the FTC [Brown and
Marsden 2013, p. 47]. The laisser-faire approach of the FTC to the regulation of the
digital economy has motivated significant criticism [Solove 2004; Harper 2005], pursu-
ing a posteriori a small number of privacy violations, sanctioned with moderate fines
[Brown and Marsden 2013, p. 54]. Furthermore, the absence of regulations for the
format and language of privacy policies resulted in widespread adoption of policies un-
intelligible to common consumers [McDonald and Cranor 2008], forcing them to bear
too much burden in protecting their privacy [Brown and Marsden 2013, p. 53]. The
adoption of more privacy-friendly regulation sin the US has been vigorously fought
by ICT company lobbies. Privacy advocates have influenced media and public dis-
course, and managed to persuade some software companies, namely browser vendors,
to work towards improving privacy protections (e.g. P3P, DNT, . . . ). However, they
are typically focused around one technology or use case, and in terms of legislation of
regulation they haven’t managed victories [Brown and Marsden 2013, p. 62].
The EU Data Protection reform, as mentioned in Section 6.2.4, is anticipated to be
a key influence regarding the future rules of the digital economy. Unlike the minimal
regulation performed by the FTC in the US, European legislation is placing signifi-
cant privacy challenges to Internet companies, which are mostly US-based but need to
follow EU rules in order to offer their services in the old continent. The interaction
between European legislators and these companies has been driving privacy regulation
development over the past few years [Brown and Marsden 2013, p. 48]. The feeling
of key EU politicians, such as Neelie Kroes and Viviane Reding, is that a balance be-
tween business and privacy should be accomplished, in order to avoid a scenario of lost
consumer trust in Internet companies and consequently slower adoption of e-commerce
and other technologies [Kroes 2010; Reding 2012].
In Europe, governments, legislators and regulators, backed by national Constitu-
tional Courts, the European Court of Human Rights, and the European Parliament,
have played key roles in assuring privacy to citizens. Germany in particular has very
privacy-friendly legislation, which shaped most of the EU privacy regulations. How-
ever, despite being more interventionist and having stronger laws for them than the
FTC, EU data protection authorities are usually under-funded and rarely take steps
to widely enforce all the privacy requirements [Brown and Marsden 2013, p. 65].
The EU Data Protection reform aims to establish a digital single market in the EU,
where data protection regulations are the same, and exempting companies from deal-
ing with several national data protection authorities. On behalf of consumer privacy,
it requires companies to provide comprehensible information regarding what data is
gathered and how it is processed, and to obtain consent from the users. Also, data
portability and the right to be forgotten are to be guaranteed. Finally, in case a data
breach occurs, companies are required to report the breach as soon as possible [Reding
2012].
Furthermore, the reform also aims providing clear rules for international data trans-
fers [Reding 2012]. A transfer of data to other countries will be allowed or denied based
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on how privacy-protecting the laws of the destination country are. Consequently, Eu-
rope emerges as a key reference for privacy laws, not only in the academic sense but
also because of the practical benefits of being more directly connected to the digital
single market [Brown and Marsden 2013, p. 64]. In turn, the US, call for consumer
empowerment and dismiss the European way as a bureaucratic and ineffective obsta-
cle to innovation [Brown and Marsden 2013, p. 64]. However, the US-led Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework, which could represent an inter-
national alternative to the European way, failed to be adopted by the countries in the
region [Greenleaf 2012].
As of October 2013, the reform documents, a directive and a regulation, were
approved in the European Parliament Committee in charge of discussing it. While
privacy associations argue the approved documents contain legal loopholes that can
exempt companies from many privacy requirements [La Quadrature du Net 2013],
the approval deadline of the new data protection laws was delayed to 2015 [General
Secretariat of the European Council 2013], following reported digital economy lobbying
headed by the United Kingdom [Fontanella-Khan 2013].
6.3.2 Conflicts with Technology
With recent calls for privacy by politicians, privacy by design has been hailed as a
key enabler of consumer privacy, and as an alternative to overly restrictive legislation
and regulation [European Commission 2010; Reding 2012; Federal Trade Commission
2012]. However, as discussed in Section 6.5.1, the exact meaning of the term remains
to be specified.
Despite these calls, writing legislation in a technology-neutral way, as it usually
happens, makes references to terms like privacy by design and data-minimization hardly
enforceable. As a result, organizations and enterprises have little regulatory incentive
to invest in PETs [Bramhall et al. 2007]. However, during the discussions of the EU
Data Protection reform in the European Parliament Civil Liberties, Justice and Home
Affairs Committee, the distinction between anonymous and pseudonymous data was
proposed by some amendments, which deserved a technical recommendation alerting
to re-identification problems by the European Data Protection Supervisor [European
Data Protection Supervisor 2013]. In case this is a sign that legislators are considering
including objective technical requirements in the law, it could represent a significant
change of relationship between legislation and technology.
If laws increasingly influence the way ICT are developed, privacy will surely benefit.
However, it is important to remember that laws cannot deny the social and technologi-
cal reality. If certain legal requirements are simply not enforceable then the law should
be changed [Langheinrich 2001].
A different type of conflict between technology and law relates to the possible
misuses of PETs. The right to privacy is not an absolute right. In certain cases,
such as properly mandated judicial inquiry, individual’s otherwise private data can
be accessed by investigative authorities. The most fundamental PETs, which protect
and anonymize communications, do not implement such mechanisms. The same PETs
that can be used to more fundamentally protect privacy, such as cryptography and
communication anonymity, can also be used to conduct illegal activities. For example,
a drug-sale website, accessible through anonymizing communications software Tor, was
shut down by US law enforcement recently [Roy 2013]. The investigation that let to the
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site shut down was successful due to operational security mistakes, as the anonymizing
software worked as intended [Tor Project 2013].
6.3.3 Lawfulness and Dangers of Surveillance
The bright side of PETs being ignorant of the law is stressed by the cypherpunk move-
ment, introduced in Section 2.1.3. The Cypherpunk Manifesto [Hughes 1993] argues
that privacy protection cannot be left in the hands of governments, that it must be
individually sought after and achieved by technical means such as cryptography. The
same PETs that are used to run illegal activity online were also used by Wikileaks, and
recently started being adopted by mainstream media, such as Forbes and New Yorker,
to protect sources and whistleblowers [Greenberg 2013].
As if self-justifying their own existence, the use of these PETs enabled exposing
NSA surveillance practices [Greenwald 2013; Miller 2013b], which have dominated me-
dia in the second half of 2013. While some of these practices have been authorized by
the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, there is an ongoing debate regarding
the problems of mass surveillance programs [Macaskill and Dance 2013]. Surveillance
advocates claim that such practices are necessary to effectively fight terrorism, and
have consistently opposed more restrictive privacy legislation. Former intelligence co-
ordinator Sir David Omand wrote that agencies would need blanket access to personal
information that resides in databases, and that the “access to such information, and
in some cases the ability to apply data mining and pattern recognition software to
databases, might well be the key to effective pre-emption in future terrorist cases”
[Brown and Marsden 2013, p. 61].
On the other hand, privacy advocates argue that consumer trust, civil liberties
and democracy itself are under attack. The collection of phone call metadata alone
can reveal significantly about a person’s intimate life, and according to the American
Civil Liberties Union, such information should not be accessible to the government
without good reason [Macaskill and Dance 2013, Section 2]. The absence of a public
debate on surveillance laws and the secret interpretations of the existing ones without
proper democratic control [Macaskill and Dance 2013, Section 5] strengthens the long
existing fears of Orwellian and Kafkaesque scenarios becoming reality (see Section
2.2.5). Finally, in line with the European politicians’ fears regarding public image of
the ICT industry [Kroes 2010; Reding 2012], US congresswoman Zoe Lofgren fears
a consumer backlash on US companies in case they keep being leveraged for mass
surveillance programs [Macaskill and Dance 2013, Section 3].
The absence of clear leadership in the EU regarding collaborations on the field
of intelligence gathering led the US to criticize the European Commission in 2009,
as national data protection authorities regularly make independent public statements
[Brown and Marsden 2013, p. 61]. Recently, following revelations of NSA surveillance
on European Heads of State and Government [Ball 2013], France and Germany stated
interest in seeking bilateral talks with the US before the end of 2013 in order to reach
an understanding on mutual relations in the field intelligence field [General Secretariat
of the European Council 2013].
However, NSA surveillance does not restrict itself to EU leaders, also including mass
surveillance of citizens [Greenwald and Aranda 2013], reportedly aided by European
espionage agencies [Borger 2013]. While the ongoing work on EU Data Protection
reform can make surveillance based on service provider data less effective, as restrictions
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are introduced regarding the physical location of data centres, mass surveillance done
with the collaboration of domestic intelligence remains unaffected. Europe cannot be
a spectator of the US public discussion regarding the limits of intelligence agencies
activity, nor regarding its international intelligence agreements. The potential penalty
for this is continued decrease of citizen trust in governments and increasing adoption
and responsibility for PETs.
6.4 Privacy in the Information Society
6.4.1 Media Understanding of Privacy
In order to better perceive the global understanding of privacy issues by mainstream
media, an analysis to the New York Times news archives was conducted. A total
of 4784 privacy related news articles were considered, ranging from November 1980 to
July 2015. Their year and tags were used to conduct a frequency analysis. The 30 most
common all-time tags are depicted in Table 6.1, along with how frequently they show up
in privacy-related articles. The most common tag, computers and the internet, shows
up associated to privacy news for the first time only in 1999, maintaining after that
a meaningful average frequency of 40%. Another ICT-related tag, computer security,
starts being used in 1995 while telephones and telecommunications has its first use in
1993. The most relevant ICT-related tag before 1995 is data processing (computers),
which shows up consistently (average of 9%) in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, but is
rarely used after 1995. Regarding the nature of privacy issues, the most common tag
is terrorism, which has an especially high average of 20% frequency from 2001 to 2013,
illustrating how much 9/11 influenced the public discussion around privacy.
Table 6.2 shows the top simultaneous tag occurrences, showing correlations between
tags. It’s clearly identifiable the correlation between the tags terrorism, surveillance of
citizens by government and wiretapping and other eavesdropping devices and methods.
A distinct group of tags that emerges in the top occurrences of the tags frequently
accompanying computers and the internet, which include computer security, google inc
Table 6.1: Top 30 tags in privacy-related news articles (1980-2015)
1. computers and the internet 27.52% 16. disclosure of information 5.03%
2. privacy, right of 22.82% 17. bush, george w 4.95%
3. law and legislation 17.43% 18. search and seizure 4.80%
4. terrorism 11.97% 19. editorials 4.72%
5. united states 11.45% 20. supreme court 4.70%
6. surveillance of citizensby government 11.24% 21. google inc 4.66%
7. suits and litigation 9.78% 22. news and news media 4.66%
8.
wiretapping and other
eavesdropping devices
and methods
7.14% 23. national security agency 4.61%
9. computer security 7.00% 24. clinton, bill 4.41%
10. decisions and verdicts 6.43% 25. consumer protection 4.36%
11. ethics 6.25% 26. united states politicsand government 4.28%
12. telephones andtelecommunications 5.95% 27. sex crimes 4.13%
13. new york city 5.43% 28. tests and testing 3.88%
14. medicine and health 5.28% 29. regulation and deregulationof industry 3.78%
15. security and warning systems 5.20% 30. electronic mail 3.67%
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Table 6.2: Top 10 Simultaneous Tag Occurrences in Privacy-Related News Articles
(1980-2015)
1. law and legislation united states 8.44%
2. surveillance of citizens by government terrorism 6.77%
3. computers and the internet computer security 5.72%
4. disclosure of information privacy, right of 5.03%
5. surveillance of citizens by government wiretapping and othereavesdropping devices and methods 4.66%
6. terrorism wiretapping and othereavesdropping devices and methods 4.49%
7. law and legislation privacy, right of 4.32%
8. national security agency surveillance of citizens by government 4.20%
9. computers and the internet law and legislation 4.07%
10. computers and the internet google inc 3.86%
Figure 6.1: Tag relevance over time for New York Times privacy-related articles from
1980 to 2015
and advertising and marketing. This suggests that privacy issues are mainly distin-
guishable in two key classes: government surveillance and company customer profiling.
The tag law and legislation shows up with all the other top tags, meaning that it is a
tag with little distinctive value, as is the tag united states.
Figure 6.1 [Gonçalves 2015] shows the evolution of some popular tags over the years
(tags related to location and people were disregarded), showing clear changes over time
for many topics, while others that exhibit some stabiliy. The tags that show up con-
sistently over time are shown on top. In the 1980s and begining of 1990s, privacy
issues appear significantly related to issues regarding sensitive information (e.g. drug
abuse, AIDS and sex crimes). In the second half of the 1990s technology-related tags
start gaining relevance. The 2000s were deeply marked by terrorism and the Amer-
ican response to it, which involved increased surveillance and aggressive intelligence
gathering. The same period also marks the establishment of ICT as the main privacy
arena. Since 2010, privacy in the Web clearly has the spotlight. The business model
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Figure 6.2: Tag graph for New York Times privacy-related articles from 2009 to 2015
of the Web giants Google and Facebook has raised a number of privacy concerns, as
introduced in Section 2.1.4 and further discussed in Section 3.4.2.
From the types of actors that create privacy issues identified in Chapter 2, indi-
viduals, companies and governments, issues created by individuals are the least visible
in the analysed data. On the other hand, the importance of technology as well as
the two different types of privacy threats that government and companies create, are
clearly represented. Figure 6.2 [Gonçalves 2014] shows a tag graph for the tags in the
articles of 5 recent years, that confirms just that. Size of the nodes indicates number of
occurrences, while distance and thickness of links indicates number of co-occurrences.
It’s clearly identifiable the correlation between the tags national security agency and
surveillance of citizens by government, related to state surveillance. A distinct group
of tags is visible around computers and the internet, ranging from google inc to data
mining and database marketing, the tags most related to the digital economy.
6.4.2 The Role of Social Practice
From the results presented in Section 6.4.1 it’s possible to observe wide public dis-
cussion regarding privacy problems caused by governmental security and intelligence
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agencies and by companies that operate in the digital market. However, privacy abuses
committed by individuals aren’t usually discussed. As introduced in Section 2.2.5, this
type of privacy issues is also enabled by technology. Users may use it to actively seek
private information of others, such as it is feared to happen with Google Glass [Miller
2013a; Streitfeld 2013], or it may mislead users into releasing information in inappro-
priate ways. In a survey where 55% of Internet users said they had taken steps to avoid
being observed online, their adversaries were predominantly hackers, advertisers and
people they personally knew, rather than companies, government or law enforcement
[Rainie et al. 2013]. This shows the relevance of individual privacy for users, despite
its residual media coverage.
As noted in Section 2.2.4, Warren and Brandeis’ privacy legal work from 1890
[1890] was prompted by a technology advance that would enable individuals to take
pictures of others without requiring their permission. Today, similar problems are being
discussed, prompted by the presentation of Google Glass. The US Congress asked for
clarification regarding Google Glass’ potential for privacy infringement of individuals,
namely regarding its ability to record video and audio inconspicuously, and its potential
facial recognition capabilities [Barton et al. 2013]. This type of privacy fears will only
be made worse by the progress of technology, extending natural human ability.
However, social practice has a role to play. There are currently numerous establish-
ments, most commonly casinos and night clubs, which don’t allow the use of photo-
graphic cameras, and the same could happen for wearable devices such as Google Glass
[Streitfeld 2013]. Thad Starner, a key figure on Google’s Project Glass, was quoted by
the New York Times saying that “asocial people will be able to find a way to do asocial
things with this technology, but on average people like to maintain the social contract.”
[Streitfeld 2013]. In a recent article about Glass, Starner [2013] stresses the importance
of microinteractions as devices merge with everyday objects, and places privacy empha-
sis in implementing microinteractions that are transparent to bystanders, encouraging
socially appropriate use.
Already part of reality is the emergence of new social privacy practices and skills
from the use of social networking sites. The user’s understanding of their actions online
is bound to improve with time, leading to more rewarding online experiences with less
privacy-related harms. The Pew Research Center report Teens, Social Media, and
Privacy [Madden et al. 2013] shows data that allows for such optimism: while online
sharing in social networks done by teenagers has increased significantly since 2006, a
majority (57%) of them reports positive experiences, while 17% reporting having felt
scared or uncomfortable and under 8% reporting actual problems due to over-sharing.
These teens also have Facebook friendship networks that largely mirror their offline
networks, report high privacy control ability and actively manage their online image
by editing and deleting content, all re-enforcing the idea that day-to-day individual
exercise of privacy is gradually being transferred to the online world. Teens with large
networks share a wider range of content, but are also more active in profile pruning
and reputation management activities.
Starner believes that interaction design can shape future social practices with
Google Glass. Analogously, existing practices in managing social network image didn’t
emerge randomly. Technology influenced the emergence of these practices, arguably
not always in the best way possible. Lederer et al. [2004], identify a number of cases
where existing social practice is inhibited. Despite the reported confidence in managing
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online image in social networks, a 2011 study shows a significant mismatch between
what Facebook users think they have configured as a privacy settings for their photos,
and their actual privacy settings. In 907 photos only 332 (37%) were configured with
the intended privacy setting, while 443 (49%) were accessible to more Facebook users
than the author intended to [Y. Liu and Gummadi 2011]. The same article suggests
the use of social proximity information derived from social graphs for assisting user
interaction in order to ease privacy setting management. While difficult to get right in
new systems, technological support for existing and emerging social practices is of key
importance for privacy.
6.4.3 Classification of Privacy Conflicts
In Section 6.4.1 governmental agencies and corporations were identified as key privacy
actors from media coverage. These actors have in common that their activities target
large groups of individuals. The scale of such data gathering and processing practices is
only possible with significant amounts of computing resources and technical knowledge.
The individuals potentially harmed by their activities are simply data entries in their
system - the relationship between the data subject and holder is deeply asymmetric.
In Section 6.4.2 privacy issues in inter-personal relations were described. Here the
data subject and data holder have a more symmetric relationship - they maybe even
know each other’s name. In this case, social norm may come into play and effectively
mitigate privacy conflicts, while in the previous, asymmetric, case this is not possible.
The motives for the data flow between subject and holder, and possible privacy harms
that can come from it, also significantly differ depending on which actors are considered.
Table 6.3 groups the privacy conflicts identified throughout the work done in this Thesis
in four main contexts, and synthesizes their common actors, motivations and harms.
The identified harms take as reference Solove’s taxonomy [2006], introduced in Section
2.2.3.
Current State data collection and processing practices create tensions between the
State and the civil society, best captured in Section 6.3.3. While reasonable searches
and seizures w.r.t. individual suspects of a crime are widely accepted, generalized
surveillance may harm the privacy of a society as a whole. This may carry grave con-
sequences to the democratic health of countries, as it enables the State to exert forms
political control on a population - an Orwellian scenario. Another danger enabled from
State-sponsored surveillance is the birth of a Kafkaesque bureaucracy which prosecutes
without humanly justifiable reasons, merely based on data mining outputs. Let us dub
this type of privacy conflicts as surveillance in democracy. While such conflicts have
been common ever since new security practices were adopted to fight terrorism (see
Section 6.4.1), the recently uncovered NSA mass-surveillance practices [Macaskill and
Dance 2013] changed the landscape of such conflicts. While before mostly activists
and whistle-blowers were involved in such issues, now the general population is in-
volved. The data collection and processing practices used by States can be classified
as the following privacy harmful activities [Solove 2006] namely: surveillance, aggrega-
tion, identification and exclusion. Furthermore, such practices can lead to decisional
interference in various ways.
The second type of privacy issues aggregates the ones related to the digital economy
and the value of personal data. A number of corporations rely on consumer or user data
in order to guarantee a revenue stream. These tensions are best captured in Section 6.2.
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The data can be used for business analysis, for marketing purposes, or for classification
and discrimination in access to credit, price of insurance or being hired. However,
users seem unaware of this, as they consistently end up supplying their information to
such corporations [McDonald and Cranor 2010]. Also, if the quantity of data amassed
by companies is large enough, it becomes economically viable for black-hat hackers
to attack such companies, seeking monetary gain out of identity thefts. Also, State-
sponsored surveillance can resort to similar attack methods and also legal methods
to access the user data accumulated by corporations. The list of identifiable privacy
harmful activities [Solove 2006] of this type is long:
• surveillance, as some applications collect data without the user’s knowledge or
consent;
• interrogation, as the access to some service depends on the disclosure or accep-
tance to disclose some data;
• aggregation, as the amount of data collected by most corporations enables them
to profile users with great precision;
• identification, as the amount of data required to profile users usually also identifies
them;
• insecurity, as corporations’ databases, holding so much personal data for so many
users, are high-value targets for black-hat hackers and intelligence agencies;
• secondary use, as some corporations make use of data collected with consent for
other uses than the ones intended by the user, namely to discriminate regarding
access to credit and regarding insurance prices;
• exclusion, as mechanisms for user data access are often not in place;
• disclosure, as some data brokers actually sell user data, namely e-mails and seg-
mentation data, as a product;
• invasion, as some of the data can be used for unsolicited advertising and telemar-
keting.
The third and fourth types aggregate inter-personal privacy issues. Online com-
munication platforms don’t have the offline spatial and temporal barriers - commu-
nications can be accessed months or years after the fact, and they can easily reach
hundreds of people. The difficulties of managing privacy in a world of liquid social con-
texts is explained in Section 2.2.4. It becomes easy for a user harm his own privacy, by
being unable or unwilling to manage appropriately, sharing too much or contextually
inappropriate information. Privacy harmful activities [Solove 2006], enabled by social
networks and other new communication platforms, include disclosure, increased acces-
sibility and exposure, due to the nature of the communication platform. Interrogation
may also be observed, as platform design and sharing norms may induce the user to
disclose more than he actually wants. Finally, if some information is disclosed in the
wrong context, it may unintentionally distort the image of the data subject towards
the new data holders.
The fourth type targets privacy issues relating to the broken barriers of human
perception, in which an individual actively seeks to get information about another, with
the help of technology, for selfish or malicious reasons. In 1890 it was Kodak’s snap
camera (see Section 2.1), today is Google Glass and RFID - technology advances that
can be used to gather information on nearby strangers create new privacy challenges.
Information can be gathered through surveillance, in case the information gathering
methods do not require the collaboration of the data subject, and interrogation, in
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Table 6.3: Contexts of Privacy Conflicts
Context Data Subjects Data Holders Motivations Harms
Surveillance
in
Democracy
Civil
Society
Government
Intelligence Agencies
Police
Law Enforcement
Intelligence Gathering
Counter-Terrorism
Surveillance
Aggregation
Identification
Exclusion
Decision Interference
Digital
Economy
Consumers
and
Users
Tech Companies
Data Brokers
Marketing Companies
Insurance Companies
Credit Companies
Recruitment Companies
Consumer Segmentation
Profiling
Targeted Advertising
Candidate Evaluation
Unsolicited Advertising
Interrogation
Aggregation
Identification
Insecurity
Secondary Use
Exclusion
Disclosure
Invasion
Liquid
Social
Contexts
Over-
Sharing
Individuals
Passive Observers
Communication
Attention-seeking
Personal/Emotional
Interrogation
Disclosure
Increased Accessibility
Exposure
Distortion
Broken
Barriers
of Human
Perception
Passive
Individuals Active Observers
Curiosity
Voyeurism
Personal/Emotional
Surveillance
Interrogation
Exposure
Appropriation
Distortion
Blackmail
Intrusion
case the the data subject is coerced or tricked into disclose information. Regardless the
case, it is likely that intrusion is present in the data gathering moment. Furthermore,
the information can be used in a number of malicious ways, namely for exposure,
appropriation, distortion and blackmail.
6.5 Technologies and Methods for Privacy-friendly Future
Scenarios
6.5.1 Building Privacy-aware Systems
The EU Digital Agenda called for wide application of privacy by design, such that “pri-
vacy and data protection are embedded throughout the entire life cycle of technologies,
from the early design stage to their deployment, use and ultimate disposal” [European
Commission 2010, p. 17]. The term Privacy by design was initially used in academia
by Langheinrich [2001] to designate a set of six principles for guiding privacy-aware
ubiquitous system design. The principles are discussions of the well known FIPs in the
technological setting of ubiquitous computing:
• notice - data collection cannot go unnoticed, especially in future scenarios where
devices used for doing so are practically invisible;
• choice and consent - besides notice, systems that collect data should request
consent for doing so from the user, and a choice of not accepting data collection,
more than “take it or leave it”, should be made available;
• anonymity and pseudonymity - data unlinkable to an individual poses no threat
to privacy, but data itself may identify the individual, as discussed in Chapter 5;
• proximity and locality - build safeguards in embedded devices such that they
only collect information if their owner is present;
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• adequate security - use security safeguards of high resilience for protecting high-
value use cases and easy-to-use safeguards for low-value constrained device use
cases;
• access and recourse - implement mechanisms in data collection and storage tech-
nology that assist legal requirements, such as facilitating privacy policy compli-
ance and detecting violations.
Due to the recent popularization of the term by legislators, the concept was revisited
[Davies and Langheinrich 2013]. Faced with the common disregard for privacy functions
in ICT systems, the idea is to incorporate privacy principles at design time rather than
as an afterthought.
In public policy and law, the term privacy by design has been commonly used to
convey the general idea of building privacy-friendly systems and processes [European
Commission 2010; Cavoukian 2009]. Mentions of the term convey that idea and a
variable set principles, but do not specify concrete design and development practices.
Motivated by this, Gürses, Troncoso, and Diaz [2011] apply privacy principles in the
development process of two projects and attempt to generalize the development activ-
ities that were performed within those projects. The result is a set of five engineering
activities that lead to more privacy-friendly systems:
• Functional Requirements Analysis - vague or implausible requirement descrip-
tions may force engineers into a design that collects more data, so that posterior
changes to system can be accommodated by the design;
• Data Minimization - only the data that is absolutely necessary to fulfil the func-
tionality needs to be analysed and it should be minimized recurring to architec-
tural options and privacy-preserving cryptographic techniques;
• Modelling Attackers, Threats and Risks - once the desired functionality is set-
tled and the data that will be collected is specified, develop models of potential
attackers and analyse the likelihood and impact of the identified threats;
• Multilateral Security Requirements Analysis - find a design in which privacy mea-
sures and other important security objectives, such as integrity and availability,
are accommodated together;
• Implementation and Testing of the Design - implement the solution and test for
potential vulnerabilities.
Several iterations of these activities may be required to achieve a privacy-enabled sys-
tem.
Theses engineering activities are in line with Spiekermann and Cranor’s privacy
architectural guidelines and rely in the concept of multilateral privacy, as discussed
in Section 6.2.3. In fact, additionally to their architectural guidelines, Spiekermann
and Cranor also propose a number of recommendations to implement privacy-sensible
systems that respect FIPs: privacy-by-policy [Spiekermann and Cranor 2009].
With the purpose of helping organizations controlling their systems’ privacy features
and legal compliance, OASIS proposes the Privacy Management Reference Model and
Methodology (PMRM) [Sabo et al. 2012]. PMRM defines a flexible reference model
and a number of practices, enabling privacy by design because of its analytic structure
and operational focus. The considered operational definition of privacy is:
the assured, proper, and consistent collection, processing, sharing, transmis-
sion, minimization, use, retention, and disposition of personal information
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throughout its life cycle, consistent with information protection principles,
policy requirements, regulations, and the preferences of the individual.
Another set of privacy practices directed mainly for enterprises are being pursued
within the ISO/IEC standards body. ISO/IEC 29100:2011 defines an high-level frame-
work for the protection of personally identifiable information in ICT systems and defines
a privacy terminology, a description of actors and roles, and a reference to known pri-
vacy principles and safeguarding requirements. ISO/IEC 29101:2013 defines a privacy
reference architecture to ease the implementation of privacy safeguarding requirements
and to provide guidance for planning, designing and building ICT system architectures
that deal with personal information appropriately [Rannenberg 2011].
6.5.2 Holistic View of ICT Privacy
The broad scope of situations that needs to be considered when privacy is being ad-
dressed can be challenging to identify. Data can be gathered, processed and disclosed
in different technical contexts, and many of these activities are necessary part of the
normal execution of ICT services. However, many of these activities also create po-
tential for privacy problems. In Section 2.2.3 Solove’s taxonomy for privacy harmful
activities is presented, and in Section 6.3.2 these harms were associated with the four
main contexts of privacy conflicts identified in this thesis. In Table 6.4 these contexts
are matched with the identified privacy-relevant bodies of knowledge from Section 2.3.
Below we discuss how the identified bodies of knowledge applies to each type of privacy
issues.
Surveillance can be mitigated by the use of techniques that prevent inteligible data
to be gathered. The use of cryptography is mandatory to protect communications con-
tent, and techniques that enable anonymous communication crucial protection to the
existence of communications between two parties. This is mostly applicable to State-
sponsored surveillance, but can also be applied when protecting from technologically
evolved paparazzi. Cryptography, when applied to user data stored by corporations,
can also mitigate some privacy harms in case a data leak occurs. With homomorphic
encryption, it could further prevent unintended use of data by corporations altogether.
Data-centric and location privacy study the ways privacy can be harmed by the
aggregation of data and identification of individuals. Data-centric privacy is applicable
whenever large quantities of user data is available: in both data economy and surveil-
lance in democracy cases. Location information has specific gathering and processing
techniques which make it worthy of specialized treatment. It is applicable whenever
the data holder is capable of somehow gathering location information, whether it is via
remote mass-surveillance, disclosure via the use of some service, or individualized local
surveillance.
User control of information and behaviour while managing privacy apply mostly
to the cases in which users somehow collaborate with the data gathering process.
User control of information flows studies the ways users can understand and control
information flows in systems, regardless whether they are communication platforms,
social networks or gadgets. The study of the choices of users when interacting of such
systems is similarly applicable to the data economy, liquid social context and broken
barriers of human perception cases. These areas are of key importance because they
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Table 6.4: Applicability of Privacy-related Bodies of Knowledge to Different Types of
Privacy Issues
Surveillance
in Democracy Digital Economy
Liquid
Social Contexts
Broken Barriers of
Human Perception
Cryptography Content surveillance Data-leak risks Not applicable Content surveillance
Anonymous
Communication
Metadata
surveillance Not applicable Not applicable
Metadata
surveillance
Data-centric Privacy Aggregation andidentification
Aggregation and
identification Not applicable Not applicable
Location Privacy Identification andaggregation
Identification and
aggregation Not applicable
Identification and
aggregation
Privacy in
Distributed Systems Authentication
Disclosure and
Accessibility Accessibility
Authentication and
Accessibility
User Control of
Information Flows Not applicable
Disclosure and
second use
Understanding of
sharing contexts
Understanding of
microinteractions
User Behaviour
Regarding Privacy Not applicable
Trade-off data
for service
Trade-off reserve
for attention
Inter-personal
behaviour
may pave the way for new social practices that regulate privacy-related attitudes in
these scenarios.
Privacy in distributed systems has to deal with the identities of the network nodes
and of the users controlling them. This body of knowledge provides a link between
cryptography and control of information. It can be applied in every case as it can
mitigate surveillance, through more secure authentication, as well as data disclosure
and accessibility, through secure and practical authorization.
6.5.3 Challenges of Future Scenarios
With the realization of AmI, as discussed in Section 2.2.5, many types of data will be
collected from everywhere, with great precision. Manual user disclosure will lose it’s
current relevance and will probably be replaced by coarse privacy controls, enabling
or disabling data collection in a specific physical location and time span. Also, the
distribution of data collected by one service to third-party services is bound to become
widespread, as services rely on each other to provide adaptation functionality.
The possible tactics of IdM, classified according to the amount of data external-
ized and the identifiability of said data, are anonymity, secrecy, confidentiality and
transparency [Smith, Dinev, and H. Xu 2011, p. 9]. However, as future scenarios are
considered, characterized by unprecedented data collection and distribution, it’s rea-
sonable to assume that the amount of externalized data will be always high, making a
confidentiality tactic very difficult to achieve in AmI scenarios. Furthermore, without
a scientific breakthrough that enables efficient fully homomorphic encryption, secrecy
is also unlikely to be viable. The key goal for protecting privacy will probably be
anonymity. Also, considering the four natures of data operations - collection, linking,
distribution and aggregation - the most important PETs for the future will be those
countering the linking and aggregation of data.
Despite not being able to protect privacy by themselves in future scenarios, tech-
nologies that aim controlling the capture and distribution of data will still be required,
mostly aiming at data minimization. In order to apply the data minimization principle
123
in a context-awareness scenario a fine-grained access control such as the one proposed in
this thesis (Section 4.5) can be used. However its control and parametrization must be
assisted, due to its complexity drawn from variety of data collected and services avail-
able. Such assistance could be enabled by requiring machine-readable privacy policies
to be published by service providers, similarly to P3P, together with an intelligent user
interaction agent that appropriately communicates the consequences of privacy choices
to users and a coarse manual control.
As it becomes more complex and less effective to micro-control the flow of data,
due to the overwhelming quantity of data in circulation, the logical step to take seems
to be hiding in plain sight. Individuals roam large cities anonymously, as long as they
obey to the social norm. If an individual is behaving inappropriately in a public space,
attention will be drawn upon him. Similarly, in the digital world, if an anonymous user’s
data fits existing patterns or clusters, the user is hidden in the crowd. Increased data
collection and distribution enables the detection of these patterns and clusters. This
information could be used by an IdM mechanism, controlling the linkability between
IOI, to estimate uniqueness and tune the linking control. Under this conjecture, the
PETs that will have a key impact in the future of privacy will be the ones that work
behind the scenes, disrupting data linking and aggregation while requiring little user
interaction. However this disruption must not be so aggressive that it prevents the
vision of AmI and the benefits of data mining, nor so naive that it allows organizations
to discover too much about individuals.
Synergies between the IdM and PPDM fields seem under-explored and present
themselves promising ground for future research towards this vision. A holistic ap-
proach that tackles linkability and aggregation together, addressing simultaneously
distributed systems and data analysis, could be able to deliver an interesting trade-off
between functionality and privacy protection. This approach would also enable resis-
tance against data-level re-identification attacks on lower-level identifiers, as explained
in Section 3.3.6. A key contribution of this thesis, the concept of Record Fragmen-
tation described in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, is a first step in the direction of addressing
privacy simultaneously at both levels. However, the widespread deployment of such
a vision would certainly involve addressing identity as a layer, as explored in Section
3.3.5, instead of as an application-level requirement - the current paradigm.
6.6 Conclusions
The concept of privacy itself undergoing transformation. It has changed significantly
over the last 40 years, especially in the last decade, and will continue to change as the
social and legal debate are faced with new possibilities enabled by technology. The
role of personal data in the digital economy is currently being discussed in the political
and legal arenas, where the benefits of profiling and data mining have to be weighed
against the risks of intrusion [Reding 2012]. At the same time, discussion regarding
intelligence gathering practices was triggered by the publication of documents that
prove the existence of mass surveillance programs at the NSA [Macaskill and Dance
2013].
A type of issues that deserved less media attention, are the ones that new consumer-
grade data gathering technology, such as Google Glass, can create [Miller 2013a; Stre-
itfeld 2013]. This is an area where social practice and human-computer interaction are
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expected to have most impact. As technology enables individuals to gather more data
from their environment and to access remote databases anywhere, the social design of
new tools becomes increasingly important as they should induce the user in socially-
responsible behaviour. If this work is done correctly most people will stick to the
social contract [Starner 2013]. Regarding social networking sites, new social practices
are emerging as users are becoming increasingly able to manage online personal data
and aware of how to work with privacy settings of existing social networks [Madden
et al. 2013].
Proficiency in using these new tools leads users to share more data as they get more
confident [Brandimarte, Acquisti, and Loewenstein 2012]. The web service providers
responsible for these systems take significant care with this as they have economic
incentives to motivate users to share more data using their platforms. However, if
privacy issues motivated from social awkwardness are avoided, issues based on these
companies’ business models emerge. Behavioural advertising profiles users and deliv-
ers targeted adds, representing a market of many Millions of US dollars [Google Inc.
2013a; Facebook Inc. 2013; Twitter Inc. 2013], while data brokers conduct even more
questionable data business [Krebs 2013]. While some architectural work exists that
doesn’t model security and privacy in terms of good guys vs. bad guys [Rannenberg
2000; Spiekermann and Cranor 2009], they lack the analytical tools that in some cases
can be provided by economics and game theory [Buragohain, Divyakant Agrawal, and
Suri 2003; Acquisti 2003], through understanding the incentives of the diverse actors
involved in the system. Despite this, without a real change in the economical incen-
tives, it’s not likely enterprises will invest in significant privacy improvements. Such
a change of incentives could be brought by new regulation or by disruptively different
business models.
From the engineering point of view, methodologies and reference models have re-
cently been proposed to aid building privacy-friendly ICT systems [Sabo et al. 2012;
Rannenberg 2011]. From the scientific point of view, privacy problems are typically
addressed at specific technological contexts, or use cases. Promising work exists in a
number of fields, especially for technological contexts that have limited user interaction.
This most solid work, however, could benefit from more holistic framing. The most
promising ground for progress identified this way is pursuing a joint communications
and data approach to privacy, bringing together the fields of IdM and PPDM, following
the direction of the work presented in Sections 5.4 and 5.5. Also, in order to pursue data
minimization in future scenarios, the work presented in Section 4.5 can be of key im-
portance, together with developments regarding privacy policies for context-awareness
scenarios, learning from P3P and from the human-computer interaction field.
Legislation and regulation have the potential to be effective deterrents regarding
the economic-motivated privacy problems [Reding 2012], however it’s necessary to de-
sign them carefully and with technical knowledge. Laws or regulations that try to
work against society or that impose unreasonable technical requirements, are bound
to cause more problems than solutions [Langheinrich 2001]. Legislation can also be
used to implement democratic control to surveillance practices of intelligence agen-
cies, making an appropriate trade-off between security from terrorism and individual
privacy [Macaskill and Dance 2013]. However, if individual privacy is essential, as it
happens often for political dissidents and activists, technology can offer stronger safe-
guards than law [Hughes 1993]. However, such PETs can be used both for questioning
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the status quo [Greenberg 2013] and for protection of criminal activities [Roy 2013].
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion
Concluding remarks include a summary of results, further research directions and con-
siderations on how to build a more privacy-friendly future.
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7.1 Results and Achievements
7.1.1 Overall Achievements
Throughout this thesis privacy was addressed as the true objective, and not as a
by-product of security as it is often treated. Its essence was discussed in a multi-
disciplinary context and a broad range of bodies of knowledge were considered. After
introducing the concept and framing the work, privacy was analysed and discussed
from the perspective of communications and distributed systems, among which a pro-
totype of an identity layer was implemented as part of the Societies European Project
(Section 3.3.5). Following communications work, context-awareness was discussed as a
key enabler of the AmI vision of future ICT. Previous work in context-awareness was
discussed, and contributions regarding applications (Sections 4.2.3 and 4.3.2), event-
oriented context management (Section 4.3.3) and low-latency access control (Section
4.5) were presented. The last perspective used to analyse privacy in ICT was data-
centric one, where the PPDM and SDC fields are most relevant. Under this perspective
a contribution to the PPDM field, inspired in IdM work, was presented (Sections 5.4
and 5.5).
Finally, a holistic analysis, both socio-economical and technological, was done tar-
geting both the present and near future. The analysis identifies key socio-economic
privacy dilemmas, namely public discussion on government surveillance, the economic
and regulatory incentives to the handling of personal data by enterprises, and the re-
lations between technological development and social practice that shape individual
privacy-related behaviour. The technology landscape is analysed based on data oper-
ations and technical context, and the impact of future data collection and distribution
practices is taken into account to frame future research.
Such an holistic analysis enables not only the identification of impactful topics for
future work, but also establishes relations between work done in different disciplines.
Crafting relations between concepts of different fields such as science and technology,
law, sociology and economy allows for the emergence of more complete and balanced
solutions for privacy issues. Perhaps, most relevantly, legal understanding of technical
constraints and vice-versa is of key importance for the shaping of future privacy.
7.1.2 Towards an Identity Layer
Currently the web implements server authentication as part of HTTPS, using an hierar-
chical PKI, and client authentication as part of the application logic, over HTTPS. This
protocol is used mostly as network eavesdropping protection by web service providers,
although it is also able to handle client authentication, both using certificates and
passwords. However virtually no web service providers use this functionality because
of its accessibility and usability problems. User certificates are not easy to manage, and
make access from multiple devices non-trivial. Otherwise using HTTPS Basic password
authentication involves interacting with browser pop-ups which not convey the ideal
user experience. For these reasons, the awkward separation between authentication
and encryption became widespread.
The nuisances that the web of silos imposes users, namely having to memorize or
save one password per web service provider, started to be addressed with the emergence
of user-centric IdM, as described in Section 3.3.3. However the currently proposed
solutions focus on creating authentication and authorization delegation mechanisms,
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that similarly operate in the application layer, above HTTPS. However, implementing
authentication and authorization as top-level functionality instead of part of an identity
layer prevents addressing identity and privacy issues that emerge both from the network
[Hansen et al. 2004; Matos, Girão, et al. 2007; Matos, Sargento, and Aguiar 2007] and
data [Clauβ, Kesdogan, and Kölsch 2005] perspectives.
The contribution to this area was the conceptualization and implementation of
an identity-enabled communication layer for the Societies European Project [SOCI-
ETIES 2011; Doolin 2013], as described in Section 3.3.5. XMPP was used as a session-
layer protocol where authentication and Identinet [Girão and Sarma 2009] functions
are provided, supporting application-layer control and data on top of it. The client-
server architecture of XMPP not only enables the Identinet by using the servers and
DNS as a resolution mechanism, but also enables servers to act as an anonymizing
TTP for most communications. Furthermore, the benefits of this Identinet and of
a distributed service-oriented ecosystem, which promotes less data aggregation, were
published by Gonçalves and Gomes [2014]. Finally, this work enabled application-level
payloads to be analysed in the user’s device, so that misbehaved applications, sharing
more information that they should, are detected [Vardjan and Porekar 2013].
7.1.3 Enabling Privacy-friendly Context-awareness
Context information can be used for enabling many and adapting virtually every ICT
service. The development of these future use cases is a challenge that needs to be
addressed in different dimensions, from idealizing functionality and business model to
devising the enabler architectural choices. As part of the work presented in this thesis,
two different scenarios which rely in context information to enable their functionality
were proposed in Section 4.2.3: a triggering scenario and a content rating scenario.
The Context-aware Triggering System [Simões et al. 2009] can be an enabler for re-
active services such as geo-targeted advertising, triggering a configurable reaction to
an event, or a standalone application directed to convergent telecommunications op-
erators. The Context-aware Content Rating [Gonçalves, Delahaye, and Lamorte 2010]
scenario enables ranking of multimedia content, both professional and user-generated,
using change-prone context information, instead of static rating information as used by
traditional recommendation systems. The architectural components required for their
implementation following service-oriented principles are described in Section 4.3.2.
However, in order to enable adaptation scenarios for improving human interaction
with systems, the latency limits of end-to-end context delivery are bound by human
perception and reaction times. In order to meet such tight requirements, an event-
driven context management platform was developed [Gomes et al. 2010] which uses
XMPP as the main communication protocol because it transparently provides federa-
tion and PubSub functionality. The platform is described in Section 4.3.3. Similarly
to previous approaches it enables the de-verticalization of context-aware applications,
but it does so in a way that it privileges speed of context update propagation, taking
reactive capabilities to the near real-time level.
As follow-up work, an access control mechanism was devised for the event-driven
platform [Gonçalves, Gomes, and Aguiar 2012], extending the existing architecture, as
described in Section 4.5. The resulting system complies with the real-time constraints of
event-driven context management, adding approximately 20ms to a process that must
take under 190ms. This access control scheme supports complex decisions based on
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both context value and metadata, such as time and type, in an extensible setting. The
access control policies are enforced at subscription time, and the context distribution
resources are re-configured as the policies change, leaving only quick validations to be
performed on context update.
7.1.4 A Different Approach to Privacy-preserving Data Mining
Personal information aggregated in datasets can represent serious privacy threats,
namely re-identification and sensitive attribute disclosure, if not appropriately pro-
tected. For this reason there are a number of techniques studied in the PPDM and
SDC fields that aim protecting against such threats while preserving the dataset util-
ity for the purposes it was originally aggregated. However, in the high-dimensional
case, the number of attributes in the dataset is so high that all records are very dis-
tinguishable, making them especially vulnerable to re-identification. The application
of existing methods to protect against re-identification in the high-dimensional case
would render the dataset practically useless.
An achievement of the work done in the scope of this thesis is the exploration of
a method for high-dimensional datasets that preserves utility for the key data mining
workloads applied to this kind of datasets.This method, inspired in IdM work and
described in Section 5.4, protects against re-identification vulnerability and impact by
using pseudonym-style data partitioning, fragmenting each record - set of attribute
values referring to the same user - in several disjoint records. The method was applied
to two well known movie recommendation datasets, Netflix and Movielens, and the
impact in utility and re-identification success and impact was evaluated. The results,
detailed in Section 5.5, show that a limit to re-identification success rate is imposed,
and that the attack pay-off is greatly reduced, while introducing acceptable error in
data mining predictions.
7.2 Future Work
7.2.1 Communications and Data Perspectives Towards a
Privacy-enhancing Identity Layer
As described in Section 6.5.3, the overwhelming increase of data flows foreseen for future
scenarios makes it increasingly interesting to focus in anonymity, to take a privacy
approach of hiding individuals in the crowd. A holistic approach that draws on existing
aggregated information to estimate how distinguishable is a digital partial identity, and
accordingly adjust the linkabilility decisions for that digital partial identity. The trade-
off between functionality and privacy could be better estimated due to the metrics
provided by the aggregated information. Such an approach could resist data-level
re-identification attacks by adapting the concept of Record Fragmentation, described
in Sections 5.4 and 7.1.4, to live use. The resistance to data-level re-identification,
that can be provided by the field of PPDM to the field of IdM, is essential for future
scenarios.
This would involve the development of new PPDM work in two foreseeable direc-
tions. First in a theoretical direction, working in a solid mathematical model, similar
to the work by Chawla et al. [2005] and Dwork [2011], that can model re-identification
in multiple partial identity cases. Second, a more practical direction that involves
more empirical experimentation of existing PPDM work such as condensation [C. C.
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Aggarwal and Yu 2004]. However, there are data characteristics that are not captured
by current work in PPDM. The quasi-identifier assumption hides the problem of un-
derstanding how identifying is some type and values of data. However, in a scenario
where data is permanently collected from multiple sources, it may be possible to draw
statistical characteristics from the data of a specific type that can help quantify how
distinguishable it is, both in general and regarding specific ranges of values. Not only
individual values are relevant, but also the variation of values in time, as it happens
with location privacy analysis described in Section 2.3.5. Despite being dense work,
this type of data characterization, significantly drawing from information theory, would
help to further build the necessary knowledge for extending current PPDM generic ap-
proaches.
On the IdM side, only an identity layer built in between transport and application
layers, like the one idealized in Section 7.1.2, is able to conveniently control linkability.
Besides enabling useful network abstractions, it enables that data flows controlled by
applications in the context of a partial identity to be audited by the client-side identity-
layer component, such as done by Vardjan and Porekar [2013]. Knowing what data
flows in what identity context to what remote entities is key to estimate how linkable
are the different partial identities of an individual, based on the discussed PPDM
work. Furthermore, threats to linkability coming from the network would only have
to be addressed with respect to this layer, not requiring a complete vertical approach,
including application layer, such as the one proposed by Matos, Girão, et al. [2007]
and Matos, Sargento, and Aguiar [2007].
7.2.2 Data Minimization in Context-awareness Scenarios
While the results presented in Section 7.1.3 are readily applicable, the path to data
minimization in context-aware systems, as described in Section 6.5.3, is still long. The
control of the access control system described in Section 4.5 in a scenario with numerous
CxP and CxC available, requires assistance from other techniques. One possible way
is to require the CxC to publish machine-readable privacy policies, not only describing
their internal practices as it happens with P3P, but also with measures of the required
QoC for the adaptation or activation of the associated service. Making privacy a search
good (see Section 6.2.3) could foster competition among CxC towards requiring less
precise context information while delivering equivalent functionality.
Also, existing QoC work and context obfuscation techniques could be greatly en-
riched with contributions from data-centric bodies of knowledge. Context obfusca-
tion, for example, is typically done through a form of generalization used PPDM, and
it would certainly benefit from insights gathered in that field. Finally, some work
from the field of human-computer interaction, such as an intelligent user interface
that non-intrusively obtains the user privacy preferences based on his usual choices,
as suggested for example by Papadopoulou et al. [2008]. The interaction design for
context-awareness control should consider the guidelines laid out by Lederer et al.
[2004], namely including a coarse manual control.
7.2.3 Economics and Game Theory for Multilateral Architectures
The concept of network centricity, discussed in Section 6.2.3, conveys the degree to
which a system relies on a infrastructure owned by the network operator or service
provider. More network centricity generally means less data control for users. The
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concept depicts a key architectural trade-off between functionality and data which must
be on the provider side and which can remain on the consumer device. This concept
can be seen as a specialization of the multilateral principle of “Careful Allocation”
[Rannenberg 2000, p. 10] for the currently widespread client-server model: since the
user is the party requiring security for his personal data, he should have the control
over said data. However, in the development of systems, this principle has to be
balanced with a number of other requirements which are usually more important from
the provider’s point of view.
The independent, multilateral, analysis of architectures is a barely explored field.
The study of the incentives of actors under a specific architecture has been rarely
done, and the few existing cases have focused in peer-to-peer scenarios. Buragohain,
Divyakant Agrawal, and Suri [2003] used the game theory notion of Nash Equilibrium
to analyse the strategic choices done by the peers of a peer-to-peer file sharing system,
and use a differential service incentive scheme in order to attempt raising the overall
availability of the system. In a privacy-related application, Acquisti [2003] explores
the incentives of actors to participate as senders and nodes in mix-net communication
anonymizers. These instruments of economic analysis could be useful for evaluating ar-
chitectures based on multilateral principles, especially hybrid ones which are not purely
peer-to-peer nor client-server, or those that would normally require the involvement of
a TTP.
7.3 Recommendations for a Privacy-aware World
7.3.1 Re-defining the Digital Economy
The digital economy, with personal data as its currency [Reding 2012], is currently
being discussed in the political and legal arenas. The EU Data Protection reform
bids to understand both consumers and businesses perspectives. Consumers have to
weigh the benefits of data mining against the risks of intrusion , while innovative ICT
businesses have to generate revenue while respecting regulations and consumer trust
[Reding 2012]. The digital economy, described in Section 2.1.4, uses personal data
in numerous marketing-related business models, from targeted advertising to direct
marketing based on consumer segmentation.
The directive and regulation being discussed in the EU as part of the Data Protec-
tion reform is expected to place significantly tighter restrictions in business operations
than its US counterpart, a laisser-faire approach enforcing the FIPs from the FTC.
Despite this, and despite significant resistance and lobbying against the tightening of
Data Protection in the EU [Fontanella-Khan 2013], privacy advocates continue ask-
ing for stronger privacy protection from this legislative effort [La Quadrature du Net
2013], as discussed in Section 6.3.1. EU politicians will have to balance the interest of
European consumers and their single market with the economical prosperity of an ICT
sector which is currently dominated by companies based in the US. As a key goal of
the EU is to strengthen the European Internet-based businesses the Data Protection
reform may create an opportunity for European competitors to conquer some user-base
to their American counterparts.
Regardless of the balance found by politicians, data protection laws will only be
effective if they are tech-savvy. As discussed in Section 6.3.2, technology cannot be
ignored by legislation under the risk of being ignored back. If efforts such as the work
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by Gürses, Troncoso, and Diaz [2011], and this very thesis, fail to mediate understand-
ing between the two domains, whatever law that is passed will have little impact for
two key reasons. First, because in the absence concrete technical requirements, orga-
nizations and enterprises have little regulatory incentive to invest in PETs [Bramhall
et al. 2007], otherwise turning their investment to their legal departments. Second, be-
cause the legislation requirements may be out of phase with technical reality, imposing
restrictions which are too costly or even impossible to enforce [Langheinrich 2001].
Data-centric privacy-preserving techniques, such as the ones discussed in Chapter
5, can significantly help reducing the privacy risks associated with data aggregation.
As data becomes less usable for other purposes than the intended, it will also be less
appealing to be attacked by hackers, disgruntled employees or the company itself, in a
future situation of financial problems. As the uses of personal data should be known at
data collection time, the anonymization method presented in this thesis (see Sections
5.4 and 5.5) is a possible candidate to such risk reduction procedures.
However, as discussed in Section 6.2.4, only the emergence of alternative business
models that do not require personal data have the potential to drastically change the
landscape for privacy in ICT. As telecommunication operators, that once aggregated
all communications services, in time became dumb pipes, maybe web service providers
are to eventually become mere logic providers that get their revenue by crowdfunding.
7.3.2 Surveillance and Democracy
As shown in the results presented in Section 6.4.1, governmental security and intelli-
gence agency surveillance practices started being commonly discussed in the US media
as a privacy issue since the 2000s, prompted by the security programmes designed
by the Bush administration to fight terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. Recently
the NSA mass surveillance practices became publicly known [Greenwald 2013; Miller
2013b; Macaskill and Dance 2013], dominating media attention thereon, as discussed
in Section 6.3.3.
Mass surveillance of citizens by government aims to detect possible terrorist activity
patterns through data mining and enacting pre-emptive measures to thwart the efforts
of these supposed terrorists [Brown and Marsden 2013, p. 61]. This current vision
of intelligence agencies is dangerously close to Kafka’s conceptions from Der Prozess,
presented in Section 2.2.5, where individuals are prosecuted by an uncountable bureau-
cratic organism which does not clearly state the crimes the individuals have to answer
for.
Intelligence agencies require having secret activities but they must be subject to
strict democratic controls. The current surveillance debate in the US, as described in
Section 6.3.3, should be attentively followed by Europe as this is also Europe’s problem:
mass surveillance of European citizens by the NSA [Greenwald and Aranda 2013] was
reportedly done with the help of European intelligence agencies [Borger 2013]. An
internal EU debate has to occur in parallel with the one of the US, that decides on the
necessary democratic safeguards to the surveillance practices of European agencies.
The strongest safeguard against even greater dangers of surveillance, such as Or-
wellian control or political censorship, are PETs that do not require trusting govern-
ments or businesses. These PETs besides also being used to conduct illegal activities, as
discussed in Section 6.3.2, are tools that safeguard essential freedoms. The anonymiz-
ing communications software Tor, which has been recently used to hide the conduction
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of illegal activities [Roy 2013], was before used to bypass the Chinese government In-
ternet control [D. Anderson 2012]. The resilience of these technologies may very well
be the characteristic that makes them be targeted by surveillance advocates but, con-
sidering the proportionality principle, it is not acceptable in democracy to attempt
to criminalize or otherwise disrupt the use of these tools, that assure such essential
freedoms, with the purpose of hindering criminal activity that occurs through them.
It is of up-most importance to preserve their legality and support their development.
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